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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Realistically, no two nuclear proliferating or defensive entities are exactly 
identical; Agent Based Modeling (ABM) is a computational methodology addressing the 
uniqueness of those facilitating or preventing nuclear proliferation. The modular 
Bayesian ABM Nonproliferation Enterprise (BANE) tool has been developed at Texas 
A&M University for nuclear nonproliferation analysis. Entities engaged in nuclear 
proliferation cover a range of activities and fall within proliferating, defensive, and 
neutral agent classes.  
In BANE proliferating agents pursue nuclear weapons, or at least a latent nuclear 
weapons capability. Defensive nonproliferation agents seek to uncover, hinder, reverse, 
or dismantle any proliferation networks they discover. The vast majority of agents are 
neutral agents, of which only a small subset can significantly enable proliferation. 
BANE facilitates intelligent agent actions by employing entropy and mutual information 
for proliferation pathway determinations. Factors including technical success, resource 
expenditures, and detection probabilities are assessed by agents seeking optimal 
proliferation postures. 
Coupling ABM with Bayesian analysis is powerful from an omniscience 
limitation perspective. Bayesian analysis supports linking crucial knowledge and 
technology requirements into relationship networks for each proliferation category. With 
a Bayesian network, gaining information on proliferator actions in one category informs 
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defensive agents where to expend limited counter-proliferation impeding capabilities. 
Correlating incomplete evidence for pattern recognition in BANE using Bayesian 
inference draws upon technical supply side proliferation linkages grounded in physics. 
Potential or current proliferator security, economic trajectory, or other factors modify 
demand drivers for undertaking proliferation. Using Bayesian inference the coupled 
demand and supply proliferation drivers are connected to create feedback interactions. 
Verification and some validation for BANE is performed using scenarios and 
historical case studies. Restrictive export controls, swings in global soft power affinity, 
and past proliferation program assessments for entities ranging from the Soviet Union to 
Iraq demonstrates BANE‟s flexibility and applicability. As a newly developed tool, 
BANE has room for future contributions from computer science, engineering, and social 
scientists. Through BANE the framework exists for detailed nonproliferation expansion 
into broader weapons of mass effect analysis; since, nuclear proliferation is but one 
option for addressing international security concerns. 
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Living with nuclear and dual use technology advancements is a reality, and will 
remain so for the foreseeable future. Evolving global networks of suppliers and 
increasing global technical competence offer new technologies with nuclear proliferation 
applications. Monitoring all legal and illicit trade is overwhelming government 
resources, as well as intergovernmental and non-government organizations (NGOs). 
Justifications for obtaining nuclear weapons remain largely unchanged since 1945, and 
focus primarily on security, economics, and prestige.  
Policy and technical analysts respectively monitor important elements causing and 
enabling nuclear proliferation. However, future intelligence and government decision-
making cycles will require deep and simultaneous integration of policy and technical 
analysis to keep up with modern proliferation efforts. Developing new proliferation 
assessment techniques to leverage modeling and simulation advancements is crucial for 
directing limited counter proliferation resources and political capital. Decision-makers 
with constrained resources should understand a broad range of contingencies stemming 
from their choices. Covering an emerging innovation for nuclear proliferation could be 
rendered infeasible on national sovereignty grounds by major international states. 
Recognizing the interplay of networked technical and policy relationships is important 
for future proliferation assessment tools. 
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To help inform policy decisions, a dynamic counter proliferation tool with the follow 
requirements was developed: 
1. Create a dynamic and iterative computational nuclear proliferation 
methodology using agent based modeling and Bayesian analysis that is 
usable by analysts from a range of technical and policy backgrounds. 
2. Implement information theory and optimization based agent decision making 
to emulate real world proliferation and counter proliferation challenges. 
3. Indicate the interconnected relationship between the social science and 
technical fields for proliferation outcomes. 
4. Consider information entropy and uncertainty impacts for proliferation 
network evolution. 
Contextual awareness of potential proliferation expansions is vital for strengthening 
global nonproliferation. Understanding how social and professional networking, along 
with physics based opportunities and limitations, will aid in determining emerging 
nonproliferation challenges. The United States must be positioned to justify its assertions 
of threats to international partners in a manner at least understandable to other states. 
I.A. History of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Methodologies 
The focus of nuclear nonproliferation tools over the last few decades has been on 
Proliferation Resistance (PR) assessments. PR is that characteristic of a nuclear energy 
system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material, or 
misuse of technology, by States intent on acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.
1
 The quantification of PR for different pathways is important to judge 
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the likelihood that an adversary could successfully surmount challenges particular to 
each pathway.   
Current PR efforts tend to fall primarily within the categories of either “Barrier” 
or “Pathway” analysis systems. “Barrier” PR methodologies emphasize the material, 
technical, knowledge, and resource hurdles associated with overcoming a particular 
pathway, or set of pathways. “Pathway” analysis focuses on the PR associated with 
completing differently arranged proliferation pathways along routes that end with the 
acquisition of a nuclear weapon. 
An overview of “Barrier” and “Pathway” PR methodologies clarifies the 
different assessment trajectories and their relative strengths and weaknesses. An 
interdependent framework could draw upon the strengths of each methodology to cover 
the weakness of the other. The resulting merger would yield a more robust analytical 
nonproliferation tool that can address the real world scenarios decision-makers face. 
I.A.1. Trends in Proliferation Resistance Methodologies: Barrier Approaches 
“Barrier” methods have several strengths that make them attractive PR tools. 
Compared to “Pathway” tools, “Barrier” systems are relatively simple to develop and 
implement due to their lower complexity. Ease of end user operation is another “Barrier” 
method advantage.  
A major weakness of “Barrier” methods is a tendency towards being tuned to 
assess a particular set of pathways for PR analysis. The further a pathway is from the 
major facilities the “Barrier” method was designed to assess, the less reliable its PR 
values become. “Barrier” methods incorporate little intelligence on the part of the 
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proliferator to overcome challenges. For instance, rather than domestically try to 
overcome a technical limitation a proliferator can seek advanced dual use technology 
components from another country. A proliferator can also simultaneously pursue 
multiple proliferation routes. The knowledge overlap thereby lowers the PR for two 
seemingly independent routes. 
The genesis of most modern “Barrier” PR methods is the “Technological 
Opportunities to increase the Proliferation resistance of global civilian nuclear power 
Systems” (TOPS) program.2 TOPS defined a framework consisting of a methodology 
and attributes used to compare the relative PR of full civilian nuclear fuel cycles. A 
further refinement to characterizing nonproliferation PR methodologies was the National 
Nuclear Security Administration‟s (NNSA) Nonproliferation Assessment Methodology 
(NPAM).
3
 The NNSA NPAM provided guidelines for integrated PR attribute and 
scenario approaches which were roughly analogous to early defined “Barrier” and 
“Pathway” methods. 
Later examples of existing “Barrier” methods include the Generation-IV 
International Forum Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) and the 
AREVA-designed Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment 
(SAPRA).
4,5
 The PRPP process can be flexibly employed for an in-depth 
characterization of the barriers associated with proliferating using a particular advanced 
nuclear energy system. SAPRA breaks down proliferation into the following four stages: 
(1) diversion of nuclear material, (2) nuclear material transportation to another site, (3) 
material transformation into weapon applicable form, and (4) material weaponization 
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through physics package creation. The SAPRA form has additional modifiers, such as 
country technology profile to further inform the PR outcome. 
Other “Barrier” methods are the North Carolina State University Fuzzy Logic 
Barrier (FLB) Method and Texas A&M University‟s (TAMU‟s) Proliferation Resistance 
Analysis and Evaluation Tool for Observer Risk (PRAETOR).
6,7
 The FLB method uses 
Fuzzy Logic to assign quantitative weighting values to qualitatively ranked fuel cycle 
attributes. Direct ORIGEN-S coupling is used with the FLB to obtain isotopic data for 
each fuel cycle stage, which is then used in determining the fuel cycle‟s PR. PRAETOR 
is a proliferation resistance barrier assessment tool encompassing multi-attribute utility 
analysis (MAUA) that can employ weighting factors obtained by nuclear technology and 
non-proliferation expert solicitation. Like SAPRA, PRAETOR also breaks the nuclear 
proliferation barriers into the four categories of diversion, transportation, transformation, 
and weaponization. The separation of proliferation into these categories is an attempt to 
incorporate some “Pathways” information into a “Barrier” method. 
I.A.2. Trends in Proliferation Resistance Methodologies: Pathway Approaches 
PR “Pathway” analysis tools take into account the difficulty associated with the 
multiple pathways along a route that could end with nuclear weapons. With “Pathway” 
analysis, the adversary can receive credit for learning and adapting to successes and 
failures at different stages along the proliferation route. Proliferators can make tradeoffs 
in pursuing pathways to favor diversion or latent deterrent values of certain nuclear fuel 
cycle postures. From a predictive standpoint, “Pathway” tools are more realistic since 
proliferators are pursuing a set of objectives as best they see fit. 
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The scenario complexity for “Pathway” system models can prove troublesome to 
implement accurately without being overwhelmed by the details. The multitude of 
potential proliferator options for “Pathway” models also makes their PR results suspect 
unless they can be tested and benchmarked against real world scenarios or simulations. 
From a time and programming standpoint, building a credible “Pathway” tool can also 
be conceptually and resource intensive. 
An example of an early “Pathway” tool, following soon after TOPS, was the 
Risk-Informed Probabilistic Analysis (RIPA) methodology.
8
 RIPA was developed by 
Sandia National Laboratory and employs deductive reasoning in a manner comparable to 
fault tree analysis that predicts proliferator pathway activities in pursuit of a nuclear 
weapon. A major feature of RIPA was calculation of proliferator cost and time to 
accomplish different proliferation objectives.
9
 Brookhaven National Lab (BNL) also 
developed a Markov model for the PRPP evaluation methodology that assesses pathways 
a proliferator might take during a specified scenario. The BNL Markov model includes 
transition, detection, and failure rates between possible pathways. 
A more recent “Pathway” model involves a Bayesian network system initially 
researched and undertaken by Corey Freeman at TAMU and expanded upon by Michael 
Mella.
10,11
 The TAMU Bayesian Pathway model provides an example for how an 
adversary could selectively improve aggregate success probability by intelligently 
sharing information between proliferation routes. However, this analysis requires 
significant pathway and adversary capability information. Without detailed knowledge 
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of adversary proliferation pursuit strategy and progress, model fidelity can become an 
issue. 
I.A.3. Proliferation Resistance Methodology Comparisons 
Overall, “Pathway” methods have significant advantages compared to “Barrier” 
methods regarding real world PR scenario development. However, a series of more 
straight forward “Barrier” methods can play an important role in calibrating “Pathway” 
tools by benchmarking their results. This does not mean that “Barrier” tools will not 
have roles to play for strengthening and assisting with the incorporation of safeguards 
and security systems into nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In that regard, the “Barrier” tools 
hold a major advantage in that they are often well designed to assess individual 
“Pathway” component weaknesses. 
I.A.4. Moving From Static to Dynamic Proliferation Analysis Tools 
Not all nuclear proliferators are the same, and therefore they cannot be modeled 
the same if the expectation is to obtain useful information for policy and technical 
decision makers.
12
 Agent Based Modeling (ABM) provides a computational structure in 
which individuals and organizations can be handled as agents each seeking to achieve a 
specific set of objectives.
13
 An ABM framework allows the granular treatment of each 
unique agent to create a far more realistic encapsulation of how nuclear proliferation 
events occur. Hundreds to thousands or more agents in an ABM system can 
simultaneously interact, with each agent seeking to manipulate the evolving state of 
affairs to suit its goals.
14
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Prestige and relatively differential treatment associated with nuclear weapons 
possession has left some Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) to assert a national 
defense and sovereignty rationale for obtaining nuclear weapons. Furthermore, nuclear 
proliferation does not occur in a complete vacuum. Even the most sanctioned state has at 
least some low-level international connections. ABM provides a computational way to 
consider these, and many other, proliferation challenges.
 
 
Nuclear weapons development is governed by energy, mass, isotopic, and other 
physics defined requirements. Uncertainties exist regarding the exact status of nuclear 
proliferation by an entity. A proliferating entity must reach certain minimum technical 
proficiencies to acquire a nuclear arsenal. Bayesian analysis is suited to handle the active 
information seeking and denial situations surrounding nuclear proliferation efforts. The 
basis of Bayesian analysis is defining a theory, and then using updated information to 
increasingly prove or disprove its existence. A theory on the physics based constraints of 
nuclear proliferation can be modeled and then dictate proliferation scenario pathways. 
Innovative tools are needed to combat global nuclear proliferation threats. In this 
research, a modular Bayesian ABM Nonproliferation Enterprise (BANE) tool was 
developed, implemented, and tested that uses Agent Based Modeling coupled with a 
Bayesian method for assessing proliferation pathway likelihoods. Agent Based Modeling 
offers capabilities for dynamically assessing intelligent and innovative nuclear 
proliferation adversaries and adaptive counter proliferation entities. With Agent Based 
Modeling, individual agent entities possess factors they seek to optimize when 
interacting with other entities. Agents are grouped in three broad categories: neutral, 
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proliferating, and defensive agents. Objectives for considering agent proliferation 
pathways include technical limitations, relative economic cost, time, and difficulty of 
outside detection. 
I.B. Justification of Bayes Theory and ABM from Nuclear Policy Perspective 
Nuclear proliferation represents a nexus of strong policy and technical factors 
that are incredibly interconnected. Creating a framework for nuclear proliferation 
scenarios requires balancing between the proliferator‟s demands for nuclear weapons 
and the rate it can supply them, if possible. Demand-side nuclear proliferation drivers of 
rivalry, alliance, regime type, openness, and liberalization are perceived differently for 
each proliferating entity.
15,16
 Supply-side nuclear proliferation drivers include sensitive 
nuclear assistance (SNA) along with domestic nuclear and associated knowledge, 
technology, resources, and industrial capacity.
17
 
A state facing a potentially existential threat to its territory and citizens will 
maximally leverage its national resources, technology, and infrastructure to obtain a 
nuclear weapon. The Manhattan Project is a well-known and well-documented example 
of a multi-nation effort willing to expend significant economic resources to obtain a 
nuclear weapon. The United States was the largest Manhattan Project economic 
contributor and provided primary military oversight. Yet, the demand-driven Manhattan 
Project employed supply side international connections with the United Kingdom Tube 
Alloy nuclear weapon program.
18
 Multi-national contributions to the Manhattan Project 
also came from the wide array of foreign born scientists who overcame critical supply-
side technical hurdles.  
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Depending upon a state‟s leadership, substantial internal or external threats to its 
power could lead to a nuclear weapon posture marshalling similar national resource 
levels. The fanatically insular North Korean government struggled for a long time to try 
and match the technical achievements of the United States despite sixty years of global 
technological progress.
19
 The North Korean Kim family dynasty, and its supporting 
oligarchy, perceives itself as under siege from outside efforts to subvert or overthrow 
it.
20
 Falling back on its “juche” philosophy of self-reliance, the North Korean 
government was willing to subject its people to a harsh standard of living to cut off 
outside contact. However, the North Korean isolation was readily breached for supply 
side nuclear and missile program justifications. An example of North Korea escaping 
international isolation is its exchange of ballistic missile technology with Pakistan for 
gas centrifuge uranium enrichment.
21
 
Beyond indigenous efforts a threatened state can rely on an alliance with an 
outside, nuclear armed state for balancing and deterrence. Whether the alliance alleviates 
some security concerns will impact future nuclear proliferation decisions. The United 
States‟ relationship with its European and Asian allies during the Cold War is an 
example of alliance supported deterrence. Through North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) nuclear sharing the United States lessened Western European state motivations 
for nuclear weapons programs.
22
  
The nuclear armed allied state is also positioned to influence its proliferating ally 
to cease independent proliferation activities as an alliance condition. The South Koreans 
and Taiwanese each attempted to proliferate in the 1960s through the 1980s.
23,24
 Each 
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time the United States pressed the South Korean and Taiwanese national governments to 
roll back their nuclear proliferation. In the end, the alliance and United States extended 
deterrence were more valuable to South Korea and Taiwan than uncertain nuclear 
weapon program progress.
25,26 
According to Matthew Kroenig, from a supply-side focus, SNA takes three 
forms: 1) providing information on nuclear weapon design and construction; 2) 
transferring substantial SNM; and, 3) helping with building and operating facilities to 
obtain highly enriched uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium.
27
 Traditionally, SNA is 
considered a state to state transaction. SNA significantly decreases the resource cost, 
time, and probability of outside detection for a proliferating state. However, Muammar 
Gaddafi‟s Libya obtained SNA from the AQ Khan network without having the domestic 
capability to finish the attainment of nuclear weapons.
28
 The provision of SNA therefore 
does not ensure a state will obtain nuclear weapons.
29
 Furthermore, the Libya example 
demonstrates how counter proliferation activities can link beyond nuclear concerns to 
encompass broader international engagement objectives. Giving up its nuclear weapon 
program, whatever the subsequent repercussions for Gaddafi, was part of a Libyan effort 
to obtain normal international economic ties. 
For a non-state proliferating entity acquiring transferred SNM or undertaking 
Special Nuclear material Theft (SNT) is critical. Outside obtaining an intact nuclear 
weapon, a non-state proliferating entity will be dependent on SNM received from 
another source. A non-state actor willing to sink a preponderant resource share into 
pursuing a nuclear weapon vis-à-vis other attack vectors lacks credibility.
30
 The high 
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hurdles for non-state entity nuclear weapon acquisition make such an investment 
strategy fraught with risks. From a terrorist perspective, attacks can take on a theater 
crucial for sustaining funding and recruitment.
31
 Therefore, a terrorist organization 
almost singularly pursuing nuclear weapons would find itself insolvent in a short 
timeframe. 
The United States DoD outlines the Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(CWMD) threat from a counter proliferation standpoint.
32
 The three DoD CWMD end 
objectives are: 1) no new WMD; 2) no WMD use; and 3) minimization of WMD effects. 
Enhanced intelligent and dynamic mapping of nuclear, and in the future other WMD, 
pathways by BANE covers the first DoD CWD desired end state. Exploring cooperative 
CWMD efforts internationally as defined by DoD is another area BANE is designed to 
address. Assessing CWMD contingencies through BANE proliferation and counter 
proliferation uncertainties handles the DoD goal of understanding possible proliferation 
outcomes. Additional DoD threat and vulnerability assessments can be initiated with the 
input of policy and technical experts to defeat and contain the effects of proliferation. 
Scott Sagan correctly identifies the crucial interplay between nuclear 
proliferation demand and supply drivers.
33
 With BANE, the pressures exerted on a state 
to proliferate influence the different national means to optimally reach the nuclear 
posture suiting the state‟s perceived objectives. BANE needed to consider the interplay 
between proliferating entity demand drivers and subsequent key nuclear supply chain 
access capabilities. Also, the continual counter proliferation action of defensive 
nonproliferation entities is needed for accurate modeling. Major perceived nuclear 
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proliferation technical hurdles encountered can lead to a state seeking SNA, employing 
domestic austerity, pursuing outside balancing alliances, or temporarily curtailing the 
nuclear weapons program. A flexible nuclear proliferation assessment methodology 
handling these and other diverse challenges that cross between demand and supply 
proliferation drivers is possible with BANE. 
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 CHAPTER II 
BANE UNDERLYING THEORY 
 
BANE fundamentally is an eco-system handling discrete agents with diverging 
and evolving proliferation goals and significant variations in the means to achieve them. 
The theory behind BANE has roots in Bayesian analysis, ABM, computational social 
sciences, nuclear engineering, and several other disciplines. BANE uses Bayesian 
analysis to estimate the technical success probability for the proliferator. ABM is 
employed by BANE to encompass the individual and organizational dynamics defining 
and sustaining proliferation. In this chapter, the basic theory of Bayesian analysis and 
ABM is presented. 
II.A. Bayes’ Theory Background 
Bayesian theory has been around for centuries for considering conditional 
probability relationships. Within ABM, Bayesian analysis can aid agents in 
understanding the likelihood that seemingly casual occurrences can predict future events. 
The technical success probability for BANE depends upon Bayesian analysis undertaken 
with the commercial Bayesian software program Netica. Although Netica is modern 
computational software, Bayes‟ Theory has existed in publication since 1763.34 Thomas 
Bayes‟ friend Richard Price published Bayes‟ seminal essay in the Royal Society 
Philosophical Transactions two years after Bayes died.
35
  
An important insight recognized by Price was Bayes‟ mathematical treatise on 
discerning links between observed events and their likely initiating actions.
36
 One way to 
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describe Bayes‟ Theorem is to consider two statistically independent events, A and B. 
Defining the probability of A and B both occurring, P(A∩B), can be done using its 
constituents. This involves A‟s probability of occurring if B has happened, P(A|B); and,  
the probability of B‟s alone or mathematically: 
     |P A B P A B P B   2-1 
The relationship between two events, P(A|B), occurring together may be known, 
along with the likelihood of one event, B, occurring independently. Equation 2-1 
provides a means to consider events A and B happening together, absent information 
about event A happening independently. Similarly, rearranging Equation 2-1 yields an 
expression for P(A|B): 
 
 
 
|
P A B
P A B
P B

  2-2 
With mutually exclusive cases, Equation 2-1 works for A and B in reverse. If B‟s 
occurrence probability given A happening, P(B|A), and A‟s individual occurrence 
probability are known, then:  
     |P B PA AB A P   2-3 
With a simple rearrangement we acquire: 
 
 
 
|
P B
A
A
A
P B
P

  2-4 
By substituting Equation 2-3 into Equation 2-2 the intersection probability is 
found to be:  
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 
   
 
|
|P B A
P A B
B
P A
P
  2-5 
A‟s complement, Ac, consists of all events outside of A including the null set 
(i.e. nothing occurring). The probability of B occurring is equal to the sum of the 
probability of A and B occurring, the probability of just B occurring, and anything else 
happening including the null set. Thus, expanding the Equation 2-5 denominator, P(B), 
yields: 
             | |P B P B P Ac P B P A P B P AcA B A Ac       2-6 
Partitioning the independent variable A into independent variable constituents, 
Ai, produces: 
       | i
i
i i
i
P B P B P BA PA A    2-7 
Substituting Equation 2-7 into Equation 2-5 yields the resulting Bayes‟ Theorem 
for a particular sub-state, Ai, in the multi-state event A: 
 
   
   
|
|
|
i i
j j
i
j
A A
B
A
P B P
A
P B P A
P 

 2-8 
Equation 2-8 is important from a Bayesian inference perspective. Bayesian 
inference uses an existing Bayesian relationship model and new evidence to determine 
updated outcome probabilities.
37
 The biggest prerequisite for effective Bayesian 
inference is possessing some “prior” knowledge and belief surrounding a hypothesis 
before embarking on a statistical study. The “prior” knowledge allows for emerging 
evidence model adjustments to match real world or statistical events. After setting the 
  17   
 
initial Bayesian model, all consequent beliefs taking advantage of new information are 
“posterior” probabilities. 
A major strength of Bayesian inference is incorporating data compilations from 
large databases. Disparate information across a wide array of topics can be collected for 
pattern assessments facilitating future information predictions and probabilities. 
Effective future Bayesian inference evidence updates benefit from a diverse set of 
applicable data sources. Many fields with big data implications including code 
decryption, military planning, economics, and neuroscience historically employ 
Bayesian inference.
38
  
The physics requirements for nuclear proliferation can be captured in a network 
lending itself to Bayesian inference. However, uncertainty exists in the exact path 
options being kept open for nuclear proliferation. Computational tools, such as Netica, 
can leverage Bayes probability theory to support agents using machine learning (ML) 
capabilities to understand the circumstances surrounding their nuclear proliferation 
decision making.
39
 A completely omniscient and omnipotent agent would not require 
ML skills since uncertainty and any resource or outside intervention limitations would 
be irrelevant. No entity within the scope of this thesis is completely omniscient and 
omnipotent, so ML is needed to model individual and human group nuclear proliferation 
choices. 
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II.B. Past Netica Graphical User Interface Basis for Nonproliferation Assessments 
The Graphical User Interface (GUI) and Application Programmer Interface (API) 
are used for defining the BANE agent nuclear proliferation perspectives.
40,41
 The Netica 
Application GUI is essential for BANE creation, updating, and visualization elements.  
II.B.1. Netica Bayesian Network Overview 
The Netica GUI is based upon “network” relationships between parent and 
children nodes. The background for initially creating the Netica GUI nonproliferation 
network comes from Corey Freeman‟s thesis. Changes incorporating increased 
capabilities from the latest version of Netica are included. The theory behind the Netica 
GUI nonproliferation networks is important for understanding how BANE agents make 
technical success decisions.  
For Bayesian models, the usage of nodes provides a model representation of a 
tangible product, process stage, or other event type. Node relationships are arranged 
from specific to general or general to specific. In specific to general models, more 
detailed information nodes govern probability distributions for more general nodes. The 
general to specific model layout is defined by less general nodes dictating the more 
specific node probability distributions. 
Initial Texas A&M work preceding Corey Freeman on Bayesian nuclear 
nonproliferation analysis considered specific to general models. The Texas A&M 
models were built using the Netica GUI which started building a Netica institutional 
knowledge base. Figure 2-1 is a simple example of a Netica node network going from 
the specific to the general.  
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Figure 2-1. Simple Netica GUI parent child Bayesian network. 
 
Probabilities for the parent nodes (A and B) being true or false directly affect the 
child node (C). In the Netica GUI, conditional probabilities and Bayes Theorem define 
the connected node causal linkages. A Netica GUI “truth table” is depicted in Figure 2-2 
for the Figure 2-1 Netica network. Consequently, truth tables govern the resulting Netica 
GUI nodal selection probabilities. 
  
 
 
(Evidence) B
true
false
40.0
60.0
(Outcome Level 1) C
true
false
52.0
48.0
(Evidence) A
true
false
20.0
80.0
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Figure 2-2. Truth table with prior probabilities for Figure 2-1 simple Netica GUI simple 
to general Bayesian network. 
 
The truth table in Figure 2-2 provides a means to understand the conditional 
probability governing node C shown in Figure 2-1. The equation defining the node C 
true probability using state subscript T for true and subscript F for false is:  
             
           
| , | ,
| , | ,
T T T F
F T
T T T T T T F
T F T T F F F F
A B A BP C P C A B P P P C A B P P
P C A B P P P C A B PA B A BP
 
 
 2-9 
Using the numbers for node A and B true and false states to find CT:  
  1.0*0.2*0.4 1.0*0.2*0.6 1.0*0.8*0.4 0*0.8*0.6
0.08 0.12 0.32 0.52
TP C    
   
 2-10 
From a Bayesian perspective using Equation 2-8 the CT is calculated: 
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 
     
     
,
,
,
|
|
|
ii
i
T
j
j
i i i
j j j j
A B A B
A B
A B
P C P P
P C
P C P A P B



 2-11 
In the Equation 2-11 numerator i represents the conditional probability 
relationship for the node of interest. In the Equation 2-11 denominator j represents true 
or false conditions for A and B. Employment of Equation 2-11 for the Bayesian 
relationship calculation results in: 
         
     
     
   
   
 
0.08
1.0*0.2*0.4 1.0*0.2*0.6 1.0*0.4*0.8 0*0.8*0.6
,
,
,
1.0*0.2*0.6 0*0.2*0.6
1.0*0.4*0.8 0*0.4*0.8
0*0
0.12 0.32 0 0.52
, (1.0*0.2*0.4) (
.
0
8*0.6 1.0*
*0.2*0.4)
|
|
|
T
j
j
j
j
j j j j
j j j j
P C
P C P P
where P C P P
A B
A B A B
A B A B

   
  
 
 



 


 0.8*0.6 1.0
 2-12 
The conditional probability relationship in Equation 2-9, and especially 
Equations 2-8 and 2-11, scales easily with Bayesian analysis computer programs like 
Netica. The Bayesian probability for Equation 2-8 readily applies for nodes with more 
parent and child connections. Conditional probabilities linked with Bayesian analysis 
update quickly on Netica networks ranging from three nodes to thousands of nodes. 
The Netica GUI provides a probabilistic equation short-hand alternative to 
writing the probabilities using Equation 2-9. The primary probabilistic equation 
stipulation is all node options must sum to 100 percent inside a truth table. An example 
  22   
 
of a basic Netica GUI truth table probabilistic equation is shown in Figure 2-3 for the 
Netica GUI network from Figure 2-1. 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Using probabilistic equations to fill in simple Netica GUI Parent Child 
Bayesian network truth table. 
 
The equation in Figure 2-3 shows a way to write the Bayesian Equation 2-8 
within Netica. The probability of C being true is contingent upon either A or B being 
true. If A and B are false, then C is false. 
Variable B in Equation 2-8 can be considered an observed event with a “prior” 
probability that allows for a coupled prediction of a “posterior” event probability. A 
more complicated Netica Bayesian situation involves Evidence A through D as parent 
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nodes for the child node Pathway 1. A specific to general Netica GUI Bayesian network 
for the Evidence A through D relationship to Pathway 1 is defined in Figure 2-4. 
Pathway 1, along with Pathways 2 and 3, are in turn the parent nodes for their shared 
child node Likely Pathway. 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Netica GUI Bayesian specific to general network. 
 
Only the “prior” probabilities are depicted in Figure 2-4, since no evidence has 
been assimilated. The initial probability values for Evidence A through D were selected 
to represent a range of evidence information. The methodology for Pathway 1 is based 
on the Bayesian analysis with conditional probabilities from Equations 2-8 and 2-11. 
The truth table prior probabilities for Pathway 1 are listed in the Figure 2-5 table 
graphic. 
 
(Outcome Level 2) Likely Pathway
Pathway 1
Pathway 2
Pathway 3
None
29.3
11.2
15.3
44.2
(Outcome Level 1) Pathway 1
true
false
35.1
65.0
(Evidence) A
true
false
20.0
80.0
(Evidence) B
true
false
40.0
60.0
(Evidence) C
true
false
60.0
40.0
(Evidence) D
true
false
25.0
75.0
(Outcome Level 1) Pathway 3
true
false
20.0
80.0
(Outcome Level 1) Pathway 2
true
false
15.0
85.0
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Figure 2-5. Pathway 1 truth table with prior probabilities for Figure 2-4 Netica GUI 
simple to general Bayesian network. 
 
The Likely Pathway is a second level child of Evidence A through D and a first 
level child to Pathways 1 through 3. The probability values for Pathways 2 and 3 were 
selected for illustration purposes similar to Evidence A through D. The true probability 
for Pathway 1 using the Equation 2-8 methodology shown in Equation 2-12 with the 
Figure 2-5 truth table yields: 
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 
         
         
, , ,
, , ,D
, ,
1
1
35.1
1 ,D
|
|
|
i i i i i i i i
j j j j j j
T
i
i
j
jj j
A B C D
A B C A B C
P Pathway
P Pathway P P P P
P Pathway P P
D
A B C A B C DP P




 2-13 
The truth table prior probabilities for the Likely Pathway are shown in Figure 2-
6. Computing Likely Pathway true probability would use the Figure 2-6 truth table 
similar to the Pathway 1 calculation in Equation 2-15. 
 
 
Figure 2-6. Likely Pathway truth table with prior probabilities for Figure 2-4 Netica GUI 
simple to general Bayesian network. 
 
If additional information later confirms that any of the Evidence nodes A through 
D are true or false, then they can be changed. In Figure 2-7, Evidence nodes A, C, and D 
are set to true. As can be seen, this increases the likelihood of Pathway being true. 
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Figure 2-7. Netica GUI Bayesian specific to general network after evidence addition. 
 
In the specific to general Netica model, parent node changes do not affect other 
parents. The individual pieces of evidence (A, B, C, and D) in Figure 2-4 are 
independent and the truth of one does not change the priors for the others. For complex 
and interconnected Bayesian networks, knowing one piece of evidence might increase 
awareness of other evidence. Therefore, the prior probabilities governing the Bayesian 
network could factor the information linkages not just between children but also other 
parents. 
 Networks organized from the general to the specific create a greater event 
dependence on evidence. This ensures that specific evidence causes changes along the 
network towards the more general outcomes as shown in Figure 2-8.  
 
(Outcome Level 2) Likely Pathway
Pathway 1
Pathway 2
Pathway 3
None
71.0
7.97
10.8
10.2
(Outcome Level 1) Pathway 1
true
false
85.0
15.0
(Evidence) A
true
false
 100
   0
(Evidence) B
true
false
40.0
60.0
(Evidence) C
true
false
 100
   0
(Evidence) D
true
false
 100
   0
(Outcome Level 1) Pathway 3
true
false
20.0
80.0
(Outcome Level 1) Pathway 2
true
false
15.0
85.0
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Figure 2-8. Netica GUI Bayesian general to specific network. 
 
 A major model flaw arises when one specific evidence node is considered as 
true. The true evidence node forces all the other evidence nodes to be true as well. 
Figure 2-9 shows a general to specific network with one piece of evidence having a 
controlling impact. 
  
 
Figure 2-9. Netica GUI Bayesian general to specific network after evidence addition. 
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 To prevent the specific evidence domination exhibited in Figure 2-9 for a general 
to specific network, an inverted node is inserted between the initial parent and children 
nodes. An “inverted” node has the original parent node probability distribution reversed. 
This arrangement forces a parent node to be true when the associated evidence 
probability distribution is zero.  Inverted nodes are thereby superior for handling 
mutually exclusive evidence from priors.  
 The truth table must handle the reality that absolutely true or false evidence is 
unlikely in real world situations leading to node “softening” requirements. “Softening” 
means permitting some ambiguity in proliferation network nodes despite increasingly 
overwhelming certainty amongst related nodes. Accounting for non-absolute statements 
using “softening” better matches the knowledge confidence limitations associated with 
nonproliferation intelligence and evidence. There is a tendency to increase peripheral 
prior impacts due to cumulative Netica network “softening.” The network in Figure 2-9 
is shown in Figure 2-10 with an inverted node. 
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Figure 2-10. Netica GUI Bayesian general to specific inverted network after evidence 
addition. 
 
Changing the inverted nodes into small circles adjacent to the parent nodes 
increased human readability. Thus, in the remainder of this document the inverted nodes 
appear as just small circles. Resources, technical knowledge, infrastructure, and desired 
nuclear arsenal arrangement are proliferator specific characteristics considered with 
inverted nodes attached to each top level general node. The proliferator specific inverted 
nodes inform the entire network regarding the proliferator likelihood of successfully 
obtaining the desired nuclear weapon position. 
II.C. Agent Based Modeling Background and Theory 
The genesis of ABM began before computers existed. In 1928, John von 
Neumann published the first paper on analog game theory covering zero-sum, two 
individual games.
42
 Later von Neumann co-authored the 1944 book, “Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior,” which was the initial work on game theory with 
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multidisciplinary implications.
43
 Many branches of game theory have emerged including 
non-zero sum, simultaneous and sequential, and large population games.  
Handling complex, real world analysis for an important and interconnected issue, 
such as nuclear proliferation, requires going beyond basic game theory. Advanced game 
theory simulations combining sequential (dynamic) and large population games equate 
to modern ABM. Contemporary ABM is a computational field enabling simulated agent 
interactions with other agents and their surroundings that has received significant 
notoriety in the last two decades.
44
 From a computational emergence standpoint, ABM is 
a bottom up approach that can incorporate agents operating rationally to maximize 
perceived benefits while learning to improve adaptive behavior.
14
  
The beginning of ABM can be considered Thomas Schelling‟s 1971 analog work 
on racial segregation using dozens of surrogates representing groups from different 
ethnic backgrounds in proximity.
45
 In 1978, Schelling published “Micromotives and 
Macrobehavior,” with more detailed topics derived from the segregation modeling.46 
The book was a foundation for digital ABM, which could take advantage of growing 
computer processing power for modeling. Schelling‟s work was ground breaking for 
mathematically modeling topics at the individual level such as race, relationships, and 
other social interactions that cause group behavioral preferences. 
The wide spread availability of computer resources from personal devices to 
network clusters to cloud computing suit ABM. Each agent requires rules for triggering 
its own actions and mechanisms guiding interactions with other agents.
47
 Advanced 
ABM systems allow for emergent behavior, whereby compounding single agent choices 
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create group actions and patterns not initially programmed into the agents. Dissection of 
agent defined procedures can sometime uncover the causal relationships that subtly lead 
to emergence after different iteration or agent levels are reached.
48
 Small activity clusters 
can propagate through ABM systems suggesting where key trigger thresholds are 
located. Where possible, unpacking the agent rules triggering emergent behavior can aid 
ABM program developers and users in ascertaining agent real world accuracy. The 
stipulated triggers matter because they can indicate opportunities for decision makers to 
interject policy, resources, technical solutions, or other means to alter individual or 
collective behavior. Often closely associated methods for ABM comprise Complex 
Adaptive System (CAS) and multi-agent systems (MAS).
49
 
The range of fields for interdisciplinary ABM usage include economics, 
transportation preferences, military operations, and recently intelligence. The potential 
for ABM to inform economic policy was pointed out in a 2009 Nature article.
 50
 The 
variable granularity with ABM was noted in Nature. ABM allowed for economic 
modeling of single consumers, to institutions such as banks and Wall Street, to rule 
changing agents such as policy makers and regulators.
51
 The nonlinear actions and 
resulting emergent phenomenon were proposed to better approximate real world 
financial behavior than more simplistic models. 
The Transportation, Analysis, and SIMulation System (TRANSIMS) program 
was an ABM program initiated in the 1990s at Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL).
52
 TRANSIMS was initiated to meet US Department of Transportation 
(USDOT) and other federal agencies‟ missions to ensure dispersal of federal resources 
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benefitted multiple communities. TRANSIMS has now spread to an open source, multi-
core parallelized program that has been used internationally. Through a 2000 LANL and 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) partnership the National Infrastructure Simulation 
and Analysis Center (NISAC) was implemented.
53
 NISAC models critical infrastructure 
management for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in areas such as physical 
or software interdependencies and biological agent dispersion pathways. 
Militarily innovative computational modeling tools from fields such as ABM and 
Operations Research are growing in value.
54
 Department of Defense (DoD) simulation 
development can be exacting and time consuming for major scenario planning. Human 
capital, technical, and financial resource limitations often combine to impede more than 
a few case studies being computationally performed.
55
 The decade long United States 
counter insurgency effort as part of the War on Terror led to Civil Military Affairs 
(CMA) ABM and MAS.
56
 At the strategic deterrence level, ABM has been employed for 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) modeling.
57
 
Beyond military applications, ABM is potentially gaining traction within the 
intelligence field. At George Mason University (GMU) a PhD student wrote a 2012 
dissertation titled, “Agent Based Modeling in Intelligence Analysis.”58 Using ABM for 
grasping how new technologies can alter military, political, or economic power 
structures is important for predicting shifting international alignments. Creating new 
methods for improving intelligence collection utilizing ABM is another frontier that 
might grow in the near future. 
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In the nuclear field, ABM research has been progressing on the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison initiated Cyclus tool and associated codes such as Cycamore.
59
 The 
Cyclus code family is a module based and open source nuclear fuel cycle simulator. The 
physics based mechanics for Cyclus are well defined for high fidelity reactor physics 
based fuel analysis, isotopic generation and tracking, and other nuclear fuel cycle based 
calculations. A major goal of Cyclus has been to create and link modules with widely 
accepted scientific and technical nuclear data codes. Linkable modules can and will 
interface with codes such as ORIGEN and the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation 
Environment (MOOSE). 
Within Cyclus, agents are created with oversight for different fuel cycle facilities 
and the institutions that own the actual facilities. The nuclear facilities can take the form 
of fuel fabrication facilities, various nuclear reactor types, used fuel separation plants, 
geologic repositories, and more. Regions are Cyclus localities, and agents within regions 
have similarities like physical proximity or sharing the same government. Agents in 
Cyclus exchange commodities from mined raw uranium ore to finished enriched 
uranium or mixed oxide fuel (MOX) to spent fuel. 
From a government support standpoint, Cyclus has been selected as the United 
States Department of Energy (DOE) next generation fuel cycle simulator. Cyclus can 
provide information to policy and decision makers across a wide spectrum. A high-level 
policy maker might focus on understanding the implications of an array of new and 
emerging nuclear fuel technologies and fuel cycles. The upper level government official 
might therefore be interested in the impact of current or proposed legislation and 
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executive orders on nuclear industry growth. Stakeholders such as the United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) might instead emphasize material accountancy. 
ABM and similar systems for agent modeling have been steadily growing in 
users, breadth of research areas, and subsequent application. The ability to consider 
individual agent behavior or aggregate to group dynamics is crucial for more than 
cursory studies of complex interactions. Within the nuclear nonproliferation arena 
BANE is a tool that can combine security, economic, political, and other factors for 
assessing future proliferation pathway risks. 
II.D. Agent Based Modeling Elaboration for Nuclear Nonproliferation 
The 2003 Guidelines for Nonproliferation Assessment Methodologies (NPAM) 
report indicated ABM as a potential option for developing next generation proliferation 
assistance capabilities. ABM remains largely unexplored for nonproliferation 
applications. The 2003 NPAM report indicates the importance of this field as follows:  
“The two-sided modeling approaches can potentially provide useful insights 
when proliferation analyses must consider cooperative or disruptive effects of interacting 
human actors. When a fundamental modeling uncertainty is the actions human beings 
might take, and when these actions are critical to the outcome of the scenario under 
investigation, then two-sided approaches (or more generally, n-sided approaches) help 
explore the space of possible outcomes. For ABM in particular, „… a simulation made 
up of agents, objects or entities that behave autonomously. These agents are aware of 
(and interact with) their local environment through simple internal rules for decision-
making, movement, and action.‟”3  
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A historical way to consider ABM is with its more simplistic game theory 
predecessor applied to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC). In the political science 
field, prospect theory is a game theory branch using agent perceptions as decision 
drivers. For an ABM social science system, prospect theory is integral since diverse 
individual and groups of humans reach different conclusions based on their 
backgrounds, expertise, resources, and situational perspectives.
60
 
Using prospect theory for different agent utility theories and action can be tested 
for rationality. The ABM example using a CMC prospect and game theory approach 
draws heavily upon Mark Haas‟s article, “Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.”61 In the CMC, the Soviet Union was challenging the United States in a region 
where the United States had long been ascendant. Therefore, the Soviet Union was 
involved in challenging the existing order. The Soviet Union leadership under Premier 
Nikita Kruschev and the United States Presidential administration of John F. Kennedy 
were defining how such adjustment to the international system would occur. A prospect 
theory relationship indicates when maintaining the status quo is beneficial for a potential 
challenger:
62 
         1c c c cu Q p u T q u M p q u S                2-14 
where uc is the challenger utility, Q represents the status quo from the challenger 
perspective, T stands for the defending entity deterrent assertions, p represents defender 
making threat, M indicates abrupt military actions, q represents the probability of 
immediate military actions, and S stands for the success of challenger altering the status 
quo. 
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From the defending entity standpoint, prospect theory can define when 
countering challengers is prudent. Cases where tolerating the status quo revision is better 
are governed by: 
         1c c c cu Q p u T q u M p q u S                2-15 
where ud is the defender utility, A represents the defender acquiescing to the status quo 
challenge, C stands for the ongoing challenger actions despite defensive entity 
responses, B is challenger submitting to status quo power efforts, and r represents 
probability of continued revisionist activities. 
Against a resolute and stronger than expected defensive entity, a challenging 
agent might elect to discontinue its threats to the status quo. Defining when some form 
of capitulation is the preferred challenger strategy comes from: 
       1c c cu B s u H s u S          2-16 
where H indicates military conflict with the defending entity and s represents the 
“estimated” probability of conflict occurrence. 
In a crisis such as the CMC, agents interacting are more prone to miscalculations 
and succumbing to uncertainty over time. The status quo agent perception for repeated 
challenger attempts readjusting the current system can alter decision selection. For a 
revisionist agent the perception of a temporary advantage or defensive agent distraction 
may lead to more aggressive posturing. Either challenging or defensive agents might 
find themselves with the perception that they are “pot committed” to maintaining their 
position. In those cases, altering course could result in the loss of unrecoverable 
resources or prestige. 
  37   
 
Prospect theory handles agent divergence from expected utility theory behavior 
under different risk spectrum. The potential for a policy decision is based on its 
occurrence probability coupled with a weighting factor to define the value function. 
Thus, prospect theory provides a means to handle policy uncertainties beyond pure 
optimization functions. The compact prospect theory outcome is written: 
   i i
i
V w p v x  2-17 
where V is the expected outcome,  p represents the perceived outcome probability for x, 
w(p) stands for the weighting function probability, and v(x) indicates the value function. 
An important social science consideration in prospect theory is apparent 
regarding loss and gain risk acceptance amongst humans. There is a strong human 
willingness to tolerate risks when evading losses. When assessing gains there is a 
tendency to pursue smaller wins that seem more certain rather than attempt to secure 
larger wins with higher perceived attainment risks.
63
 Equation 2-19 covers the prospect 
theory deviation for gains and losses. The utility function in Figure 2-11 captures the 
convex expectation in the loss regime, and the corresponding concavity for pursuing 
gains.
64
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Figure 2-11. Generalized value function for risk acceptance. 
 
For the convex loss avoidance in Figure 2-11, the entity is more risk seeking 
because the outcomes are perceived to be more beneficial and worth the trade-offs. 
Conversely, an entity in the Figure 2-11 concave gain expectation region would be more 
risk averse. The expected results at higher gain levels are less appealing relative to the 
predicted costs associated with the entity achieving them. Figure 2-11 handles the non-
linearity associated with humans following optimal expected probability theory.
65
 When 
people tend to believe an event is certain they can depart from expected prospect theory 
choices. Thus, over- or under-confident agents will make decisions at odds with reality 
because they are dismissing actual event probabilities. 
Simplifying prospect theory for the intelligent agents involved in the CMC is 
possible by considering metastable situations. An example of meta-Game Theory is 
defined if the Soviet leadership assesses that is can anticipate the reaction of its United 
States counterparts.
66
 In the metagame, the Soviet strategies of maintain (M) and 
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withdraw (W) are augmented by American choices. The expected consideration of 
American confrontation (A) is weighed against the assessed American willingness to 
cooperate (B). The following CMC situations exist from the Soviet perspective using a 
simplified prospect theory: 
1. W/W: choose W irrespective of US decisions (Withdraw unconditionally) 
2. M/M: choose M irrespective of US decisions (Maintain unconditionally) 
3. W/M: choose W if US cooperates, but M if US is confrontational (tit-for-tat) 
4. W/M: choose M if US cooperates, but W if US is confrontational (tat-for-tit) 
Table 2-2 shows the CMC meta-game options defined by the Soviet decision 
options. The options in the prior list for Table 2-2 are for a single situation / game 
selection point. 
 
Table 2-I. Simplified prospect theory for single metagame state 
 
 
In the single state CMC metagame the Soviets have the option for a withdrawal 
based on working with the United States. Running the metagame repeatedly in a 
dynamic fashion helps recreate the Soviet Union and United States CMC leadership 
decision evolution.
67
 With the dynamic metagames, the decision table becomes far more 
complex with each decision opportunity iteration.  
W/W M/M W/M M/W
W Irrespective M Irrespective Tit-for-Tat Tat-for-Tit
B (3,3) (2,4)* (3,3) (2,4)
A (4,2)* (1,1) (1,1) (4,2)*
United States
Soviet Union
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For the CMC case study, over time the gradual tit-for-tat nature of the 
compromise provides greater assurance to both parties of their intentions. The removal 
of uncertainty increases the stability of the third option. Dynamic games with regions of 
metastable cooperation or confrontation using prospect theory for social science 
proliferation decision making provide a sound BANE agent foundation. 
II.E. Advantages of ABM using Bayesian Analysis 
The intersection of ABM and Bayesian analysis has been explored in several 
fields. Simulation research in national and regional planning, economic and industrial 
choice selection, and military applications have included intertwined ABM and Bayesian 
analysis. ABM and Bayesian inference complement each other for improving emulation 
of real world intelligent decision making processes. Literature review of joint ABM and 
Bayesian research indicates ABM benefits for creating a range of diversely endowed and 
motivated actors. The Bayesian aspect brings the agent ability to assess their 
surroundings and relationships with each other to achieve their desired goals. 
An ABM and Bayesian research nexus occurs for studying spatial planning 
regarding rural, village, and urban development. Three researchers from Wageningen 
University (WU) developed an ABM simulation for citizen, farmer, and nature 
conservationists.
68
 The Netica GUI Bayesian program was used by the agents to decide 
and register their cooperation and satisfaction perceptions. The WU ABM scenarios 
demonstrate optimal levels of the agent self-selection aggregation. The impact of 
environmental variations and agent parameters along the lines of satisfaction alter the 
final outcome. 
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Stock markets represent the cumulative beliefs of millions of actors about the 
value of different service, industrial, aerospace, and other types of companies.
69
 The 
Santa Fe Institute (SFI) put together an interdisciplinary team of economists and 
computer scientists to construct the Santa Fe Institute Artificial Stock Market (SFI-
ASM). The SFI-ASM points out different levels of rational agent behavior can be 
augmented through learning methods such as Bayesian analysis. As an economics 
model, the SFI-ASM agent parameters can fluctuate to test different resource movement 
hypotheses. 
A computational framework for the Chinese coal producers and power 
generation industry exists.
70
 Contract negotiations between coal producers and power 
generators is modeled with variations in agent attributes. Employing Bayesian analysis 
reduced agent simulation decision time and improved negotiation efficiency. For one-on-
one negotiations between agents, the ABM system can be approximated via Nash 
bargaining theory. The coal and power producer model thereby correctly shows that for 
small agent numbers simplified game theory models are accurate. However, for large 
agent numbers the more game theory models are overwhelmed vis-à-vis ABM. 
Almost a decade ago an international workshop on, “Defence Applications of 
Multi-Agent Systems,” was held in July 2005 in Utrecht, the Netherlands.71 Ten papers 
on MAS were presented, and one in particular combined ABM and Bayesian belief 
networks (BBNs) for assessing information overload and mission success.
72
 Specifically, 
the article employed BBNs to cover agent critical success factors (CSFs). Analysis of 
CSFs related to areas such as decision uncertainty related to achieving mission goals. 
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Other military applications of combined ABM and Bayesian include irregular 
warfare situations. The usage of ABM meshes well with simulating social science 
relationships including cultural preferences. Bayesian analysis is well suited for irregular 
scenarios where changes in dynamic situations can radically alter the threat environment. 
A United States Army modeling example using ABM and Bayesian analysis emphasizes 
the importance of the civilian populace in conflict zones.
73
 BBNs are used for cognitive 
modules simulating civilian intelligent behavior. 
Dynamic adversary interactions using ABM with Bayesian analysis have also 
been undertaken. The large defense contract BAE Systems created the Commander‟s 
Model Integration and Simulation Toolkit (CMIST) for dynamic ABM scenarios.
74
 
CMIST functions as an integrated development environment (IDE) for assessing 
political, military, social, economic, and information associated with different agents. 
The Bayesian modules are used for advanced intelligent adversarial responses.  Agents 
using Bayesian modules can recognize preferential decisions based on evolving 
situational awareness. 
The literature review indicates Bayesian analysis coupled with ABM shows 
promise for increasing simulation authenticity. In the multi-disciplinary nuclear 
nonproliferation field, social sciences including political science and psychology are 
intertwined with physics defined technology and industry. For instance, nuclear 
proliferation pathway selection has a strong connection basis tying directly into several 
social sciences. Key equipment transfers via espionage, economic considerations, or 
other means outside nuclear programs directly impact nuclear proliferation. External 
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security threats may rapidly induce proliferation demand facilitating substantial new 
proliferator risk acceptance.  
A few knowledgeable scientists reverse engineering or innovating a technology 
can suddenly shift proliferation preferences. Crucial expertise can overcome technical 
hurdles thought to raise a particular pathway‟s difficulty. Modeling nuclear proliferation 
supply-side and demand-side proliferation drivers requires handling many factor 
simultaneously. The employment of Bayesian analysis and ABM in other fields adds 
validity to its successful application for the complex nuclear nonproliferation arena.
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 CHAPTER III 
BANE STRUCTURE AND ARRANGEMENT 
 
An ABM tool using a Bayesian network analysis for estimating the probability of 
nuclear supply side technical success along with demand side proliferation drivers was 
constructed. The presence of defensive and neutral agents within the tool, named BANE, 
allows for simulation of covert nuclear proliferation agendas with and without 
attachment to civilian nuclear programs. The basis of BANE‟s structure is its modular, 
flexible arrangement for handling a wide variety of agents with a diverse set of 
objectives. BANE is designed for users with different background expertise and 
programming levels. A policy analyst using BANE will interface differently with it 
relative to a technical analyst or developer. As a computational proliferation assessment 
eco-system, BANE is built to be upgraded with new modules. Later incorporation of 
technology and policy challenges unknown during BANE development is imperative to 
prevent declining proliferation analysis utility. 
III.A. Outline of BANE Agent Methodology 
The rules governing agent actions are central to a nuclear nonproliferation ABM 
context. Agent operation guidelines should match the motivations and methods pursued 
by those engaged in, and countering, proliferation activities. Entities involved in nuclear 
proliferation cover a range of activities, but can be broken up into three main agent 
classes: (1) proliferating agents, (2) defensive agents, and (3) neutral supplier agents. 
Proliferating agents seek nuclear weapons, or at least a latent nuclear capability. 
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Defensive nonproliferation agents try to uncover, hinder, reverse, or dismantle any 
proliferation networks they discover. Neutral supplier agents represent the broadest class 
and comprise all other types of agents. 
Some of the information on proliferating and defensive agent learning and 
interactions has been previously published in the 2013 Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management (INMM) conference proceedings.
75
 INMM has graciously granted 
permission to reuse this material in other publications, including this dissertation. 
III.A.1. Proliferating Agents 
Proliferating agents select pathways optimizing the likelihood of achieving their 
objective. The proliferating agent class types possess different attribute levels. Factors 
such as resource levels, indigenous technical capability, and nuclear weapon outlook 
affect proliferating agent pathway choices. As with reality, proliferating agents are free 
to make contact with each other and also neutral supplier agents. Through neutral 
suppliers, the proliferating agents can obtain access to dual use technology altering their 
proliferation pathways. Extended outlines for several proliferating agents are included in 
Table 3-I. 
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Table 3-I. BANE proliferating agents types. Reprinted with permission from 75. 
 
 
Realistically, proliferators can establish relationships with other proliferators and 
sympathetic or oblivious neutral supplier agents. Proliferating agents therefore contact 
other proliferating agents and neutral supplier agents, as benefits their interest. 
Depending upon the neutral agent‟s affinity with the proliferator, its cooperation may 
require substantial coercive force, or other inducement measures. If the affinity 
relationships are high enough, then the neutral agent may enthusiastically assist the 
proliferator to the maximum extent possible. Proliferating and neutral supplier agents 
might offer SNA or important dual use technology opening up new proliferation 
pathways for exploitation. 
III.A.2. Defensive Agents 
Defensive agents analyze proliferating agent pathways for pursuing illicit nuclear 
weapons programs. The defensive agent class type capabilities vary significantly for 
Possible 
Proliferating 
Agent Posture
Objectives Capabilities
State Seeking 
Latent   
Deterrence
 - Obtain Nuclear Infrastucture and Capabilities 
Sufficient to Credibly Obtain Nuclear Weapons in 
Short Timeframe                                                                                                        
- Possess Plausible Justification for Nuclear 
Infrastructure
 - Sizeable Economic, Technical, and Political 
Resources from the State                                                                                                                  
- Military and Diplomatic Protection for National and 
International Entities Supporting Nuclear 
Infrastructure Development
State Seeking 
Nuclear Arsenal 
Exceeding 10 
Weapons
 - Covertly Develop Deliverable Nuclear Weapons 
Beyond Threshold of Inviting Preemptive Military 
Strike                                                                                                           
- Prioritize Concealment, Weapon and Delivery 
Reliability, and Program Sustainability Depending 
Upon Adversary Threat Profile
 - Significant Economic, Technical, and Political 
Resources from the State                                                                                                                    
- Shell Companies and Falsification of Economic 
Documentation for Dual Use, Technical, and 
Knowledge Growth
Non-State Actor 
Seeking Nuclear 
Arsenal
 - Acquire Nuclear Material and Capability to Build 
at Least 1 Nuclear Weapon                                                                                                 
- Develop Means to Covertly Deliver Nuclear 
Weapon With Appreciable Nuclear Yield to Target
 - Exploitation of Sympathetic or Potentially 
Persuadable Connections                                                                                                              
- Diffuse and Compartmented Network
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detecting, hindering, and reversing proliferation. Preserving authenticity for defensive 
agents means ensuring they can create and break relationships with each other. Table 3-
II provides a more detailed elaboration for a range of possible defensive agents. 
 
Table 3-II. BANE defensive agents types. Reprinted with permission from 75. 
 
 
For counter proliferation, defensive agents can work individually or in concert to 
constrain neutral agent dual use technology availability. Defensive agents can also 
partner with other defensive or neutral supplier agents to hinder connection opportunities 
enabling rapid proliferation advancements. Defensive agents will have diverging goals 
for what constitutes a proliferation threat and what are the appropriate responses. These 
factors will combine to affect the limits of their cooperation.  
Possible Defensive 
Agents
Objectives Capabilities
International Atomic 
Energy Agency
 - Prevent Misusage of Nuclear Infrastucture 
for Nuclear Weapons Production                                                                     
- Deterrence of Covert Nuclear Weapons 
Production
 - Onsite Inspections of Declared Nuclear 
Facilities                                                                                                    
- Short Notification Inspections of Suspected 
Nuclear Facilities                                                                                                   
- Wide Area Environmental Sampling
Advanced National 
Intelligence Service
 - Determine Pursuit of Nuclear Proliferation                                                                                       
- Setback, Rollback, and Dismantle Nuclear 
Proliferation Networks
 - Cyberwarfare on Critical Nuclear 
Proliferation Infrastructure                                             
- Imagery, Electronic, Human, and Special 
Intelligence Assets
National Government 
Defense Minisitry
 - Ensure Military Disruption and Elimination of 
Critical Nuclear Proliferation Infrastructure                                                
- Removal of potential nuclear delivery 
systems
 - Convetional Army, Navy, and Air Forces 
Platforms                                                                      
- Special Forces Units                                                        
- Cyberwarfare
National Government 
Foreign Minisitry
 - Non-military Resolution of Nuclear 
Proliferation Activities                                                          
- Sustainable Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Verification Regime
- Provide Economic Incentives such as Trade, 
Financing, and Easing of Sanctions
Commerce Ministry 
and Customs Agencies
 - Establishment of Export Control and Dual Use 
Equipment and Technology Regime
 - Strengthened Export Controls
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The means for detecting and then disrupting proliferating agents will differ based 
on the defensive agents. Intelligence collection and interference resources are not 
uniformly distributed; thus, defensive agent strengths and weakness can deviate 
considerably. Variations in defensive agent nonproliferation capabilities cause 
substantial differences in their counter proliferation effectiveness depending upon the 
proliferating agents they confront. 
III.A.3. Neutral Agents 
The global economy consists of billions of individuals, millions of companies, 
thousands of conglomerates and affiliated organizations, and hundreds of national 
governments interacting daily. The majority of individuals and companies are far 
removed from proliferation activities. A fraction of the remaining individuals and 
companies have tangential connections to nuclear knowledge and technology of value to 
proliferators. At a lower level, only a small subset of individuals and companies add 
significant value for nuclear proliferation. 
Neutral agents comprise the widest range of proliferators. Individuals, 
companies, and foreign governments fall within this class. Each neutral agent has 
objectives it seeks to satisfy by engaging in cooperative relationships with other agents. 
If diametrically opposed to a belief, a neutral agent can also undertake adversarial 
interactions to counter perceived threats. A set of generic neutral agents are presented in 
Table 3-III to indicate the broad span of the category. 
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Table 3-III. BANE neutral agents types. Reprinted with permission from 75. 
 
 
Despite the relatively small number of valuable neutral agents for nuclear 
proliferation, they are important enough for proliferating and defensive agents to warrant 
making and maintaining connections. A proliferating state agent possessing a multitude 
of legitimate neutral agent businesses will hold some sway over them. Through 
economic or political persuasion the neutral agents can be coerced into enabling nuclear 
proliferation. The more overt or desperate the proliferator gets, the more compliance 
they may elicit from the indigenous neutral agent. However, the proliferating agent risks 
increased scrutiny through any existing monitoring and connection establishment by the 
defensive agent of the co-opted neutral agent. 
An outside neutral agent energetically supporting a nuclear proliferation program 
can provide dual use technologies or indirect economic and political support. Beyond 
just direct resource transfer, an active neutral supplier may aid in circumventing 
international export controls. Enabling plausible deniability creates a “sum is greater 
than the parts” situation, where the proliferator and outside neutral agent can work more 
Possible Neutral 
Agent Posture
Objectives Capabilities
Foreign National 
Government
 - Support Other Government With Positive 
Relations In Acquiring Nuclear Weapon 
Capabilities                                                                                  
- Complicate the Strategic Calculus of Rival Nation
 - Economic, Technical, and Political Resource 
Support as Determined in the National Interest of 
the State                                                                                                
- Allow Routing of Dual Use Nuclear Equipment 
Through Justifiably Loose Export Controls
Corporation
 - Economic Profits                                                                                            
- National Patriotism                                                                                           
-  Support Proliferator With High Ideological 
Affinity
- International Supplier Network for Export 
Controlled Items                                                                                                                       
- Access to Dual Use Resources                                                                                                  
- Plausible Deniability
Individual or 
Small Group of 
People
 - National Patriotism                                                                               
- Religious, Ethnic, Political, Cultural, Economic 
Affinity
 - Provide Insider at Critical International 
Corporations or Governments                                                                                                                     
- Create Linkages for Proliferation Network 
Expansion
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closely with a decreased risk of direct incrimination. An outside neutral agent might 
prefer passively allowing knowledge and equipment transfers. If a major individual 
neutral agent in a company favors a proliferating agent they can induce the neutral agent 
company to not prevent technology transfers. 
Relationships and influence with neutral agents will vary greatly depending on 
the defensive agent. For instance, the neutral agent individual or company could be 
located in the defensive agent country. In that scenario, the likelihood of affinity ties 
binding the neutral agent to the defensive agent counter proliferation effort is high. The 
neutral agent risk for shutdown, imprisonment, or heavy fines are all mechanisms to 
deter cooperation with proliferating agents. 
When it comes to an outside neutral agent, defensive agents can approach other 
state level defensive agents with jurisdictional authority over the neutral agent. The 
jurisdictional defensive agent may then influence the neutral agent into opposing 
proliferation. The initiating defensive agent goal with that neutral agent is fulfilled in 
such a situation. However, if no defensive agents exist with oversight for the outside 
neutral agent then, the initiating defensive agent can elect to operate unilaterally or 
multilaterally with other willing defensive agents. 
III.B. BANE Modular Configuration Overview 
BANE is configured to uses modules called by the different agent classes when 
interacting dynamically. Several major module groupings are arranged by their BANE 
purpose and functionality: 
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 Netica GUI Interface and Visualization 
 Netica API Parser 
 Structured Query Language Database Storage 
 Optimization Solver Methodologies 
 Affinities and Influence 
 Omniscience and Uncertainties 
The first are the Netica GUI Interface and Visualization modules, which address 
the BANE developer and user requirements for setting up proliferation scenarios. The 
second module set revolves around the Netica API Parser operation. The API Parser 
modules interpret agent requests and then interact with specialized Netica .dne files.  
Third, data storage within BANE is based on Structured Query Language (SQL) 
databases. SQL Server Access and Storage modules direct agent requests within other 
BANE modules to the appropriate SQL databases. Fourth, the Optimization Solver 
modules allow the agents to make decisions balancing technical success, resource 
expenditure, detection probability, and time considerations. 
The fifth set of modules are for affinities and influence. In an ABM framework, 
interactions are determined based on affinities between agents across categories such as 
security concerns and economic opportunities. Influence relates to the change in 
affinities over time, and handles how agents grow closer or more distant. The Affinities 
and Influence modules are therefore interdependent and considered together.  
The sixth module groups is for omniscience and uncertainties. Omniscience 
modules address evidence absences for agents trying to ascertain the actions and 
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postures of other agents. Agents also face uncertainties in predicting their own technical 
progress, effective resource placement, detection thresholds, and action timeliness. The 
Omniscience and Uncertainties modules are linked within BANE for dealing with 
information limitations. 
The modular BANE operational flow is determined by agent requirements for 
intelligent ABM decision making within a Bayesian framework. The required modules 
for internal and external engagement with other agents are accessed as needed. Figure 3-
1 outlines at a high level how BANE operates during a simulation. 
 
 
Figure 3-1. High level BANE operational flow 
 
Prior to starting a BANE simulation, the agent and environment parameters are 
defined. Additional aspects of the Figure 3-1 operational flow will be explained in detail 
BANE Agent and 
Environment Parameters
Initial State Proliferators’ Netica
Bayesian Networks
Proliferating Agent 
Decisions Making
Neutral Agent 
Inquiries
Defensive Agent 
Decisions Making
End State Proliferator and Defensive 
Netica GUI Bayesian Networks
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by the following figures and text. The Netica Bayesian network files for the proliferating 
agents are then modified according to the initial simulation conditions. The proliferating 
agents are the first class to run, and during the process they may reach out to the neutral 
supplying agents. Once the proliferating agent actions are complete the defensive agents 
begin running as shown in Figure 3-1. Like the proliferating agents the defensive agents 
also might interface with the neutral agents. BANE then functions iteratively with the 
proliferating and defensive agents interacting until at least one of the simulation end 
conditions is triggered. 
The BANE functionality of the proliferating and defensive agents is more 
complex than shown in Figure 3-1. The path for each proliferating agent is indicated in 
Figure 3-2. For the defensive agents, Figure 3-3 designates how they use BANE modules 
for selecting choices. 
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Figure 3-2. Proliferating agent decision making flow on a time step basis 
 
During the first iteration of a BANE simulation, the proliferating agents review 
the state of their proliferating networks based on the input conditions specified. Figure 3-
2 outlines how the proliferating agents then progress each time step. The proliferating 
agents next parse through their respective Netica Bayesian .dne files to gather the needed 
data based on their objectives. The heart of proliferating agent technical success pathway 
selection is through entropy analysis, which amounts to assessing the information 
content associated with different options relative to a given preference. After ranking its 
proliferation pathway preferences, the proliferating agents assesses whether they have 
sufficient resources and can risk the associated detection for progressing down a 
preferred proliferation pathway. 
Parse Bayes’ 
Network
Entropy Based Node 
Technical Success 
Selection
Resource and 
Detection Limitation 
Determination
Neutral / Other 
Proliferating Agent 
Affinity Inquiry
Neutral Agent 
Influence Adjustments
Best Technical Success 
Node Selection
Initial Input or 
Defensive Agent
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The proliferating agents then seek out other proliferating agents and also neutral 
agents with positive affinity relationships. The other agents are engaged to determine 
whether they can provide capabilities to advance down the desired proliferation 
pathway. Adjustments to the proliferating agent influence levels are made following the 
other proliferating and neutral agent inquiries. If another proliferating or neutral agens 
can provide a greater probability of technical progress on the preferred proliferation 
pathway, then the proliferating agent makes the connection transaction. When the 
proliferating agent cannot obtain the technical advancement through other agents they 
advance based on their indigenous capabilities within the resource and detection 
constraints permissible.  
 
 
Figure 3-3. Defensive agent decision making flow on a time step basis 
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Once all the proliferating agents have finished, then the defensive agents are 
allowed to run as indicated in Figure 3-3. Defensive agents rely upon their different 
proliferation detection strengths to make them aware of proliferating agents. Once a 
proliferating network is located, the defensive agents input the .dne files for parsing to 
detect and assess proliferation pathway development. Like the proliferating agents, the 
defensive agents use entropy for determining what constitutes technical “success” within 
a proliferation scenario. However, the defensive agent technical success is based on 
hindering, rolling back, or eliminating proliferation networks. Immediate and expected 
future resource limitations are measured by the defensive agent when considering which 
proliferating activities to address. 
Neutral and proliferating agent interactions are important from a counter 
proliferation perspective because outside assistance might rapidly increase proliferating 
agent abilities. The affinity levels of different defensive agents affect their ability to 
ensure neutral agent compliance with nonproliferation regimes. Working together allows 
aligned defensive agents to further spread the nuclear nonproliferation reach.  
Once a defensive agent perceives a particular proliferator has a key pathway 
bottleneck it can proceed independently or elicit assistance from other appropriate 
defensive agents. Defensive agents then attempt to reverse proliferating agent influence 
and affinity levels with potential neutral agent sources of nuclear information, 
equipment, technology, or material. The defensive agent influence and affinity levels are 
then adjusted to reflect time step changes. Afterwards the defensive agent uses its 
indigenous capabilities where it best deems possible to prevent nuclear proliferation. 
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III.B.1. BANE Network Arrangement 
In a Netica GUI Bayesian network, making evidence additions is analogous to 
increasing certainty in proliferator activities. Proliferation network priors facilitate 
understanding how proliferators weigh nuclear weapon acquisition pathways. Netica 
Bayesian networks priors provide insights into proliferator technical choices by 
bounding the benefit range of agent decisions. The priors are a major consideration, as 
new intelligence sources can indicate proliferator progress in a few areas that insinuates 
a shift in the currently expected proliferation pathway. The extrinsic physics governing 
progress along a particular proliferation pathway does not change. Therefore, grounding 
the Netica GUI proliferation network in scientific realities is advantageous. Updates to 
Netica GUI networks are still required as promising innovations that might overcome 
existing proliferation hurdles develop. New proliferation technologies and enhanced 
capabilities, such as in the laser uranium enrichment or pyroprocessing fields, can be 
adaptively considered within an ABM context.   
Expert elicitation from available nonproliferation technical experts can relate the 
contribution of different node components to the total likelihood a node is true. The 
Netica GUI provides its technical success probability using repeated Bayesian analysis 
linkages. Therefore, priors are key for Bayesian nonproliferation analysis in an 
information denied environment. More detail about the setup, building, and modification 
of a Netica GUI nuclear proliferation model is shown in the thesis for Cory Freeman and 
Michael Mella.
10,11
 Figure 3-4 shows the full version of the Freeman-Mella initiated 
Bayesian Netica GUI proliferation network references 10 and 11 articulate.  
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Figure 3-4. Full Netica GUI Bayesian proliferation network 
 
Within BANE, the Bayesian model is broken up into 7 sections. A key objective 
for the BANE sections is to be flexible and allow additional section categories to be 
added in the future. Section 1 in Figure 3-4 is the proliferator specific characteristics 
2 
3 
5 
7 
4 
6 
1 
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associated with resources, technical knowledge, infrastructure, and desired nuclear 
arsenal arrangement. Uranium enrichment comprises section 2 and plutonium 
reprocessing makes up section 3. Processing of transformed special nuclear material 
(SNM) is section 4. Section 5 includes the non-SNM nuclear weapon fabrication, while 
section 6 encompasses the creation of usable SNM weapon pits. The complete nuclear 
weapon arsenal yield, size, delivery, and other aspects are considered in section 7. A 
more detailed view of section 1 is provided in Figure 3-5. 
 
 
Figure 3-5. Bayesian proliferator specific attributes 
 
The traditional nuclear fuel cycle for civilian, and with adjustment military, 
purposes is covered in sections 2 and 3. The front end of the nuclear fuel cycle with 
uranium mining or acquisition is closely associated with section 2. Plutonium 
reprocessing is a part of the nuclear fuel cycle back end. An image of a commercially 
oriented nuclear fuel cycle is shown in Figure 3-6. 
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Figure 3-6. Nuclear fuel cycle with commercial emphasis.
76
 
 
The commercial nuclear fuel cycle in Figure 3-6 undergirds peaceful nuclear 
energy generation. Whether a country needs to domestically possess all the components 
of a nuclear fuel cycle is a major source of international contention. The commercial 
nuclear fuel cycle can be broken up into a front and back end as shown in Figure 3-6. 
Generally, the front end covers uranium mining, milling (refining), conversion, 
enrichment, and fuel fabrication prior to usage in a nuclear power plant. 
Correspondingly, the back end includes spent nuclear fuel separation to recover valuable 
isotopes for future nuclear power generation. 
BANE incorporates the commercial nuclear fuel cycle shown in Figure 3-6 
through its 7 sections. The uranium enrichment portion of the Netica Bayesian network 
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is section 2. In broad terms, section 2 can be broken up into the uranium enrichment 
methods and the associated precursors and post material management requirements. The 
methods for uranium enrichment are shown in Figure 3-7. 
 
 
Figure 3-7. Uranium enrichment methods 
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The uranium enrichment network in Figure 3-7 has several parent and child 
relationship levels. Many uranium enrichment network parents have a large number of 
branching children. The parent success link is a non-uniform mix of “and” and “or” child 
nodes depending upon the necessity of individual or sets of technologies to achieve a 
particular type of uranium enrichment. The uranium management before and after 
enrichment is included in Figure 3-8. 
 
 
Figure 3-8. Uranium enrichment precursors and post material management 
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Creation of uranium based nuclear pits is grouped in Figure 3-8 into section 2. 
Figure 3-8 also covers the potential theft or obtaining of uranium from another entity. 
Plutonium reprocessing makes up section 3; and it predominately spans the back end of 
the fuel cycle in Figure 3-6 after nuclear reactor fuel production.  
For comparison purposes relative to the BANE general to specific network 
methodology, a notional specific to general Netica proliferation network is depicted in 
Figure 3-9. The Figure 3-9 example is for a proliferator seeking reprocessing 
capabilities. Cladding removal precedes spent fuel dissolution, as depicted in Figure 3-9, 
with the subsequent radioactive gas release signature. 
 
 
Figure 3-9. A pre-BANE specific to general reprocessing section with evidence 
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From a counter proliferation standpoint, uncovering a spent fuel diversion and 
clandestine cladding removal capability predisposes a broader covert reprocessing 
program. The detection of significantly elevated noble and radioactive gas via a wide 
area environmental sampling (WAES) system all but confirms the covert reprocessing 
Bayesian inference assertion.
77,78
 An issue with the specific to general network 
arrangement in Figure 3-9 appears for the child node, Dissolved Fuel Elements, 
relationship to its parent nodes, Separate Fuel & Cladding and Reprocessing Release 
Gas. The parent Spent Fuel possession and Cladding Removal Capabilities fail to 
undergo the requisite alteration because Dissolved Fuel Elements is part of a child node 
chain. Realistically, a counter proliferation effort learning through WAES of 
reprocessing gas release should highly suggest reprocessing precursor steps occurred. 
In contrast, the current BANE Netica plutonium reprocessing network using the 
general to specific network is more responsive to evidence additions. The BANE Netica 
proliferation network focuses on aqueous plutonium separation pathways as indicated in 
Figure 3-9. A subset of Figure 3-10 demonstrates the more evidence responsive general 
to specific BANE network incorporating reprocessing signatures from volatile 
compounds and different noble, radioactive, and other gas emissions. 
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Figure 3-10. Plutonium reprocessing options 
 
Aqueous plutonium reprocessing began by housing tall pulse columns and large 
volume, concrete lined separation facilities with heavy radiation shielding. Over time the 
reprocessing facilities could accommodate smaller and more efficient centrifugal 
contactors and other upgrades that shrank the physical and support requirements.  
Preprocessing and post processing are required for plutonium proliferation pathways 
following separation as shown in Figure 3-11. 
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Figure 3-11. Plutonium reprocessing precursors and post material management 
 
The non-nuclear aspect for nuclear weapon deployment is section 4 in Figure 3-
4. Greater proliferation network detail for non-nuclear component connections exist in 
Figure 3-12. 
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Figure 3-12. Non-nuclear weaponization 
 
Research and development (R&D) associated with Figure 3-12 are mostly non-
nuclear outside of the initiator systems. Activities undertaken by a proliferator in Figure 
3-12 could be pursued prior to, concurrently with, or following efforts to obtain 
sufficient SNM to initiate a nuclear weapons programs. The pusher and reflector parts of 
nuclear weapon fabrication are outlined in Figure 3-13, and part of Figure 3-4 section 5. 
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Figure 3-13. Nuclear weapon reflector and pusher components 
 
Similar to non-nuclear R&D in section 4, some aspects of the pusher and 
reflector portions of nuclear weapons can proceed or follow SNM acquisition. 
Depending upon the preferred pusher and reflector, the material might be non-nuclear in 
nature and routinely used in legitimate commercial products. The creation of usable 
SNM weapon pits with different configurations is section 6. More depth on the section 6 
network is shown in Figure 3-14. 
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Figure 3-14. Nuclear weaponization configurations 
 
The nuclear weaponization process in Figure 3-14 addresses generalities 
associated with different horizontal nuclear warhead proliferation options. New nuclear 
weapon states are a horizontal proliferation issue. Vertical proliferation covers 
improvements to existing nuclear weapon arsenals. Aspects of vertical proliferation 
nuclear weapon efforts are addressed in section 6. Nuclear weapon component testing is 
considered in greater detail separately from other parts of section 6 and provided in 
Figure 3-15. 
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Figure 3-15. Nuclear weapon testing 
 
Whole or component weapon testing shown in Figure 3-15 may or may not be 
optional for a proliferator. Indications of some nuclear weapon testing equipment 
leaking out raises major questions about final proliferation intentions. In Figure 3-4, 
section 7 is the node, and associated prior nodes, where all the other sections intersect 
for nuclear weapons program development. 
III.C. Netica GUI Node Level Verification Testing 
Considering a small subset of a full Netica GUI nuclear proliferation model 
demonstrates how small changes in constituent capabilities can alter proliferation 
decision making. Figure 3-7 shows the uranium enrichment network as a starting point 
for discussing Netica GUI network verification testing. Verification of components 
comprising the Netica GUI nuclear network can be tested by checking the truth tables to 
ensure the final probabilities match expected calculations. If smaller nuclear network 
parts are verified as part of increasingly large sections, then trust is built in the correct 
operation of the network. 
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Five uranium enrichment capabilities (Gas Diffusion, Aerodynamic Isotope 
Separation, Gas Centrifuges, Laser Isotope Separation, and Electromagnetic Isotope 
Separation [EMIS]) are available options for a potential proliferator in Figure 3-7. Each 
uranium enrichment proliferation option has several key components needed for their 
successful operation. Depending upon the potential proliferator, the likelihood of 
possessing the constituent technology as indicated by the “true” percentage in the Netica 
GUI model will vary. With the Netica GUI, each higher level node becomes a 
constituent for the next node and affects its chances of occurrence. 
The components associated with a successful gas centrifuge program 
demonstrate the importance of Equation 2-8 within the Netica GUI. The high probability 
acquisition of advanced composite filament winding machines provides one of several 
crucial gas centrifuge technical requirements, B. The presence of the filament winding 
machines escalate the chances a proliferator could successfully obtain gas centrifuges, 
Ai, relative to several uranium enrichment technologies, Aj.  
Proliferation technical success predicted by the Netica GUI occurs for a snapshot 
over a relatively short time frame. Changes in capabilities from a resource, time, or 
outside detection standpoint can impact the nuclear proliferation technical aptitude for an 
entity. As a result the Netica GUI module needs to be updated and run repeatedly by 
each agent every time step to address perturbed nuclear proliferation situations. The 
Netica .dne files may be generated for every proliferation update as part of robust 
verification operational testing. 
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III.C.1. Netica GUI Visualization Tool 
The Netica Application GUI is invaluable for BANE .dne file creation, updating, 
and visualization elements. Viewing relationships between proliferation network nodes 
prior to updating them is typically handled with the Netica GUI. Depending upon the 
BANE user background, the Netica GUI visualization facilitates easy comparisons 
between different proliferation network progressions. Visualization within the BANE 
context is based on successive Netica .dne file generation and subsequent Netica GUI 
viewing. Human Netica GUI and agent based Netica API alterations to nodes in an 
existing .dne file change the normally beige colored nodes gray. The gray color aids 
rapid assessment of proliferation network changes. 
The uranium enrichment model example from Figure 3-7 is shown in Figure 3-16 
after several dozen time steps have occurred. The deviations in the Figure 3-16 uranium 
enrichment network subset reflect evolving decision making by a proliferating agent. 
Note the grayed out nodes indicate the proliferating agent hedging strategy of focusing 
first on UF6 and Compressors improvements. The rationally based proliferating agent 
emphasizes obtaining uranium enrichment foundational capabilities of UF6 and 
Compressors. Investing in UF6 and Compressors opens up the Gas Diffusion, 
Aerodynamic, and Gas Centrifuge sectors for later proliferation exploitation.  
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Figure 3-16. Updated Netica uranium enrichment model from proliferating agent 
perspective after several dozen time steps 
 
Beyond a certain technical success threshold, the proliferating agent selects a 
more specific proliferation pathway. Proliferating agent attributes in the Figure 3-16 
example depict a proliferation preference for gas centrifuge enrichment. Once the 
underpinning gas centrifuge UF6 and Compressors mastery is sufficiently advanced, then 
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the proliferating agent begins researching Magnetic Bearings and Bellows. Committing 
to the Magnetic Bearings and Bellows, which are only applicable for gas centrifuges, 
makes the desired proliferation pathway clearer. 
The rate .dne files are generated by BANE for cataloging agent histories can be 
adjusted. Obtaining necessary agent information is balanced against computational 
storage and efficiency for selecting the number of .dne files produced. For MAS oriented 
simulations emphasizing in-depth analysis of a particular agent, producing more .dne file 
histories may be appropriate. Larger simulations along ABM lines would generally 
operate with fewer .dne files per agent with longer time intervals in between. 
III.C.2. Netica Application Programmer Interface Parser 
The nuclear proliferation networks contained within the .dne files are the 
backbone of BANE. Agents dynamically accessing the .dne files use the Netica API 
Parser module. The Netica API Parser allows agents with widely different objectives to 
determine, from their perspective, the state of nuclear proliferation. 
The Netica API Parser can be broken up into several key functions. First, the 
Netica API Parser helps the agents breakdown the Netica network nodes based on their 
assigned category, type, and component. Second, the Netica API Parser handles the best 
node technical selection for the agent using Shannon entropy. Third, the Netica API 
Parser provides the mechanism for agent adjustment of Netica networks and .dne files 
considering resource and detection limitations for a given set of time steps. 
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Netica API Node Classification 
Each Netica node in BANE has a unique category, type, component (CTC) 
classification identifier at the start of its name. From a visualization standpoint the 30 
character Netica node name differs from the node title, which is not length limited. 
Fortunately, a human user looking at a node in the Netica GUI sees the node title. The 
CTC identifier allows agents to associate particular knowledge, technologies, equipment, 
and signatures to various nuclear proliferation pathways. Figure 3-17 outlines how the 
CTC is structured. 
 
 
Figure 3-17. CTC classification arrangement. 
 
The CTC classification system is designed for expansion as additional 
functionality is added to BANE. The CTC category currently consists of seven sections 
corresponding to a different nuclear weapon program proliferation aspect. The names 
and matching numbers for the CTC Category are shown in Table 3-IV. The CTC type is 
broken up into 38 sections based on node association such as prior node input, 
knowledge, material, signature level, etc. Within each CTC category a unique 
component number is assigned for numerical referencing and to speed up node access. 
 
  
  76   
 
Table 3-IV. CTC Category names 
 
 
The seven category sections cover the major mainstream and contemporary 
portions of a proliferating entity nuclear weapons program. The Netica proliferation 
network overview in Figure 3-4 is apportioned by CTC category. The subsequent 
Figures 3-6 to 3-8 and 3-10 to 3-15 were finer breakout images of the CTC categories 
used in BANE. 
The Shared Category node CTC category, category 1, is the catch-all 
classification for nodes not located in a particular section. Proliferating agent specific 
nuclear weapon posture nodes fall within the Shared Category. The second CTC 
category is for enriched uranium production, along with the requisite uranium ore 
feedstock, tails, and other associated processes. Specifically CTC category 2 covers 
uranium-235 enrichment. Sections of the proliferation network for uranium enrichment 
are shown in Figures 3-7 and 3-8. 
Plutonium reprocessing through aqueous methods is addressed within CTC 
category 3. Figures 3-10 and 3-11 illustrate the proliferation network detail for aqueous 
Number Category Name
1 Shared Category Node
2 Enriched Uranium
3 Plutonium
4 Non-Nuclear Weapons Package
5 Pusher, Reflector, Tamper
6 Device Fabrication
7 Completed Device
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derived plutonium reprocessing. Uranium ore for plutonium production is contained in 
category 2. However, the irradiating nuclear reactor is part of category 3. 
CTC category 4 encompasses the non-nuclear weapon package portion for a 
nuclear posture. The proliferation network section linked to the non-nuclear weapon 
requirements are in Figure 3-12. The more nuclear related pusher, reflector, and tamper 
are in CTC category 5. The depiction in Figure 3-13 is for the pusher, reflector, and 
tamper nodes. 
Nuclear weapon device fabrication is CTC category 6, which also includes any 
nuclear weapon device testing needed. Category 6 nodes depict the growth of horizontal 
and vertical proliferation capabilities for various nuclear weapon postures. The device 
fabrication nodes are provided in Figure 3-14, while the nuclear testing nodes are in 
Figure 3-15. The completed nuclear weapon category 7 is an interface node for 
categories 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Category 7 nodes are for quickly indicating the state of 
proliferating agent overall nuclear weapon technical success. 
The CTC Type is broken into several sections based more loosely on what the 
node represents. The node sections are based on prior nodes, education level for 
attaining certain equipment and knowledge, SNA and SNT, nuclear and non-nuclear 
materials, and signatures. A node requires a type, and the best fit is used to place nodes 
that could fit into multiple types. The first 8 nodes are placeholder and prior nodes, and 
are shown in Table 3-V. 
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Table 3-V. CTC Type prior nodes 
 
 
Placeholder nodes are generally visualization nodes that should not be modifiable 
by agents through the Netica API. The prior nodes are heavily equated with the 
proliferating agent objectives and attributes in Figure 3-5. Prior nodes attached to other 
nodes serve as proliferating agent specific modifiers allowing for flexible usage of the 
same Bayesian inference network architecture. Deliverability relates to relative 
distribution of nuclear weapon arsenal, with the most difficult weapon configuration 
dominating technical difficulties. The most challenging obtainable yield dictates 
minimum technical requirements for nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapon arsenal size is a 
function of demand and supply proliferating agent drivers. Nuclear weapon 
sustainability posture varies significantly for non-state actors and state actors seeking 
latent deterrence versus medium to large stockpiles. 
With ABM nodes types 6 through 8 are handled in the Bayesian network for 
agent specific possessions. International networking is a supply side determinant for 
proliferation technical success. The technical capabilities of an agent are a function of its 
Number  Sub-ID Type Name
1 -- Placeholder Node 
2 Prior [Desired Weapon(s)] Deliverability
3 Prior [Desired Weapon(s) Most Challenging] Yield 
4 Prior [Desired Weapon] Number 
5 Prior [Desired Weapon] Sustainability 
6 Prior International Networking 
7 Prior Technical Capabilities 
8 Prior Available Infrastructure /Ability 
  79   
 
indigenous human capital. The availability infrastructure, or acquisition ability, deals 
with the industrial and scientific agent nuclear proliferation prowess. CTC Type 9 
through 16 address proliferation equipment industrial abilities as defined in Table 3-VI. 
 
Table 3-VI. CTC Type equipment nodes 
 
 
The BASE sub-type identification (ID) is important for nuanced agent 
interactions with the Bayesian network. Predominately, the BASE sub-ID restricts 
proliferating agents to internally pursuing foundational capabilities. Accumulated 
investments in BASE nodes then drive more advanced proliferation acquisitions. The 
BASE sub-ID limitation mirrors proliferator incremental research challenges. Ensuing 
proliferation desires to obtain international research and development (R&D) and SNA 
are predicated on rapidly overcoming proliferation hurdles requiring major time and 
resource investments. 
There are four CTC Type classes for equipment based on the educational 
attainment needed. The CTC Type classes are duplicated because half are fundamental 
Number  Sub-ID Type Name
9 Base Unskilled Equipment
10 Base Skilled / Technician Equipment
11 Base BS / MS Level Equipment
12 Base PhD Level Equipment
13 -- Unskilled Equipment
14 -- Skilled / Technician Equipment
15 -- BS / MS Level Equipment
16 -- PhD Level Equipment
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BASE nodes and the others depend on BASE nodes to exist. The unskilled level equates 
to equipment attainable by those with a high school education. Equipment at the skilled / 
technician education needs a workforce with a trade or associates level degree 
background. The bachelor‟s (BS) and master‟s (MS) degrees include most common 
place high technology equipment. Doctoral (PhD) level equipment is cutting edge for its 
respective field, but complicated to develop and maintain. The proliferation knowledge 
CTC Types are depicted in Table 3-VII, and similar to the CTC Type equipment classes. 
 
Table 3-VII. CTC Type knowledge nodes 
 
 
Paralleling the CTC Type equipment, the CTC Type knowledge breaks down 
proliferation knowledge into BASE and BASE dependent nodes. A high school 
education leads to unskilled knowledge. With a technical trade or associates degree 
workforce the skilled / technician level nodes are available. College BS or MS educated 
science, technology, engineering, or math (STEM) personnel engaged in proliferation 
grant access to BS / MS level knowledge. At the upper tier, doctoral SETM experts are 
Number  Sub-ID Type Name
17 Base Unskilled Knowledge
18 Base Skilled / Technician Knowledge
19 Base BS / MS Level Knowledge
20 Base PhD Level Knowledge
21 -- Unskilled Knowledge
22 -- Skilled / Technician Knowledge
23 -- BS / MS Level Knowledge
24 -- PhD Level Knowledge
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required for PhD level knowledge. Specialized nodes 25 through 27 are provided in 
Table 3-VIII. 
 
Table 3-VIII. CTC Type specialized nodes 
 
 
A network major multiple node is a central connecting node with major 
implications for direct agent access. The central enrichment node in Figure 3-6 is a CTC 
Type 25 node. The SNT CTC Type 26 node is crucial for non-state agent nuclear 
nonproliferation lacking the sophistication of a state proliferating agent. The non-state 
agent seeking a single nuclear weapon prefers the acquisition pathway with the least 
work to a functional and deliverable weapon. Enclosed within SNT is taking SNM, 
stealing a nuclear pit, or even absconding with a completed nuclear weapon. 
The SNA is state centric and covers a wider range than SNT. With SNA a 
proliferating state agent could receive crucial nuclear weapons design information. 
Providing a large quantity of SNM for a proliferating state also constitutes SNA. 
Supplementing a proliferating state with major equipment and knowledge is SNA if it 
enables creation a SNM reprocessing or enrichment facility for HEU production. 
Directly supplying nuclear weapons would be another form of SNA. Nuclear materials 
CTC Types for proliferation are provided in Table 3-IX. 
Number  Sub-ID Type Name
25 -- Network Major Multiple Node
26 -- Special Nuclear Theft (SNT)
27 -- Special Nuclear Assistance (SNA)
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Table 3-IX. CTC Type nuclear material nodes 
 
 
There are four CTC Type nuclear material classes based on the level of 
processing to create. Raw nuclear materials need minimal alteration. With refined 
nuclear materials chemical processing was used. Processed nuclear materials have been 
purified and transformed for easy usage in more advanced nuclear endeavors. Enriched 
nuclear materials underwent isotopic enrichment or irradiation leading to another 
element or isotope being generated. In Table 3-X the CTC Types for non-nuclear 
materials are listed. 
 
Table 3-X. CTC Type non-nuclear material nodes 
 
 
Number  Sub-ID Type Name
28 -- Raw [Ex. Uranium Ore]
29 --
Refined [Ex. Purified Uranium Yellowcake and 
Uranium Dioxide]
30 --
Processed [Ex. Uranium Hexafluoride, Natural 
Uranium Metal]
31 --
Enriched [Ex. Low Enriched Uranium, Highly 
Enriched Uranium, Plutonium, Depleted Uranium]
Number  Sub-ID Type Name
32 -- Raw [Ex. Seawater]
33 -- Refined [Ex. Hydrogen]
34 --
Processed [Ex. Steel, Composite Material such as 
Carbon Fiber]
35 -- Enriched [Ex. Heavy Water]
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The four CTC Type non-nuclear material classes parallel the CTC Types 28 to 
31. Non-nuclear materials that are raw exist naturally without human activity. Obtaining 
refined non-nuclear material requires at least chemical processing. There is a big 
differential between refined and processed non-nuclear materials. Manufacturing 
processed non-nuclear material needs advanced industrial processing across polymer, 
ceramic, or metallurgy fields. The enriched field for non-nuclear materials equates to 
isotopic composition alterations. Nodes that are signatures for activities are included in 
Table 3-XI. 
 
Table 3-XI. CTC Type non-nuclear material nodes 
 
 
Several nuclear proliferation areas, but particularly reprocessing, yields 
detectable signatures potentially alerting defensive agents. Easily apparent signatures 
encompass issues such as large facility and complex footprint. Discernable signatures 
include radioactive and non-natural concentrations of noble and volatile gas products.  
Within the difficult signatures CTC Type are precursor materials and compounds 
suggestive of a nuclear proliferation effort. The signature nodes represent proliferation 
features that vary in technical difficulty to achieve for agents. However, the signature 
nodes have a far greater impact on nuclear counter proliferation for defensive agents. 
Number  Sub-ID Type Name
36 -- Easily Apparent Facility Signatures
37 -- Discernable Facility Signatures
38 -- Difficult Facility Signatures
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Netica API Node Technical Selection 
Focusing only on node technical selection illustrates the underlying mechanism 
for Netica API operation. The uranium enrichment network shown in Figure 3-7 works 
as a technical selection starting point. A proliferating agent perturbing the UF6 
capabilities in the Figure 3-7 proliferation network could occur. Increased UF6 technical 
aptitude might be based on applying resources to eventually overcoming domestic 
research hurdles. Another option could be the proliferator makes contact with an entity 
inclined towards nuclear cooperation with it based on economic, religious, ideological, 
or other affinity.
17,79
  
Figure 3-7 shows the UF6 technology connection to gas diffusion, aerodynamic, 
or gas centrifuge uranium enrichment methods. Advances in UF6 mastery broaden the 
proliferation pathways and increase the chances the proliferator could obtain enriched 
uranium. At higher levels of UF6 advancement, BANE demonstrates in Figure 3-18 the 
expectation that the proliferating agent receives greater proliferation benefit. Growing 
UF6 abilities enable enhanced testing and development of other proliferation pathway 
components dependent on UF6. 
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Figure 3-18. Alterations in UF6 capabilities change proliferating agent gas centrifuge 
technical success. Reprinted with permission from 75. 
 
In BANE the determination to pursue UF6 research for proliferation technical 
success over other uranium enrichment options uses Shannon entropy. Priors in 
Bayesian inference create data networks. With Shannon entropy the “information 
content” is analyzed to determine relationships between a specific option / BANE node 
and the range of additional choices / remaining BANE nodes. The node with the greatest 
information content uncertainty, relative to the node of interest, matters most when using 
Shannon entropy. 
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A proliferating agent applying resources towards mastering a proliferation 
pathway node in one time step reduces the overall information content uncertainty. 
Certain proliferation pathways become relatively more favorable, and the information 
content uncertainty on nodes down the proliferation chain increase. Conversely, other 
proliferation pathway options become less advantageous and their information content 
uncertainty declines. The declining information content uncertainty is linked to the 
diminished benefit of selecting those pathways for achieving the desired proliferation 
objective. Therefore, the Shannon entropy methodology allows for intelligent agent 
identification of the BANE proliferation network nodes with the greatest technical 
success impact. 
An advantage of Shannon entropy is its reversibility ease. Proliferating agents 
with an objective can determine the BANE nodes most valuable for attaining their goals. 
Defensive agents can employ the same Netica API Parser technical “success” functions 
with Shannon entropy for ascertaining the best BANE nodes to hinder, reverse, or 
dismantle proliferation networks. Keeping the same BANE Shannon entropy technical 
success methodology for all applicable agent classes helps prevent biasing for 
proliferation or counter proliferation. 
Netica API Network Adjustment 
The Netica API Parser is the BANE focal point for agents, since it performs 
agent dictated alterations of Netica .dne files. Agents can interface with other modules, 
such as the SQL Server or Optimization Solver, but the information is still transferred 
back to the Netica API Parser. Each BANE agent action during a time step relies on the 
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Netica API Parser for any operation. An illustration of the Netica API Parser importance 
for coordinating agent specific in BANE is shown in Figure 3-19. 
 
 
Figure 3-19. Netica API Parser role for directing agent specific information in BANE 
 
The movement of BANE information in Figure 3-19 is for a single agent during 
one time step. The yellow arrow going from the Netica GUI indicates the interaction is 
only for the first time step when the starting agent parameters are provided. The green 
two sided arrow represents the Netica API Parser modules being used to repeatedly ping 
the other modules groups for ALL time steps. The dark blue two sided arrows represent 
connections that MAY transfer information during a given time step run depending upon 
the agent. 
An internationally isolated agent might not receive any assistance if its affinity 
with other agents is low and its influence is further declining. In that situation the 
affinity and influence modules within the dashed red box from Figure 3-19 would not 
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provide proliferation usable benefits for the agent. Substantial resources and 
international influence can help insulate a country from resource and detection 
proliferation restrictions. Over a short time span, a wealthy and well-connected 
proliferating agent can ignore resource and detection “Optimization Solver” 
requirements. The “Omniscience and Monitoring Tracker” modules are designed for 
defensive agents checking proliferating agent progress. 
Once the agent has selected the needed modules the information is routed 
through the agent specific SQL databases and concentrated in the Netica API Parser. The 
Netica API wrapper translates the new data into means for adjusting the agent .dne file. 
An example of Netica API Parser control considers the case of an agent deciding to 
pursue indigenous proliferation research on a node. Upon agent node selection functions 
with Netica commands are selected that take inputs such as agent research capabilities in 
the desired area. The node probability for technical success being true is then adjusted 
based on the research formula inputs. 
During a single time step for an agent, the Netica API Parser modules might 
operate iteratively several times. The agent starts by using Shannon entropy to decide on 
the node with the best technical success. However, the first choice node might be 
rejected due to resource limitations. For the subsequent iteration, the next best node is 
infeasible because it raises the proliferation detection level to an unacceptable level. 
Finally, a permissible node is selected by the agent. Updating the .dne file occurs with 
the Netica API parser modules; and, BANE progresses to the next agent or time step. 
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III.C.3. SQL Server Access and Storage 
Creating a BANE architecture designed for handling thousands of agents with 
different classes, types, postures, competencies, etc. required a robust information 
storage system. SQL provides a means to store, access, and update the large databases 
required for fully exploring BANE capabilities. SQL Server is the Microsoft program for 
using SQL to interface with databases and is integrated within BANE.  
The importance of SQL is shown in Figure 3-19 for BANE agents. Several 
different agent parameters and attributes are stored in SQL databases. Table 3-XII breaks 
down a few of the key SQL database data sub-sections associated with agents in BANE. 
 
Table 3-XII. Agent data kept within SQL databases 
 
 
Initial agent information is contained within one SQL database as indicated in 
Table 3-XII. Also, the starting agent objectives and success thresholds are in SQL 
databases and loaded to start simulations. Across a broader spectrum the unique agent 
abilities, affinity tables, etc. are all handled through SQL databases. A first generation 
BANE basic database for the extrapolation of technical success is shown in Table 3-XIII 
for the UF6 node. 
Agent Information Affinities Node Levels
Agent ID Allegiance Node CTC
Agent Type Security Resources
Agent Posture Economic Detection Probability
Agent Goals Political
Agent Goal Levels Religious
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Table 3-XIII. Database table for initial node technical success extrapolation 
 
 
Interpolation ranges for individual node alteration of attributes, such as resource 
requirements, can rely upon SQL databases for storing the large data quantities. The 
database frameworks are all repeatable, but the specific BANE node values are 
adjustable. Without SQL databases, or some other model like HDF5, holding agent 
specific parameters and attributes BANE could only handle very generic agents. Unique 
data storage is necessary for creating agent granularity to gain benefits from ABM and 
MAS paradigms. 
The SQL access and data manipulation modules are designed for use with as 
many databases tables as possible. Interfacing with agent operational modules, as 
described in Figure 3-19, makes the SQL databases modules information nexus even 
when no changes are made to them. Modules performing multiple SQL database 
interactions decrease BANE code complexity. 
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Beyond similar data employment within agent types, SQL modules allow 
different agent types to often use the same database tables. Keeping as uniform a data 
framework ensures computational equality between agent types. One agent type is not 
allowed to unintentionally make more decisions simply based on different rules for 
database access. 
III.C.4. Optimization Solver 
Historical proliferation efforts show intelligent proliferator decision making 
being pursued. Agent optimization in the BANE paradigm informs proliferation choices 
in an analogous manner. First generation BANE efforts centered on the proliferating 
agent seeking the highest technical success probability for a major nuclear weapons 
program. A 100% barrier was implemented for the proliferating agents. Still, there are 
additional historical precedents for proliferators greatly exceeding their initial nuclear 
weapon program budgets. Adding to the nuclear weapons budget means national 
resources are potentially removed from other productive enterprises like economic 
growth or conventional military operation. Short term, negative implications of adding to 
the nuclear weapons program may be minimal. Over an extended timeframe the 
degraded economic growth or weakened conventional capabilities could decrease the 
proliferator‟s national security, prestige, and influence. 
The optimization process allows agents to select proliferation pathways while 
weighing multiple constraints. The linkage in BANE between economic resources and 
proliferation technical success probability is demonstrated in Figure 3-20. The 100% 
threshold in Figure 3-19 represents the notional budget available for the proliferator‟s 
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national defense. The allocated proliferation resources clearly affect the ability of the 
proliferator to reach its nuclear posture. Therefore, BANE shows the compromises being 
made by a proliferator to satisfy national security and economic importance connections. 
The trade-off dynamics play an integral role in identifying and understanding potential 
proliferator responses under various conditions. 
 
 
Figure 3-20. Proliferation technical success for a proliferating agent based on resource 
allocation. Reprinted with permission from 75. 
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The BANE optimization solver module uses a linear programming based method. 
Handling different proliferation success regions was accomplished through breaking the 
technical success sections into “bins.” Linear best fits were taken over each “bin” section 
and passed to the solver as articulated in Table 3-XIV. Figure 3-20 makes the optimal, 
60% technical success probability apparent, provided the proliferator does not exceed 
the nominal 100% resource allocation level.   
 
Table 3-XIV. Linear optimization bins for ABM resource and detection interference 
 
 
The proliferation detection, and associated interference, probability for defensive 
agents is shown in Figure 3-21. Outlining a major assessment benefit from the 
interaction between proliferation and defensive agents helps indicate BANE‟s analytic 
nonproliferation utility. Counter proliferation entities possess several means of 
identifying proliferation including wide area and localized environmental sampling, 
multiple intelligence assets, etc. As a proliferating agent progresses through nuclear 
weapon programs stages (e.g. conceptual, lab scale, pilot scale, small covert production, 
or large overt production) the defensive agent detection opportunities grow. Table 3-XIV 
indicates the “bin” category linkage between proliferating agent nuclear weapon 
Bin
Agent Resource 
Allocation 
Capacity  [%]
Linear Equation for 
Proliferation 
Technical Success 
Probability [%]
Bin Category
Probability of 
Detection by 
Outside Agent [%]
Linear Equation for 
Proliferation Success 
Probability Considering 
Interference [%]
1 0 < x ≤ 10 2.0x + 1.1 1 Conceptual 0 < x ≤ 10  -0.17x+100
2 10 < x ≤ 50 0.6x + 16 2 Lab Scale 10 < x ≤ 40  -0.29x + 100
3 50 < x ≤ 190 0.25x + 34 3 Pilot Scale 40 < x ≤ 70  -0.64x + 110
4 190 < x ≤ 350 0.12x + 58 4
Small Covert 
Production
70 < x ≤ 98  -1.2x + 150
5
Large, Overt 
Production
98 < x ≤ 100  -17x + 1700
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program stages and the associated defensive agent detection probability. Nuclear 
proliferation intuition is again satisfied by BANE. More successful nuclear proliferation 
activities incur heightened exposure to counter proliferation efforts. 
 
 
Figure 3-21. Defensive agent interference considerations for a proliferating agent. 
Reprinted with permission from 75. 
 
In the early BANE methodology, defensive agents discovering proliferation 
operations have a particular intervention probability. The proliferation level attained by 
the proliferating agent when discovered will play a major driving role in future versions 
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of BANE for the defensive agent response. Advanced proliferation activities will yield 
more vigorous, and multi-pronged, defensive agent efforts to roll back, or outright 
eliminate, nuclear weapons programs. Therefore, all proliferation decisions under the 
BANE framework have a corresponding risk if located by a defensive agent. 
The example in Figure 3-21 is for a BANE scenario with a proliferating agent 
seeking pilot reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. Such a nuclear weapons 
program objective results in a 40% chance the defensive agent ascertains the existing 
proliferation. The BANE corresponding incurred proliferation risk probability from 
defensive agent interference is 10%. Defensive agent intervention might encompass 
economic, political, or potentially military responses. The assessed proliferation 
advancement, along with the defensive and proliferating agent rapport, will also affect 
how the defensive agent attempts to intervene. 
In BANE, the first option for handling proliferation detection along a pathway, 
DPath, focused on using the largest single detection probability, Di. The detection 
probability of the largest single time step could be used to define the proliferation 
signature for a defensive agent. The initial pathway detection probability is: 
 maxPath iD D  3-1 
However, Equation 3-1 failed to consider the implications of defensive agent 
proliferation pattern recognition. The next level of proliferation pathway analysis used a 
form of time based learning. A product formula for proliferation learning was explored. 
With the product formula, the defensive agent develops increased proliferation 
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awareness the longer the identified proliferation program is in existence. The equation 
form for the product detection probability formula is: 
 
1
1 1
j
Path i
i
D D

    3-2 
The increased intelligence attributed to the defensive agent for Equation 3-2 
aided in developing and improving BANE realism. A proliferator might decide early in 
the lab scale stages to pursue research with application for multiple proliferation 
pathways. Two explored proliferation routes are shown in Figure 3-22 that suit the 
proliferator nuclear weapon objective. 
 
 
Figure 3-22. Proliferation pathway with step commonality 
 
The common step in routes 1 and 2 for Figure 3-22 represent proliferation 
hedging behavior. Table 3-XV shows the advantage of Equation 3-2 when a proliferator 
is hedging by pursuing proliferation pathways with a technical step in common.   
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Table 3-XV. Multiple proliferation step detection progress  
 
 
 
The uranium hexafluoride (UF6) research has application to route 1 for gas 
centrifuges and also for gas diffusion research along route 2. The higher aggregated 
detection probability with Equation 3-2 makes the defensive agent more effective at 
proliferation suppression in the Figure 3-22 case. If a defensive agent can avoid stove 
pipes and share obtained proliferation information effectively it will more closely 
resemble knowledge governed by Equation 3-2. However, in a highly data sectioned 
environment decreased defensive agent abilities will manifest as illustrated by Table 3-
XV. The defensive agent then functions as though Equation 3-1 represents its 
proliferation detection probability. 
The linked proliferating and defensive agent relationship modeled in BANE is 
done in Figure 3-23. The resulting analysis of how the defensive agent can curtail 
proliferating agent proliferation technical successes is illustrated. Initially the technical 
success probability limitation, shown by the red dashed line in Figure 3-23, impedes the 
Proliferation Pathway
Detection 
Probability
Non-Detection 
Probability
Path A - Centrifuge Rotors 0.20 0.80
Path B - Uranium Hexafluoride 0.30 0.70
Path C - Magnetic Bearings 0.40 0.60
Aggregate Proliferation 
Assumption
Aggregate 
Detection 
Probability
Single Pathway Analysis 0.40
Simultaneous Pathway Analysis 0.66
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proliferator. In the BANE scenario the proliferating agent attempts to reach the highest 
proliferation technical success probability. However, the proliferating agent activities 
attract defensive agent awareness when establishing its small, covert SNM 
transformation facility. The defensive agent coercing influence then renders the 
proliferating agent expending 100% of its available proliferation resources, as shown by 
the Figure 3-23 red vertical line, less valuable. The constrained maximum optimal 
technical success probability is 55%; therefore, the intelligent proliferating agent would 
only seek to deploy 83% of its proliferation resources. 
The defensive agent prevented proliferation region lies underneath the solid 
black lines in Figure 3-23. The proliferation prevented region is a function of defensive 
agent proliferation assessment capabilities. When the defensive agent interference line 
has a higher probability over a range than the technical success probability alone would 
indicate, a forbidden region exists. 
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Figure 3-23. Interaction between proliferating agent preferences and defensive agent 
intervention for optimal nuclear proliferation scenario for proliferating agent. Reprinted 
with permission from 75. 
 
In Figure 3-23 the BANE indicated forbidden region is represented by a dashed 
orange shape. Were the proliferating agent to enter the forbidden region its nuclear 
program would face rollback from the defensive agent. A constrained proliferating agent 
is less likely to generate a regional nuclear arms race, for instance; and, thus the counter-
proliferation role played by a proactive defensive agent is highlighted using BANE. 
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III.C.5. Uncertainties 
Nuclear proliferation predictions are fraught with uncertainty for proliferators, 
counter proliferation entities, and drawn in neutral agents. An adage often attributed to 
Albert Einstein is, “If we knew what we were doing it wouldn‟t be called „research,‟ 
would it?” Forecasting progress on intricate research coupled with potentially diffuse 
contributors operating to avoid drawing scrutiny is far from precise. BANE uncertainty 
modules are designed to emulate real world information gaps throughout nuclear 
proliferation programs. 
Simulations in BANE can operate in deterministic mode or with varying 
uncertainty levels and methodologies. The level affects the number and type of agent 
decisions that use the BANE uncertainty modules. The two current BANE uncertainty 
methodologies are random range and Gaussian in nature. Figure 3-24 lays out the 
relationship between range and Gaussian uncertainty distributions used in BANE. 
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Figure 3-24. Uncertainties with boxplot and Gaussian distribution
80
 
 
The top of Figure 3-24 shows a box plot with a central, deterministic value and 
an interquartile range (IQR). Within BANE, the uncertainty range methodology is used 
like the IQR as a bounding measure. Depending upon the agent, the same research might 
lead to higher or lower capabilities similar to enlarged boxplot whiskers. 
The middle and bottom portions of Figure 3-24 are Gaussian distribution with the 
same mean value. The shaded Gaussian distribution regions correspond to the 
probability density function (PDF) for a given standard deviation, σ. Integrating PDFs 
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with smaller σ yield lower probability values within the range. In the middle Figure 3-24 
portion the integrated dark region is less than for the bottom portion. Using the smaller 
middle portion bound darker region instead of the bottom bound darker region in BANE 
corresponds to less uncertainty. With the BANE uncertainty modules the agent 
variations in action certainty have major proliferation repercussions. 
Before embarking on a covert nuclear weapons program, a proliferator may 
believe a high research rate is sustainable. Only later will the proliferator realize 
additional progress will entail much higher resource and / or intellectual capital 
allocation. Conversely, a proliferator might run into indigenous proliferation R&D 
hurdles leading to its discouragement. The dejected proliferator could turn to SNA or 
pursue other less effective pathways rather than attempt to persevere down the pathway 
with only domestic means. When nearing completion of a research area, the proliferator 
might also face the risk of greater detection than expected during the initial project 
phases. Accurate awareness of potential technical hurdles in clandestinely acquiring 
nuclear material would shift proliferator decision making. 
With a better understanding of proliferation challenges alternative pathways 
might have been followed years or decades earlier. For instance, pursuing latent 
deterrence can involve longer nuclear weapon time horizons. Enlarged resource cost and 
knowledge base breadth for pursuing civilian nuclear infrastructure is a potential 
downside for latent deterrence. When hedging against future security threats the 
increased technical success and diminished international suspicion for nuclear R&D may 
outweigh the negative latent deterrence concerns. Pairing other justifications, such as 
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economic or political self-sufficiency arguments, with security threats can enhance 
proliferation attractiveness. The implications of leadership failures for all entities related 
to nuclear proliferation efforts is illustrated in Figure 3-25. 
 
 
Figure 3-25. Leadership failures and associated remedies
81
 
 
Effective leadership, and associated planning and mitigation strategy, is harder to 
marshal when confronting black swan type events. BANE uncertainty modules help 
incorporate strategic proliferation and counter proliferation planning while considering 
the Figure 3-25 leadership challenges. Relative to military and national security 
challenges, successful nuclear weapon development pathways could receive black swan 
classification. Particularly if new or unexpected scientific R&D was applied to 
circumvent expected and largely accepted proliferation protection barriers.
82
 Allowing 
BANE simulations to fluctuate agent research and affinity connection investments 
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through uncertainty propagation can aid in bounding rarer proliferation events. The 
accumulation of rare events in BANE simulations can mirror occurrences like multiple 
intelligence snippets not being aggregated to determine terrorist or state activities.  
Nuclear proliferation models tend to treat proliferation leadership as possessing 
an “inability to learn” from past events. Historically this is not the case, and 
circumstances that led to early proliferation efforts rejecting EMIS for uranium 
enrichment might differ for a later proliferator. Another example is proliferators favoring 
certain types of gas centrifuge designs based on choices such as technical achievement, 
individual ego, and pride motivations.
83
 In BANE, agents perform “corrective” learning 
by looking first at the technical and physical limitations for proliferation.
84
 Other 
limitations such as resource needs are then considered. 
Including uncertainty effects for most modules justified BANE maintaining 
proliferation network history. Agents facing unexpected, and seemingly insurmountable, 
proliferation system challenges gain a measure of credit for past proliferation choices. 
Detective agent work in BANE takes place as agents assess the best remaining 
proliferation decision fork along their chosen proliferation pathway. This adaptive 
BANE behavior is highlighted by the uncertainty modules creating non-linear variation 
in encountered proliferation challenges. 
Historical inspiration for BANE agent decision methodologies was also 
instrumental for laying out the uncertainty modules‟ operation. The expert Prussian 
military strategist Helmuth von Moltke coined the phrase, “no plan survives contact with 
the enemy.”85 Therefore, the role of superb leaders is attempting to anticipate plan 
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perturbations, their associated outcomes, and means to mitigate consequences. BANE 
addresses von Moltke‟s concerns by using uncertainty modules to create a range of 
options for counter proliferation decision makers to understand the impacts of their 
decisions. The anticipative nature and risks of BANE agent hedging also touches on von 
Moltke‟s quote, “strategy is a system of expedients.” Technically and politically the 
grand strategy of obtaining or hindering proliferation advancements turns on operational 
and tactical choices. Proliferation uncertainties likely alter how operations and tactics are 
executed using a different set of constraints governing their optimization. 
III.C.6. Affinities and Influence 
No single individual can perform all the steps needed to create and deliver a 
nuclear weapon with a high order yield. A proliferating entity that is a state can perform 
all those tasks, but thousands of individuals are involved throughout the nuclear fuel 
cycle and militarization process. Relying on assistance outside the proliferating state, 
even if just for intellectual capital or raw materials, can significantly speed up nuclear 
weapon acquisition. A major BANE justification is capturing the affinities driving 
relationships between agents and how the influence wielded over each other changes 
with time.  
Table 3-XII in the SQL database section indicates the allegiance, security, 
economic, political, and religious affinities categories agent can possess. For the affinity 
categories the BANE affinities modules have cooperation and animosity triggers. Agent 
affinity levels range from 0 to 10. Not all affinities are black and white and involve 
outright cooperation or affinity. Therefore, affinities have sub-categories which enable 
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nuanced agent postures. A breakdown of several affinities into sub-category used in the 
SQL database tables are shown in Table 3-XVI. 
 
Table 3-XVI. Agent affinity sub-categories 
 
 
BANE modules handle the affinity sub-categories based on creating real world 
approximations. Depending upon the affinity category, a level 0 sub-category affinity 
may represent absolute hostility or a refusal to trade. A level 10 sub-category affinity 
represents an overwhelming desire to interact. The specifics of sub-category affinity 
meanings are addressed with the following affinity category discussions. 
The allegiance affinity stemmed from individuals having citizen, businesses 
being headquartered or having major operation locations, and governments ideally 
having geographic boundaries. Several major state sub-category allegiances used in 
BANE simulations are listed in Table 3-XVI. Agents sharing the same allegiance will 
cooperate until the affinity level is below 2. Allegiance represents the nationalism, 
regulations, family and friendship ties, values, and other normative factors that elicit 
adherence to governmental rules and objectives. 
Allegiance Political Religion
United_States Liberal_Democracy Muslim_Sunni
Russia Capitalist_State Muslim_Shia
China Socialist_State Chrisitan_Catholic
Pakistan Socialist_Liberal Christian_Protestant_A
France Communist Officially_Agnostic
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The security affinity covers issues such as alliances, state based relations, and 
non-state actor perceptions of the international environment. Security oriented demand 
side proliferation drivers and threats motivate proliferating and counter proliferation 
agents to seek a wider range of cooperative assistance. BANE couples demand side 
drivers to new supply side proliferation opportunities from affinity connections. Sub-
categories for security are absent from Table 3-XVI because many security relationships 
can exist simultaneously and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Letters 
represent security alliance sub-categories, and agents then join or leave security 
alliances. Agents can also oppose particular security alliances and exhibit antagonistic 
behavior towards agents with high affinity levels for that sub-category. 
Modern international trade is predominately driven by economics. Corporation 
and individual monetary persuasion susceptibility to engage in proliferation is captured 
in BANE. Even government entities face budgetary pressures. Except in dire national 
security circumstances, government agencies base their actions on fiscal resources. 
Economic sub-categories are straight-forward and affinity interactions occur once trigger 
levels representing sufficient monetary resources are present. 
Historically, political and ideological alignments were strongly tied to nuclear 
assistance. Following the Cold War ending, security and economic rationales have 
eclipsed political affinities for nuclear cooperation with military dimensions. Particularly 
when tracing past ties for successful nuclear proliferation, BANE module consideration 
of ideological affinities is a crucial feature. Political sub-categories from Table 3-XVI 
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are currently designed for constructive engagement. When a level of affinity towards the 
shared ideology is reached the agents will work together. 
Non-state agents definitely share religious connections that bring them into 
contact and incline them to work with each other. For states, asserting pure religious 
nuclear connections devoid of strategic concerns is more tenuous. Whether those 
connections enable vis-à-vis facilitate usable nuclear assistance is more debatable. 
However, BANE provides the means to consider religion induced nuclear cooperation. 
The religion affinity sub-categories in Table 3-XVI operates with agents belonging to a 
single sub-category. The constructive affinity trigger system is then used when 
determining if shared religious beliefs are sufficient for cooperation. 
A series of nuclear proliferation graphics are shown starting with Figure 3-26 for 
a normal, base example. The example series affinity category is generic and uses only 
constructive trigger thresholds. 
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Figure 3-26. Base affinity connections 
 
In Figure 3-26 the defensive agent has a strong affinity connection with the 
bottom neutral supplier agent. The existing level 10 affinity connection between the 
defensive and bottom neutral supplier agents cannot be broken in BANE. Even if the 
proliferating agent reaches a level 8 affinity the neutral supplier agent will not provide 
nuclear assistance. At the time the top and middle connection affinities favor the 
defensive agent over the proliferating agent.  
57
10 5
57
- Connection (Insufficient Affinity)
- Connection (Sufficient Affinity)          
- Defensive Agent 
- Neutral Supplier Agent 
- Proliferating Agent
Connection Trigger Threshold is 8
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Over several time steps the role of influence on BANE modules affinities grows 
in importance. If the proliferating agent influence is rising they can allocate influence to 
establishing a connection with the top or middle defensive agent in Figure 3-26. 
Although the defensive agent initial affinities are higher, careless monitoring and / or 
declining influence can prevent the defensive agent from first reaching the level 8 
connection threshold. A strong proliferator situation in Figure 3-27 poses greater 
challenges for a defensive agent. 
 
 
Figure 3-27. Strong proliferator affinity connections 
 
Against a high level proliferator, a lower level defensive agent can be over 
matched on affinity and influence counter proliferation. The strong proliferating agent in 
Figure 3-27 has an affinity connection with the top neutral supplier agent. The defensive 
agent retains its affinity with the bottom neutral agent. However, for the middle neutral 
agent the strong proliferating agent holds the affinity advantage for reaching the 
connection trigger first. Conversely, a weak proliferator example version is shown in 
Figure 3-28. 
83
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Figure 3-28. Weak proliferator affinity connections 
 
In the weak proliferator example from Figure 3-28, the proliferator is outclassed 
on affinities for all three neutral agents shown. An international pariah that is a nuclear 
proliferator would have a network more closely approximating Figure 3-28. BANE 
affinity and influence modules using SQL database tables can keep thousands of 
proliferation associations mapped out. A weak proliferator in BANE can seize the 
chance for obtaining an affinity connection if presented the opportunity. Realistically, 
BANE is still tracking the limited number of opportunities for the proliferating agent to 
build international contacts. 
Figures 3-26 to 3-28 indicated the substantial nuclear proliferation implications 
of affinity relationship diversity and strength. Higher affinity levels provide proliferating 
agents more chances to achieve technical success through resource and information 
acquisition from connections. The nonproliferation capabilities of defensive agents are 
severely strained by proliferators with strong affinity bonds. Traditional defensive agent 
advantages such as political and economic pressure are mitigated by active and passive 
38
10 1
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assistance to the proliferator. The proliferation technical success of several proliferators 
analogous to those depicted in Figure 3-26 to 3-28 are shown in Figure 3-29. 
 
 
Figure 3-29. Proliferator technical success with affinity inclusion 
 
A proliferator with significant access to global nuclear suppliers and deep 
research connections will pursue one set of proliferation paths. Figure 3-29 indicates 
how technical barriers are more readily countered by a proliferator with strong 
international affinities. Proliferators suffering more limited worldwide connections 
depend on indigenous research resources. For similar states, the lack of global resources 
in BANE is shown in Figure 3-29 to result in diminished nuclear proliferation progress.  
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III.C.7. Omniscience and Monitoring 
The BANE omniscience and monitoring modules were designed specifically to 
capture counter proliferation defensive agents challenges. In BANE the omniscience and 
monitoring modules rely heavily upon linkages to other modules as shown in Figure 3-
19. Perturbations from provided BANE module information then shape defensive agent 
decisions. The BANE operational flow diagram in Figure 3-1 indicates defensive agents 
are responsive by nature to proliferating agent activities. 
Defensive agent monitoring efficiencies in BANE differ significantly depending 
upon its resources and technological prowess, proliferation efforts being uncovered, etc. 
Taking corrective action against unknown proliferation is very inefficient for defensive 
agents. Therefore, defensive agent preferences focus on first expending substantial effort 
on identifying proliferator pathways. 
To enhance realism defensive agents suffer time delays in acquiring proliferating 
agent network information. Once proliferating efforts are detected the defensive agents 
still must analyze the signatures. The intelligence processing cycle the BANE 
omniscience and monitoring modules approximate is shown in Figure 3-30 from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
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Figure 3-30. FBI identified intelligence collection cycle
86
 
 
The generation of Netica .dne proliferation network time histories is central for 
defensive agents. Although the .dne files have visualization roles, the BANE 
omniscience and monitoring modules restrict the access time. The FBI Figure 3-30 
intelligence collaboration cycle provide a means of rating defensive agent proliferation 
attentiveness. Efficient intelligence efforts with superior proliferation recognition and 
exploitation competencies aid some defensive agents in lessening the proliferation 
awareness time delay gap. 
In the optimization solver section, the defensive agent proliferation hindering 
shown in Figures 3-21 and 3-23 is for deterministic cases. Realistically, proliferation 
networks obtained by defensive agent have uncertainties. With BANE the uncertainty 
module configuration is adjustable for each defensive agent. When using the BANE 
omniscience and uncertainty modules together there are two main determinants of 
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uncertainty. First, the level of proliferating agent openness and counter intelligence. 
Second, the defensive agent intelligence sources and capabilities. Several intelligence 
collection parameters impacting defensive agent omniscience limitation are provided in 
Table 3-XVII. 
 
 Table 3-XVII. Counter proliferation intelligence collection sectors 
 
 
The uranium enrichment proliferation progress example using Figures 3-7 and 3-
16 can demonstrate defensive agent monitoring practices. A defensive agent can possess 
the proliferator uranium enrichment proliferation network in Figure 3-7. After a 
monitoring campaign, the defensive agent can acquire updated the more recent Figure 3-
16 proliferation network. The available Table 3-XVII intelligence collection methods 
help dictate the defensive agent Figure 3-16 acquisition delay. When parsing the new 
network the defensive agent recognizes a preference for gas centrifuge uranium 
enrichment based on detected magnetic bearings and bellows research. 
The BANE omniscience and monitoring modules are also integrated into the 
affinities and influence modules. A defensive agent with intelligence gathering 
Intelligence Method Cost Technical Difficulty Access Difficulty
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Low Low High
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Medium Medium Medium
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) High High Low
Measures and Signature 
Intelligence  (MASINT)
High High Medium
Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT)
Low Low Low
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difficulties might confront several proliferators that appear stronger in narrow areas. The 
affinity situation in Figure 3-27 could then occur as a subset of the existing international 
connections where the defensive agent is particularly vulnerable. A more powerful 
defensive agent, or coalition of defensive agents, confronting a proliferator would more 
closely approximate Figure 3-28. 
III.D. Justification of BANE Modular Development and Upgrade Potential 
BANE was developed using a modular paradigm for creating an ABM and MAS 
nonproliferation assessment computational ecosystem. Entities involved in proliferation 
are not monolithic; but, rather proliferation involves collections of individuals 
simultaneously working together or at odds to achieve a set of objectives. ABM 
facilitates granular agent definitions. 
The BANE foundation is the Netica Bayesian inference methodology. The 
original static Bayesian inference proliferation assessment models were built using the 
Netica GUI. However, BANE really became modular and dynamic when the Netica API 
based wrapper modules were created. The Netica API modules allowed agents to modify 
the Netica .dne files underlying the Netica GUI proliferation models. 
Intelligent agents make multiple decisions informed by the best proliferation 
information available to them. With modules each major type of intelligent decision 
making can be sectioned off for independent testing and exploration within BANE. New 
ways to further define agent choices lead to the development of additional linked 
modules. Agents can consider data across a range of categories such as resource 
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expenditures versus detection risks to select the best proliferation posture suiting their 
goals. 
In BANE the modules were developed with the goal of being agent reusable to 
reduce computational loads. SQL interface modules access and alter database tables that 
store a wide range of information types. Agent predictions and accessing information on 
other agents incurs uncertainty penalties. Cooperation and animosity between agents is 
governed by affinity and influence modules. Omniscience and monitoring modules 
capture defensive agent realism struggles for ascertaining and addressing proliferation. 
Upgrades across all BANE modules in response to new proliferation or counter 
proliferation technologies and methods is easily performed. Emerging proliferation 
technologies can be added to the Netica .dne proliferation network files using the Netica 
GUI or Netica API text configuration. Handling uranium-233 proliferation pathways is 
an upgradable BANE possibility. New technologies and associated signatures for 
pyroprocessing proliferation can be incorporated into BANE to expand its utility. 
Counter proliferation decision makers will always face being caught by a black 
swan proliferation event. An upgradable BANE tool will let them explore how different 
international treaty engagements, technology controls, and monitoring regimes can 
reduce proliferation risks. Policy and technical analysts can contribute to BANE 
improvements by providing module input in the area of expertise. 
III.E. BANE Tiered Operations and Input Data 
BANE is currently built and run using Microsoft Visual Studio 2013 and SQL 
Server Management Studio 2012. Proprietary software such as the Netica API and GUI 
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is used for the Bayesian inference BANE core. However, there are no restrictions on 
owning the Microsoft products or Netica. The cost of Visual Studio and SQL Server is 
not prohibitively high. The low educational, or even commercial, costs of the Netica API 
and GUI should not be major barriers for more open source BANE contribution and 
development. 
Including a wide array of social science, nuclear and related technical experts, 
and machine learning specialists will definitely benefit BANE upgrades. Global 
proliferation awareness varies significantly between entities. With BANE, proliferation 
system information is used to tune agent, and in turn simulation, fidelity. Developing 
and enhancing BANE decision making mechanics requires nothing more than readily 
available proliferation reports. Allowing a broad range of code developers to enhance 
BANE is another option. 
Tiered operation of BANE is possible for users with proprietary information. 
Different paths forward could happen for those BANE users. They could directly 
develop specialized BANE modules that meet their specific needs. A partnership with a 
BANE developer could allow the funding entity to direct module additions by providing 
guidance on a range of future needs. It would then be the BANE developer‟s job in the 
partnership to provide newly empowered BANE modules. If appropriate some of the 
developed BANE modules, but probably not the input information, would be made 
available to a wider audience. The sharing of upgrade modules will help maintain the 
BANE nonproliferation ecosystem. 
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 CHAPTER IV  
AGENT EMPOWERING BANE MODULES IN ABM CONTEXT 
 
Technical success varies based on the agent class and their desired nuclear 
proliferation, or nonproliferation, posture. This is fundamental to BANE. Intelligent 
agent actions are a requirement of ABM and provided modularly within BANE. 
Technical decision making is linked to the calculations agents make in other modules 
regarding real world proliferation trade-offs. 
IV.A. BANE Agent Technical Success Decision Making 
The field of information theory evolved from communication theory proposed by 
Claude E. Shannon in 1948.
87
 Information theory began as a means to determine 
information content attributes along the lines of data compression, storage, and 
communication.
88
 Two integral parts of information theory are Claude Shannon‟s 
entropy measure for a random variable‟s information content and the area of mutual 
information between random variables. Shannon entropy, or just entropy, quantifies 
information compression and associated uncertainty. Mutual information considers rates 
of information exchange.  
Numerous fields have employed cutting edge information theory and research. 
Several major areas include economics, social sciences, intelligence, communications, 
electronics, and nuclear engineering. Within the nuclear engineering field, one 
application of information theory is improving fuel cycle material flows for possible 
reprocessing extraction candidates associated with repository loading schemes.
89
 For 
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BANE agent technical success decisions, entropy reduction and mutual information are 
valuable and complementary information theory aspects for proliferation analysis. 
IV.A.1. Shannon Entropy and Mutual Information Based Technical Success 
The BANE Bayesian inference network approach for managing agent technical 
progress is based on physics defined proliferation constraints. Agents make decisions by 
considering their perceptions for achieving technical success meeting their objectives. 
Proliferation pathways evolve as aggregated agent decisions introduce more data 
indicating proliferation intentions and corresponding key technology investments. The 
additional information reduces the entropy associated with a particular agent goal being 
achieved. The Netica GUI and APIs can be configured for entropy reduction through 
mutual information determinations of the Netica network node proliferation 
relationships. 
Shannon Entropy Overview 
The probability and statistics basis of entropy meshes well with the BANE 
Bayesian inference framework for guiding agent technical success choices. Entropy, H, 
can be written in a generic form that is the foundation of more advanced entropy 
equations used in BANE. The general entropy equation is:
90
 
      H ln fX E I X E p X         4-1 
where A is a discrete random variable with state mapping values {x1, …, x||X||} and 
probability mass function (PMF),    (X); expected value operator, E; and, information 
content, I, comprising the discrete random variable information content. 
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Equation 4-1 introduces formatting useful for entropy information processing. 
Random variables that are discrete have set value ranges that lend themselves to PMFs. 
Continuous random variables, by contrast, require probability density functions (PDFs). 
In information theory, the emphasis on a “particular” random variable‟s uncertainty 
under specific different conditions lends itself to using PMFs.
91
 Two different PMF sets 
are shown in Figure 4-1 for the probability of variable Y with respect to variable X. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Probability mass functions.
91 
 
PMFs cannot have negative probabilities for any discrete state and the 
summation of all states must be 1. A straight forward PMF example for any side x of a 
fair six sided dice X is: 
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 
 
 
1 , 1,2,3,4,5,6
6
0, 1,2,3,4,5,6
X i
x
p x
x
 
 

 4-2 
In Equation 4-2 the PMF pX (xi) differs from    (X) because pX (xi) is the PMF 
for a single discrete state, xi. The pX (xi) dictates that for any of the six dice sides, 1 
through 6, there is a 1/6 probability any particular side turns up. The bottom part of 
Equation 4-2 defines the sample space being only 1 through 6. Since no other option is 
available the PMF is zero everywhere else outside the sample space. A PMF can contain 
the information content for a random variable with the form: 
    logb fI X p X   4-3 
The logb in the Equation 4-3 is the generic form used in Equation 4-1 for 
information content. Using ln is based on the assumption of a natural logarithm base. 
Other logarithmic bases, such as binary with a b = 2, are valid. The entropy thus 
maintains a functional relationship with a random variable PMF or other distribution. 
The expectation value for information content in X is encompassed by: 
 
1
( ) i X i
i
E X x p x


  4-4 
For n evenly distributed possible events, like the six sided fair dice, {x1, …, x||n||} 
the probability is 1/n. The entropy uncertainty, u, needed to define the set of n outcomes 
for x is: 
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 logbu n  4-5 
In BANE, entropy and uncertainties stack on each other. The additive property of 
logarithms makes combing Equation 4-5 event uncertainties possible. If the uncertainty 
associated with m evenly distributed possible events is pooled with n events then: 
     log log logb b bu nm n m    4-6 
Decomposing the uncertainty for a single event yields the surprisal, ui.
92
 The 
surprisal for a single event in a uniform set is defined as: 
 
 
1 1
log log , 1,...,i b b
X i
u i n
p x n
   
           
 4-7 
Another form of Equation 4-7 is needed to handle non-uniform events. The 
surprisal for a single non-uniform event is: 
  logi b X iu p x   4-8 
For a lower probability pX(xi), the result is pX(xi) → 0. This causes higher 
uncertainty and surprise leading to ui → ∞ for event xi. The average outcome set 
uncertainty is     : 
      
1 1
log
n n
X i i X i b X i
i i
u p x u p x p x
 
     4-9 
The derivation for individual and aggregate entropy and information content 
uncertainty is needed for defining more advanced entropy equations forms. When 
formulating his entropy theory, Shannon proved the exchangeable nature of information 
entropy and uncertainty.
93
 The explicit entropy using Equation 4-1 can be written as:
94
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         
1 1
H log
n n
X i i X i b X i
i i
X p x I x p x p x
 
      4-10 
The joint entropy of the discrete random variables X and Y are:
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      ,H , , log ,X Y b X
x y
X Y p x y p x y   4-11 
In Equation 4-11 pX,Y(x,y) is a joint PMF (JPMF), sometimes called a joint 
probability distribution function. The JPMF captures the probabilities for the combined 
state possibilities when considering multiple discrete variables together. The additive 
property of independent random variable entropy builds on the logarithmic additive 
property from Equation 4-6. The entropy additive form follows: 
 H , ( ) ( ) ( , x) p ( )p (y)XY X YX Y H X H Y if p x x    4-12 
For a set of variables X1 to Xn, the joint entropy is greater than or equal to any of 
the individual, Xi, entropies: 
     1 1H ,...,X max ,...,n nX H X H X     4-13 
The joint entropy is less than or equal to the summation of individual, 
statistically independent variables entropies: 
   1
1
H ,...,X
n
n i
i
X H X

  4-14 
Conditional entropy is based on the joint entropy definition. The entropy 
conditional probabilities link to conditional Bayesian analysis for two independent, and 
discrete random variables X and Y. The information required to determine variable X‟s 
state given the state of variable Y is the conditional entropy and given by: 
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 H | ( , ) ( )X Y H X Y H Y   4-15 
Rewriting the conditional entropy Equation 4-15 using the PMF definition of 
entropy in Equation 4-10 yields: 
   
 
 , ,
H | , log
,
Y
X Y b
y Y x X X Y
p y
X Y p x y
p x y 
 
   
 
  4-16 
The conditional Bayes probability in Equation 2-6 for knowing A if B is known 
is very similar to Equation 4-16 for conditional entropy. The similarities between the 
two probability types is fundamental to why using entropy reduction can inform agents 
within a BANE Bayesian framework. 
Mutual Information Overview 
The mutual information, I, is a relationship of the information content shared 
between two or more variables. For discrete random variables X and Y the mutual 
information is: 
 ; (X) ( | )I X Y H H X Y   4-17 
Constraints on Equation 4-17 include I(X; Y) = I(Y; X) and I(X; Y) ≥ 0. Mutual 
information can be used almost synonymously with entropy reduction. Therefore, 
mutual information can be written as: 
   
 
 , ,
; , log
,
Y
X Y b
y Y x X X Y
p y
I X Y p x y
p x y 
 
   
 
  4-18 
Mutual information quantifies the average reduction in uncertainty for X once the 
value of Y is learned. Conversely, mutual information relates the average information 
amount X provided regarding Y. Conditional mutual information allows for large data 
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relationship interdependences to be analyzed. Understanding the conditional mutual 
information of X and Y based on a third random variable Z in an entropy context is: 
 ; | (X | Z) ( | , )I X Y Z H H X Y Z   4-19 
The three variable conditional mutual information can be rewritten in Equation 4-
18 format using JPMFs: 
   
   
   
, ,
, ,
,Z Y,Z
, ,
; | , , log
,z y,z
Z X Y Z
X Y Z b
z Z y Y x X X
p z p x y z
I X Y Z p x y z
p x p  
 
   
 
  4-20 
The conditional mutual information in Equation 4-20 still holds I(X: Y|Z) ≥ 0 as 
a requirement. The mutual information format I(X; Y|Z) may be modified only by 
adding conjunctive linkages in any location occupied by X, Y, or Z. Consider I(X, Y; U, 
V | Z, W) as a case in point. I(X, Y; U, V | Z, W) relates the average information U and 
V indicated for X and Y, carrying the assumption of knowing Z and W. Figure 4-2 
provides a physical representation of the overlaps between entropy and mutual 
information.
96
 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Entropy and mutual information overlap.
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The overlay from Figure 4-2 indicates how joint entropy for X and Y can be 
defined using single variable entropy, conditional entropy, and mutual information. The 
Figure 4-2 entropy equation overlaps mirror those for Bayesian probabilities. The 
similarity is particularly strong for conditional entropy and probability. 
Agent Entropy and Mutual Information Guidance in BANE 
Entropy and mutual information are integral to BANE agents‟ proliferation and 
counter proliferation decision making. From a BANE technical perspective, a major 
entropy reduction advantage is its consistency for positive or negative correlations. 
Assessing primarily the connection relationships between physics grounded technical 
nodes facilitates proliferating and defensive agents sharing the same technical selection 
methodology. The uranium enrichment pathways example is useful for understanding 
scientific determinants and their associated mutual information as they relate to 
proliferation options. A schematic for uranium enrichment nodes at a higher level is 
presented in Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-3. High level proliferation network level mutual information example 
 
In Figure 4-3, an agent uses mutual information for assessing the pathways for a 
nuclear weapon acquisition. The proliferation network example shows the relationship 
that the uranium enrichment routes provide relative to the nuclear weapons acquisition 
objective. The mutual information values are not probabilities; and, therefore the values 
do not sum to 1.0. Other proliferation pathways options not shown in Figure 4-3 have 
mutual information values that balance the gas diffusion, gas centrifuge, and laser 
enrichment values shown.  
Generally, but not always, the parent nodes have and higher mutual information 
levels than their children unless they are on a separate proliferation pathway branch. 
Intuitively this makes sense because Netica Bayesian network parent nodes are 
Uranium 
Enrichment
Gas Diffusion
Gas 
Centrifuge
Laser 
Enrichment
0.10
0.20
0.03
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influenced by their children. However, to achieve mastery of a parent nodes means some 
set of children nodes were obtained.  
The BANE uranium enrichment subset, in Figure 3-7 is used for illustrating 
actual Bayesian inference technical success options; and, the network subset is also 
applicable as an example of entropy and mutual information. In Figure 3-7 the 
proliferating agent exhibits a preference for pursuing gas centrifuges. Several moderate 
affinity assistance transfers in the laser enrichment realm shift the proliferator 
probability and entropy values. Figure 4-4 shows the Netica visualization perspective, 
and associated probability changes, from the laser enrichment probability assistance. 
In the Netica visualization section III.C.1, Figure 3-16 shows how grey Netica 
nodes indicate network changes. The increased proliferator capabilities shown in Figure 
4-4 illustrate the higher proliferation likelihood with laser enrichment over the time steps 
with laser enrichment technology transfers. Correspondingly, the gas centrifuges and the 
other enrichment technologies all declined. Table 4-1 indicates the entropy reduction for 
the top 25 proliferation network nodes for Figure 3-7 and Figure 4-4. The rule for mutual 
information values being real numbers between 0 and 1 was followed in Table 4-I. 
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Figure 4-4. BANE uranium enrichment network entropy and mutual information overlap 
 
With Figure 3-7 the proliferator is in the initial nuclear weapon program stage 
and favors gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. The first section in Table 4-1 is for the 
Figure 3-7 situation where the agent seeks a latent deterrent uranium enrichment 
program. The technical nodes having the highest mutual information for the Figure 3-7 
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scenario are weighted towards gas centrifuges, as shown in Table 4-I. The second 
section of Table 4-1 contains the mutual information for the Figure 4-4 laser enrichment 
latent deterrent case. The highest mutual information technical nodes in the second 
section of Table 4-1 are heavily slanted towards those further sustaining laser 
enrichment. 
Capturing real world variations amongst and between individuals, corporations, 
NGOs, and governments to the greatest possible extent improves BANE fidelity. 
Increasingly accurate data connections lead to improved BANE mutual information ties. 
If a proliferator and a defensive agent were exactly matched across all areas a stalemate 
would occur with the proliferation frozen in place. However, “exact” equality occurring 
across proliferation affecting resources, forecasting or executing indigenous research, 
international connections, and counter proliferation skills is virtually impossible.  
Areas such as agent internal and external uncertainty on awareness and 
capabilities meld well with mutual information decision making. Coupling mutual 
information and uncertainty randomization, for instance, can create incorrect agent 
perceptions causing sub-optimal choices. The problem of incorrect data linkages plagues 
both individuals and powerful government agencies. When the stakes are nuclear 
proliferation with the associated military, economic, and political costs, the wrong 
information assessments have profound regime and national security implications. 
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Table 4-I. Proliferation network entropy change following affinity technology transfer 
 
 
Number
Netica Proliferation 
Node
Proliferation Base Case 
Mutual Information
Netica Proliferation 
Node
Post-Laser Enrichment 
Transfers Mutual 
Information
1 UF6 0.25081
Laser Isotope 
Separation
0.66664
2 Compressors 0.25081 Tehnical Capability 0.63161
3
Gaseous Centrifuge 
Enrichment
0.20622 Ion Collectors 0.48285
4
Aerodynamic Isotope 
Seperations
0.09774 Argon Son Laser 0.47764
5 High Speed Motors 0.09206 carbon dioxide laser 0.47764
6 High Strength Tubes 0.09206 Uranium Metal 0.47764
7 Bellows 0.09206 Copper Vapor Laser 0.47764
8
Filament Winding 
Machine
0.09206
Neodymium Doped 
Laser
0.47764
9 Magnetic Bearings 0.09206 Raman shifter 0.44375
10 High Strength Rotors 0.09206
single mode dye 
oscillator
0.32392
11 Maraging Steel 0.06722 dye oscillators 0.21283
12 Energy Requirements 0.06432 Alexandrite laser 0.17011
13
Gaseous Diffusion 
Enrichment
0.06147 pulsed excimer laser 0.16844
14 Cooling Requirements 0.05644 Electron Gun 0.05783
15 Carbon Composites 0.04838
Gaseous Centrifuge 
Enrichment
0.03944
16
High Strength 
Aluminum
0.04838 UF6 0.02128
17
Multiplane Balancing 
Machine
0.0364 Compressors 0.02128
18 H2 0.03166
Aerodynamic Isotope 
Seperations
0.01964
19
Electro-Magnetic 
Isotope
0.02901
Gaseous Diffusion 
Enrichment
0.01254
20 Large Facilities 0.01425 High Speed Motors 0.00809
21
Laser Isotope 
Separation
0.00461 High Strength Tubes 0.00809
22 Ion Collectors 0.00451 Magnetic Bearings 0.00809
23 Magnetic Seperators 0.00411 Bellows 0.00809
24 Electromagnets 0.00411
Filament Winding 
Machine
0.00809
25 UCl4 0.00411 High Strength Rotors 0.00809
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IV.A.2. Netica Cases for Agent Information 
A powerful Netica GUI and API feature for agent decision making involves 
Netica “Cases”. With Netica Cases, agents can assess the associations between technical 
components along nuclear proliferation pathways. For clarity purposes, the definition of 
a proliferation pathway is all the knowledge, technology, and equipment needed to 
achieve a nuclear weapons program goal. Depending upon the proliferation pathway 
branch, its pursuit can alleviate the need to acquire specific capabilities unique to 
another proliferation pathway branch. Branches on proliferation pathways may each 
require several common nuclear or non-nuclear technologies. A simplified uranium 
enrichment network is illustrated in Figure 4-5 using Boolean logic in a fault tree 
diagram. 
 
 
Figure 4-5. Boolean logic fault tree simplification for Netica proliferation network 
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Figure 4-5 demonstrates the nature of key nuclear proliferation knowledge, 
technology, and equipment elements. At the top of Figure 4-5 is the uranium enrichment 
parent gate with 5 children representing possible enrichment methods. Uranium 
enrichment is an OR gate because a proliferator only needs to possess any one capability 
to succeed. If a particular aspect of one proliferation pathway is too challenging, then 
another route might let the agent entirely bypass that hurdle. 
Each of the 5 uranium enrichment methods are configured as AND gates. At 
least two different proliferation aspects are needed for the different uranium enrichment 
methods to be successful. In actuality, the 5 uranium enrichment methods in Figure 4-5 
should be a mixture of AND and OR gates for full Netica network accuracy. Gas 
centrifuge rotors and tubes can be fabricated using a variety of material feedstock. A 
number of lasers might be modified and tuned to succeed in creating a selective uranium 
atom ionization mechanism. However, the children nodes for uranium enrichment 
depicted in Figure 4-5 are all needed for the particular parent method. This justifies 
AND gates being appropriate for descriptive purposes. 
Some of the Figure 4-5 uranium enrichment bottom level nodes are specific to 
one uranium enrichment method. These include Magnetic Bearings and centrifuge rotor 
Bellows which are bolded and italicized. Other nodes that represent proliferation aspects 
shared between uranium enrichment methods are bolded and italicized, but also noted in 
red. The shared nodes in Figure 4-5, and especially in the BANE proliferation network, 
have major proliferation implications by enabling hedging.  
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When running Cases, Netica relies on the current network equations indicated in 
section II.B, Figure 2-3. Every possible set of node state arrangements is first defined in 
Netica based on Netica GUI user or agent Netica API choices. For a Netica Case, the 
number of possible states, n, for a set with i nodes where each node has m states is 
governed by: 
1
i
i
n m

  4-21 
Netica then uses the node governing equations to convert the node state 
probabilities into deterministic node state outcome distributions. The run distributions 
are tabulated, and if using 100 runs the result is a node state outcome occurrence 
probability. The occurrence probability for different state arrangements of the bolded 
and italicized nodes in Figure 4-5 using Netica Cases are shown in Table 4-II. 
The Table 4-II example only uses nodes with true or false outcomes; but, Netica 
Cases work with nodes having more than two states to understand proliferation network 
technical linkages. For the starting proliferator in Figure 3-7, the most likely outcome is 
that almost 60% of the time the proliferator fails to master any nodes. A more capable 
proliferator with an advanced uranium enrichment program or greater resource and 
technical base would have a lower all false occurrence probability.  
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Table 4-II. Proliferation forecasting using Netica Cases 
 
 
Consideration should be given for a serious nuclear proliferator having no 
uranium enrichment capability. The proliferator could elect to pursue the plutonium 
proliferation pathway with natural uranium fuel. Above the Figure 4-5 top level uranium 
enrichment OR gate would be another OR gate for obtaining SNM. With BANE network 
expansion, other proliferation routes besides uranium-235 enrichment and aqueous 
plutonium reprocessing could be added. An example is thorium-232 based generation of 
U-233 and its subsequent reprocessing. 
Returning to Table 4-II, the next most probable occurrence is that only UF6 
mastery is true. Quick inspection of Figure 3-7 or Figure 4-5 shows how UF6 is used in 3 
out of the 5 uranium enrichment methods. A proliferator seeking to hedge proliferation 
Probability (%) UF6 Ion Collectors Magnetic Bearings Bellows
0.633 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.121 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE
0.121 TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE
1.235 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE
5.791 TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE
1.025 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE
1.025 TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE
10.436 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE
0.069 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE
0.711 FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE
0.711 FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE
7.277 FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE
0.557 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE
5.747 FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE
5.747 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE
58.794 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
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bets can pursue a shared node allowing a quick jump into which ever pathway becomes 
most enticing. The situational changes that facilitate an eventual pathway selection after 
hedging include new affinity connections or changes in available indigenous resources 
or technology. With latent deterrence the hedging option plays a role when comparing 
technical success to other factors like non-detection. Often the shared technology is 
foundational to more advanced proliferation research and operation. The basic nature of 
shared technology can in turn make it harder to associate with treaty or dual usage 
violations supporting a nuclear weapons program. 
After UF6, the second most likely single outcome from the Table 4-II Case is that 
only Ion Collectors are present amongst the nodes. As with UF6, Ion Collectors are 
important for 2 of the 5 uranium enrichment methods. A proliferator could again hedge 
by pursuing ion collectors and at a later stage decide whether to go for laser enrichment 
or EMIS. 
The chances of the Magnetic Bearings or Bellows used in gas centrifuges 
occurring separately is actually slightly less likely than them occurring together with 
UF6. For a proliferator pursuing gas centrifuge enrichment the AND gate nature has an 
impact. Obtaining any of the Magnetic Bearings, Bellows, or UF6 components alone has 
far less utility than possessing them all for a gas centrifuge. If the proliferator invests 
resources in one of the necessary AND nodes not benefitting another pathway, they are 
“pot committing” to a particular proliferation route. The Magnetic Bearings or Bellows 
are less likely to appear alone than the UF6 or Ion Collectors, since they are only 
applicable to the gas centrifuge proliferation pathway. 
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The chance of the UF6 and Ion Collectors showing up together represent a 
proliferator uranium enrichment hedging at a low level. The occurrence of UF6 with just 
Magnetic Bearings or Bellows is the next most possible situation. However, it represents 
a proliferator committing to obtaining a unique gas centrifuge component but not 
sufficiently to obtain the other requisite components to master the technology. 
For a defensive agent, Netica Cases are also valuable for ascertaining 
proliferating agent future pathway options. A defensive agent benefits from knowing the 
Boolean logic fault tree layout for proliferator pathway technical requirements. The key 
AND gate component bottlenecks represent opportunities for establishing difficult to 
overcome proliferation hurdles.  
Figure 4-5 and Table 4-II indicate how Magnetic Bearings and Bellows are both 
necessary gas centrifuge constituents. An intelligent defensive agent recognizing this 
fact could focus on denying the proliferator mastery of a particular technology. Without 
an AND gate technology the proliferator could not achieve mastery of that proliferation 
pathway. Focusing on fewer technology, knowledge, or equipment denials is easier for a 
resource constrained defensive agent to undertake for several reasons. First, a defensive 
agent might not have the resources or connections to stop a concentrated proliferating 
agent across all proliferation pathways. By denying a few crucial capabilities, the 
defensive agent can have an oversized proliferation impact. 
Second, in reality a counter proliferation entity cannot declare all areas of global 
trade banned due to proliferation concerns. Business and economic interests in the 
country would lobby and use their influence to weaken and circumvent trade restrictions 
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if they became overly restrictive. In addition, there would be a threshold where 
businesses located in other countries would step in to make sales. At some point the 
national interests of economic growth and preventing unemployment would override 
poorly substantiated restraints. National security and alliance preservation can also affect 
the willingness of states to curtail certain types of trade depending upon the intended 
recipient. Like a real counter proliferation entity, a defensive agent will have greater 
success in building counter proliferation coalitions if the banned trade area is tightly 
focused. 
Third, recognizing proliferator investments in hedging technologies can help a 
defensive agent shift a proliferating agent towards another nuclear weapons program 
pathway. The shifting can force the proliferating agent to spend more resources or ease 
the detection on potential partner defensive agent. With BANE tying the demand and 
supply side proliferation drivers, making the supply side costs greater could shift the 
demand push. Section I.B discussed how the South Koreans and Taiwanese pulled back 
from nuclear proliferation under pressure from the United States as a powerful security 
and economic patron. 
IV.B. Optimization for Constrained Agents 
Technical success along any step of a proliferation pathway requires economic 
investments and detection risks over a period of time. Proliferating agents seek optimal 
solutions balancing these concerns based on their capabilities. Defensive agents use the 
technical success, resource, detection probability, and time considerations differently in 
pursuing their defined optimal counter proliferation posture. 
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Unless acted upon by an outside agent, once technical progress has occurred for a 
proliferation step it remains available. Along a pathway step, resource allocation, Ei, and 
detection probability, Di, attributes are partially cumulative. Resource recovery and 
memory retention and fading rates vary based on the agent for adjusting resource 
placement and detection risk accumulation. Allocating resources alters agent 
proliferation and counter proliferation pursuits based on information loss according to:  
 max , 10
,
1 ,
, 1 *log
*
, 0
i t
E E i E
tot i E i
i E E i
if i C w y i
E E w
if i C w


   
 
 
  4-22 
In Equation 4-22, i is time increment, 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 is maximum time for summation function, 
w(E,i) is a resource weighting factor, yE is an agent specific resource factor, and 𝐶E is an 
associated resource time constant before recovery occurs. 
An updated detection probability for contemporary BANE agents takes the 
proliferation step aggregation and introduces memory loss. The decline in proliferation 
memory mirrors real world institutional information losses. Proliferation and counter 
proliferation expert knowledge of past proliferation actions atrophies. Updated detection 
probability memory retention changes agent proliferation and counter proliferation 
perceptions based on:  
 max D, 10
D,
1 D,
, 1 *log
*
, 0
i t
D i D
tot i i
i D i
if i C w y i
D D w
if i C w


   
 
 
  4-23 
In Equation 4-23, i is time increment, 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 is maximum time for summation function, 
𝑤(D,i) is a detection probability weighting factor, yD is an agent specific detection 
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probability factor, and 𝐶D is an associated detection probability time constant before 
memory fading occurs. 
The time based limitations in Equations 4-22 and 4-23 cover some of the BANE 
agent specific nuclear proliferation attributes. Several of the real world limitations 
applicable to proliferating agents are indicated in Table 4-III. 
 
Table 4-III. Proliferating agent challenges and associated implications 
 
 
Table 4-III contains factors modifying proliferating agent parameters expressed 
as variables for Equation 4-22 and 4-23. A major proliferation challenge is that research 
takes time to yield nuclear and non-nuclear components for a weapons program. The 
technical success is a function of the different nuclear proliferation resources an agent 
can call upon. Resources can be allocated to faster proliferation technical success with 
an associated detection penalty. Simply adding more proliferation resources suffers 
diminishing returns. More rapid progress may lead to greater proliferation detection 
Resource Detection
Proliferation budget allocation Produce proliferation signatures
Money unavailable for other security 
or economic purposes
Introduce government and private 
sector fiscal irregularities
Entity economic growth Proliferation budget trajectory
Proliferation budget indicators are 
changed
International connections Alter proliferation expenditures
Corporate and key individual trades 
and deals emerge
Reduce indignenous proliferation 
program scope
Hostility and frustration amongst 
forced entities
Increase proliferation program 
financial efficiency
Grudging support
Implications
Limitations
Proliferation research
Compulsion and coercion 
for global assistance
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probabilities triggering defensive agent interventions. Still, increasing proliferation 
budgets can pay proliferation dividends when the proliferating agent economic situation 
is improving. 
Hiding proliferation amongst large volumes of global trade and domestic 
corporation transactions is easier for a well-connected proliferator. From a probabilistic 
standpoint, a global pariah has a higher detection chance since fewer interactions must 
be monitored. A powerful proliferator can also engage in international compulsion on 
nuclear proliferation. However, there may arise future resource or detection costs that 
can backfire. The jaded support might have lax communications security and be 
unconcerned about the proliferation leaking out. 
BANE defensive agents using Equations 4-22 and 4-23 will bring unique counter 
proliferation variable parameter values. Table 4-IV describes several major counter 
proliferation areas that defensive entities face. 
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Table 4-IV. Defensive agent challenges and associated implications 
 
 
A number of defensive agent challenges considered in BANE are described in 
Table 4-IV. From a defensive agent standpoint counter proliferation research pays 
dividends in improving abilities to detect, assess, hinder, rollback, and collapse 
proliferation networks. Better technology may lead to more accurate proliferation 
information; but, blind faith in the technology can exacerbate incorrect information 
beliefs. A defensive economic situation can affect whether resources reach critical 
counter proliferation programs. If the entity the defensive agent belongs to is undergoing 
economic ascendancy, then even inefficient funding plans can still create counter 
proliferation gains. 
Domestic and international cooperation between defensive agents is not always 
smooth. Within states, government bureaucracies can expend almost as much effort in 
turf battles as achieving their missions. Acrimonious relations can degrade the 
Resource Detection
Counter proliferation budget 
allocation
Alters capabilities for assessing 
different proliferation activities
Resources focusing on analysis, for 
instance, cannot be spent on taking 
action against proliferation
Expending resources is not the same 
for all defensive acros every counter 
proliferation area
Entity economic situation
Less bueracratic fighting in budget 
expansion versus contraction
Fluctuations in different aspects of 
counter proliferation
Domestic relationships
Funding redundancy and repeating 
prior research
Counter proliferation methods, 
technologies, and awareness fails to 
match funding expectations
International connections
Areas of responsibility allows for 
lower individual costs
Complementary counter 
proliferation skill sets are more 
effective when interests align
Limitations
Implications
Available budget
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effectiveness of even high levels of counter proliferation funding. International contacts 
matter for defensive agents because of unique access, skill sets, and capabilities. 
Alignment can be a challenge for international defensive agent cooperation. 
Nonetheless, diverse counter proliferation partnerships can extend across more 
proliferation territory making such programs riskier. 
Equations 4-22 and 4-23 are important for understanding how BANE agents 
optimize multiple proliferation considerations in Tables 4-III and 4-IV simultaneously. 
Temporal linkages force agents to confront their past choices. This prevents short term 
risk taking from turning into unrealistic long term BANE simulation benefits. Accurately 
modeling aspects of the proliferation process aids in drawing appropriate conclusions 
from BANE. 
IV.C. Internal Agent Uncertainties 
The BANE uncertainty modules introduce ambiguity in several nuclear 
proliferation areas. Proliferation and counter proliferation R&D does not proceed at a 
uniform pace. For a particular agent, the uncertainty modules create fluctuations in 
progress at any time step. Figure 4-6 demonstrates agent R&D uncertainty impacts by 
overlaying BANE uncertainty runs at several time steps on a proliferating agent 
simulation. The uncertainty distribution in Figure 4-6 is Gaussian with BANE operating 
in deterministic mode. 
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Figure 4-6. Uncertainty distributions at regular BANE simulation intervals 
 
The deterministic BANE simulation in Figure 4-6 indicates the proliferating 
agent technical success without perturbations. Technical success with uncertainties only 
taken at the time steps for 5, 10, and 15 is included in Figure 4-6 to show uncertainty 
aggregation. At each time step the uncertainty effects build, leading to greater 
fluctuation in technical success.  
Time step 5, in general, will have smaller uncertainties for several reasons. First, 
the variations in technical success are solely due to R&D perturbations associated with 
that time step. Later time steps have their variations plus prior time step uncertainties. 
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Second, the base proliferation R&D performed includes research that is less 
technologically advanced with greater certainty of success. Third, there are more 
hedging opportunities early in proliferation pathways. Slow progress when hedging does 
not remove multiple pathways from being available. This makes recovery from small 
research setbacks less damaging than when pursuing more focused proliferation 
activities. 
At time step 10, there is the potential for slow or fast progress from time step 5 to 
be cancelled out by the opposite occurrence. The randomness of R&D means that a 
progress slow down might precede a major breakthrough. This cancelling relationship 
with a Gaussian, or even R&D range, distribution keeps the technical success progress 
centered somewhat on the deterministic technical success. Of course, with increasing 
uncertainties the deviation from the deterministic technical success grows.  
The BANE simulations at time step 15 display even greater differences due to the 
uncertainty aggregation. Part of the justification for larger BANE simulations further 
along a proliferation pathway is that specialized R&D can cause bigger technical success 
swings. Higher level R&D usually entails more resources and detection considerations. 
A major technical success can enable greater resource or chancier detection in a 
previously unavailable area. Suffering a research setback with advanced R&D can cause 
significant follow-on repercussions that slow-down the nuclear weapons program in 
unexpected ways. 
A very important fact about BANE internal agent uncertainty implications is 
buried in the Figure 4-6 data. Proliferation technical success considers an agent‟s ability 
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to achieve its goal. How the objective is achieved in BANE is left for the agent to decide 
based on dynamic feedback. If an agent makes a technical breakthrough they can pick 
the appropriate proliferation pathway for advancement subject to constraints like 
resource and detection probability. Similarly, a challenge might require additional R&D 
effort to overcome; thereby, making another proliferation pathway more attractive. 
Early in the proliferation decision making, a proliferator might chose HEU or 
plutonium for a weapons pathway based on available infrastructure and expertise. The 
influence of an unexpected affinity proliferation connection could make the other route 
more appealing. The appearance of Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan held major sway for the 
Pakistani program going down the HEU nuclear weapons pathway. In a negative sense, 
enhanced proliferation scrutiny from a defensive agent could negate an expected 
proliferation pathway. Technically the proliferation hurdles might be less of an issue 
than the economic and security isolation during and after the nuclear weapons program. 
IV.D. Temporal Affinity and Influence Evolution Modules 
The affinity framework precursor to BANE was developed and tested using the 
open source Repast Simphony software. Attractive Repast Simphony aspects include 
support for complex system modeling and High Performance Computing (HPC) 
features.
97
 Several programming options for Repast Simphony ABM are JAVA for its 
visualization optimized package and C++ for HPC. An initial Repast Simphony 
advantage was autonomous, modular verification testing of dynamic ABM proliferation 
pathway evolutions.   
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The BANE affinities modules benefitted from Repast Simphony verification 
efforts. An example used for calibrating later BANE affinity modules was a series of 
independent proliferators with desires to establish proliferation networks. The 
proliferating agents seek supplies and technology to overcome proliferation technical 
barriers. Each neutral supplier agent has a certain resistance to serving as a proliferator, 
but that resistance can eventually be overcome by repeated proliferator approaches. 
Wearing down of suspicion, i.e. removing negative influence, is associated with 
continued business and personal relationships between the proliferator and its target 
neutral supplier. 
Once a proliferator has established a proliferation connection, the new 
proliferator proceeds to support the original proliferator by making additional network 
connections. In the ABM case shown in Figure 4-7, there are several hundred neutral 
suppliers, depicted as blue stars. The neutral suppliers have at least relatively beneficial 
nuclear proliferation capabilities. There are only a few initial proliferators, displayed as 
orange triangles. The proliferation network growth is tracked and indicated via red lines 
with arrows depicting affinity relationships. Figure 4-7 shows the affinity model for one 
run of the nuclear technology acquisition network. 
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Figure 4-7. Repast Simphony inspired affinity based nuclear proliferation network 
 
With each Repast Simphony affinity model run, the code stochastically creates 
an iteration with different initial starting affinity proximities between the proliferator and 
potential supplier agents. In addition, each neutral supplier agent resistance to serving as 
a proliferator varies depending upon the run. The dynamic neutral supplier and 
proliferator engagement alters the proliferator‟s estimation of its ability to achieve its 
nuclear weapon goal. The first generation model allowed the user to determine ranges 
for proliferating agent perceptions regarding indigenous knowledge, technology, skills, 
and experience. International proliferation networking influence levels via clandestine or 
dual-use routes are also user adjustable. The proliferation example raised questions later 
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addressed in BANE about permitting corrupted supplier agents to break free from a 
proliferating agent‟s network. The introduction of corrective actions, such as increased 
export controls or neutral supplier government intervention, were explored as 
cooperation ending events.  
The number of illicit nuclear proliferation sales and exchanges happens far more 
regularly than the number of states that successfully developed nuclear weapons. From 
an ABM perspective, that makes ML using pattern recognition and testing / tuning 
analysis much easier. Realistic individual, company, and country data from different 
sources could enable statistically significant nuclear export control and dual use testing 
for validation purposes. Furthermore, individual Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and 
Zangger Committer violations might have similarity to other internationally regulated 
weapon regimes.
98
 The missile technology control regime (MTCR) or the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are two prime candidates for 
exploring respective proliferation violations. Depending on the additional data, 
weighting the MTCR and OPCW transgressions less than the NSG and Zangger 
violations could prove statistically beneficial. 
The affinity and influence adjustments for BANE agents occur on a time step 
basis. Two agents, A and B, might be considering an affinity relationship on category x. 
The agent affinities are therefore, AX and Bx. The governing constraints for insufficient 
BANE affinity are: 
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2 || 8x xA B   4-24 
The agent affinities can be governed by Equation 4-24 leading to a cooperation 
failure for a wide range of reasons. A primary justification underlying the lack of 
interaction might be lack of proximity. The absence of trust, mutual commitment, or 
deep common interest is detrimental to proliferation engagement. The sufficient BANE 
affinity regimes are governed by: 
 & 2x xA B   4-25 
 8 &x xA B  4-26 
Equations 4-25 encompasses situations such as collaboration due to mutual 
opposition to a particular state or set of beliefs. While Equation 4-26 represents positive 
cooperation affinity for reasons such as shared history or alliance. The BANE affinity 
modules treat affinity as a snapshot in time, so updates are needed to coincide with 
changing global power and relationship dynamics. 
Time based affinities in BANE draw upon the influence modules to represent 
agent opportunities and challenges for proliferation related exchanges. The BANE agent 
influence variations are handled in intervals across multiple categories. The basis of 
affinity stems from the distinctive agent initial affinity and influence changes: 
, ,0x i x xA A F t   4-27 
t is time, 𝐴(𝑥,𝑖) is agent affinity at a particular time, 𝐴(𝑥,0) is initial agent affinity level, F𝑥 
is agent specific influence change rate. 
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BANE affinities are constrained between 0 and 10 for Equation 4-27. Influence 
adjustments can be positive or negative; and, the agent influence is broken up using 
affinity bin levels. Affinity categories realistically do exhibit interdependence. Economic 
growth can correspond with more security resources being available or an increasingly 
attractive political system. Other influence adjustments equations are possible including 
logarithmic, polynomial, etc. However, exploring more advanced influence equations in 
BANE is beyond the scope of this work. 
IV.E. Omniscience and Monitoring Agent Implications 
The BANE omniscience and monitoring modules build upon several 
optimization and other module features. However the omniscience and monitoring 
modules approach proliferation from a defensive agent oriented perspective. Defensive 
agents seek to locate anomalous behavior that indicate the presence of nuclear 
proliferation. Detecting proliferation relies upon pattern analysis and recognition. 
No entity can ever be entirely omniscient about itself, let alone others. 
Incomplete information can lead to incorrect judgments causing improper actions. The 
reciprocating spiral of failure occurs in real life. Allowing false feedback to send 
defensive agents down the wrong monitoring paths benefits BANE realism. Proliferator 
resource tracking and detection analysis are broad categories with implications for 
defensive agents. Resource and detection arenas offer subtle nuances which different 
defensive agent type‟s parser better. 
The resource recovery rate incorporates the budget cycles for an agent. The 
default BANE approach is a funding cycle aligned with larger state bureaucracies and 
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corporations. Approximately one year budgets are the expected norm. Major deviations 
by an agent from the anticipated resource recovery rate could suggest a proliferation 
operation. Figure 4-8 shows the resource recovery rate for a proliferating agent using a 
budget roughly corresponding to an annual funding cycle. 
 
 
Figure 4-8. Expected agent resource recovery rate 
 
A linear resource recovery rate is included in Figure 4-8 for contrast with the 
logarithm based Equation 4-22. Near the end of a project fiscal cycle Equation 4-22 
handles an increased chance the agent can expend funds again without looking as 
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suspect. The additional resources could appear buried as natural organizational budget 
growth or year-end fiscal tweaking. The linear resource equation is more restrictive on 
resource surges further from initial allocation.  
A defensive agent monitoring and then finding nuclear weapon program R&D is 
not omnipotent. Therefore, counter proliferation is also constrained by the resource 
recovery Equation 4-22. There is a finite supply of resources for defensive agent 
corrective action. This means defensive agents must be careful about how they approach 
setting back proliferation.  
Proliferation detection in BANE accounts for time based information changes 
similarly to resources. Proliferators can have perceptions on their tolerated detection 
level. Depending upon the proliferation progress and the monitoring detection agent the 
detection threshold is insufficient to avoid raising suspicion. If the proliferator just 
undertook a R&D proliferation step with heightened signatures, for instance, then less 
capable defensive agents may be alerted. Figure 4-9 shows the detection memory losses 
associated with a defensive agent monitoring suspected proliferation.  
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Figure 4-9. Expected defensive agent memory loss 
 
Proliferation awareness falters over intervals as illustrated in Figure 4-9. 
Defensive agents lose the ability to correlate linked proliferation activities over time. 
The logarithmic based Equation 4-23 addresses the rapid decline in memory the longer 
between event occurrence and needed recollection. A proposed linear detection memory 
loss is overlaid on Figure 4-9. The memory loss response with Equation 4-23 better 
approximates the difficulty for defensive agents to draw proliferation conclusion. This is 
particularly true for seemingly disparate events separated by substantial time periods. 
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Wrapped up in proliferation detection are numerous physical, environmental, 
electronic, human capital, and other signature types. Investments in uncovering 
environmental signatures might lead to detection weaknesses against electronic 
proliferation trails. A more nuanced set of detection equations would increase defensive 
agent granularity. Exploring missing proliferation detection chances due to poor 
defensive agent cooperation could be informative for decision makers. However, 
unwrapping the BANE detection equation into many signature constituents exceeds the 
thesis boundaries. 
Another area of note is including uncertainties on defensive agent monitoring. 
Ambiguity in defensive agent detection makes errors possible when searching for 
proliferation. Behavior that seems like erratic resource expenditures might not indicate 
proliferation. Failing to correlate rapid proliferation activities can cause nuclear weapon 
programs to be missed for long periods. When the proliferation is noticed again, the task 
of the defensive agent might be far more challenging. 
The memory loss response representing Equation 4-23 in Figure 4-9 does not 
address the actual “detection probability threshold” for defensive agents. Different 
defensive agent detection capabilities may more effectively penetrate proliferation 
networks. Proliferating agents can miscalculate or take risks in pursuing proliferation. If 
the defensive agent detection probability threshold is sufficient it can take advantage of 
the oversight. The memory loss function in Figure 4-9 then factors in for recognizing 
proliferation. Once the proliferation is detected, the defensive agent may begin taking 
counter measures. 
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IV.F. Agent Empowerment Synopsis 
BANE has an array of modules to facilitate intelligent agent actions. The 
modules use entropy and mutual information for proliferation pathway determinations 
based on technical success. Optimization modules incorporate resource and detection 
criteria that modifies the preferred agent choices. Lacking omnipotence, BANE agents 
can experience proliferation setbacks. However, they can sometime make major 
breakthroughs ahead of schedule. 
Affinity proliferation connections open up opportunities for major pathway 
jumps. Defensive agents can also use affinities to increase their range of coverage to 
counter proliferation. Absent omniscience, BANE defensive agents must continually 
monitor and seek out proliferation in order to hinder or roll back nuclear weapons 
programs. 
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 CHAPTER V 
MODULE VERIFICATION WITHIN BANE 
 
Nuclear nonproliferation verification of BANE is emphasized at the modular 
level. Several of the BANE modules can be tested alone, or a few modules. Within a 
complex ABM or MAS, testing individual agent and small group actions in narrow 
fields builds confidence in complex simulation results. Expected agent behavior can then 
be more robustly checked. 
The BANE module verification testing allows for exploring historical impacts on 
nuclear proliferation activities. The French, South African, Iraqi, and Swedish nuclear 
weapons programs were analyzed. Case study verification and limited validation testing 
of the case studies centered on the BANE Netica GUI and API Parser modules. Prior 
Bayesian analysis work at Texas A&M University was crucial in developing verification 
and limited validation BANE benchmarking.
99,100 
Verifying agent empowerment applications of several BANE modules bounds 
their capabilities for intricately connected proliferation scenarios. Understanding how 
agents handle limitations when balancing multiple constraints can aids tuning BANE 
towards more real world simulation. In a social science context creating environments 
where a few relationships can alter proliferation opportunities is important. Uncertainties 
plague proliferating and defensive agent progress through information overloading and 
misdirection. Each case considered helps with realizing BANE operating capabilities. 
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V.A. BANE Bayesian Results in ABM Context 
Historical case studies were used for assessing the BANE Bayesian methodology 
cogency. The French and South African nuclear weapon programs are evaluated using 
BANE to test the Netica GUI network. Time based evidence assertions for historical 
cases are incorporated inside BANE modules for the Netica API Parser and Affinities. 
Iraq and Sweden provide another two historical cases for BANE analysis. However, the 
Iraq and Sweden cases use BANE to gauge states not reaching nuclear weapon 
acquisition. Substantiating BANE across multiple proliferation cases prevents 
preferential tuning of the overarching Netica GUI proliferation network to provide 
correct results for just one small sub-set of proliferation scenarios. 
V.A.1. France Nuclear Weapons Program 
Elements within France explored a nuclear weapon program, but official 
government attentiveness following World War II accelerated the effort.
101
 In 1948 
indigenous French uranium mines in the Autun, Limousin, and La Crouzille regions 
were located.
102
 Triggering a domestic French capability for the uranium mine 
acquisition in BANE leads to the uranium enrichment gas centrifuge probability 
increasing. Figure 5-1 shows a 25.8% gas centrifuge true probability as the favored 
enrichment pathway. 
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Figure 5-1. Netica GUI analysis of early French nuclear weapon program uranium 
enrichment pathway 
 
In 1956 the French G-1 production reactor for plutonium became operational.
103
 
Using BANE the domestic reactor node is set to “true” through French research efforts. 
The G-1 reactor addition causes the BANE plutonium implosion pathway technical 
success to rise in Figure 5-2 to 8.51%. BANE correctly maintains some French uranium 
enrichment pathways pathway options through 1956. At 8.72% the HEU gun type 
pathway is marginally higher than the plutonium implosion route. The HEU implosion 
device pathway looks most promising in 1956 with 10.20% true probability. 
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Figure 5-2. Netica GUI analysis of early French nuclear weapon acquisition pathway 
 
The French desire for enhanced prestige, not only within the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) but also on the global stage, coincided with General de 
Gaulle‟s June 1958 rise to power. The French Chemical Separations Plant (CSP) at 
Marcoule started operations in July 1958 using the plutonium uranium exchange 
(PUREX) process. By the end of 1958, CSP produced 0.67 lbs/day of plutonium.
104
 
Within BANE, the French agent obtaining reprocessing and plutonium capabilities 
basically zeroes out all the Figure 5-2 HEU weapon pathways.  
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From a weapon perspective, BANE indicated a 21.6% true probability for the 
French agent pursuing a plutonium weapon. Activating the BANE testing stage to 
indicate awareness of French agent nuclear weapon site preparation agent increases the 
plutonium implosion weapon true probability to 100%. On February 13th, 1960 the 
French conduct their inaugural weapon test with a 70 kiloton plutonium implosion 
device.
105
 Hence, BANE truthfully identifies the first French nuclear weapon conclusion. 
In the BANE French verification case, only major proliferation technologies 
were triggered by the French agent. Smaller nuclear weapons constituents were activated 
as needed, such as specific reprocessing methods or test equipment. Prior to the French 
agent committing to nuclear weapon testing, 20% true probability for the plutonium 
implosion route was the highest indicated by BANE. Results from the French case show 
the limitations of a few large proliferation signatures purely depicting nuclear weapon 
programs. Instead BANE suggests that the culmination of a larger array of smaller 
events form a mosaic specifying proliferation progress. 
The role of identifying single large proliferation facilities for highlighting nuclear 
weapon procurement must be put into proper context. The French case suggests the 
extent large facilities aid particular weapons path selection. Entering intelligence 
collection or other data on significant proliferation technologies does effectively bound 
nuclear weapon acquisition pathways. Absent linkable proof of multiple constituent 
nuclear weapons equipment, a high likelihood of determining the final device success 
type and time is limited. The French BANE scenario results demonstrate the network 
behaves properly. 
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V.A.2. South Africa Nuclear Weapons Program 
South Africa began its nuclear program in the early 1950s, and by 1952 the West 
Rand Consolidated Mine and uranium plant were operational as Figure 5-3 shows.
106
 
The BANE HEU and plutonium weapon pathways indicated in Figure 5-4 for the South 
African agent hover near 7%. Returning to South African uranium enrichment in Figure 
5-3, the 36% gas centrifuge true probability is the highest. Aerodynamic isotope 
separation has the next largest true probability at 17% in 1952.  
 
 
Figure 5-3. Netica GUI analysis of South African nuclear weapon program uranium 
enrichment pathway 
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In 1965 the United States origin Safari-I South Africa reactor initiation occurred. 
A United States agent used a BANE affinity induced transfer to account for the Safari-1 
reactor availability to the South African agent. Obtaining the domestic reactor lowers the 
South African agent gas centrifuge and aerodynamic separation true probabilities to 
24.5% and 11.9%, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5-4. Netica GUI analysis of South African nuclear weapon acquisition pathway 
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The South Africans pursued ultracentrifuge research for uranium enrichment, 
which was assessed to take place in the early 1970s.
107
 Research and acquisition of high 
speed motors in BANE through indigenous South African agent research is granted as a 
technological progress surrogate. With high speed motors the South African agent 
reaches a 78.5% likelihood for its gas centrifuge pathway as shown in Figure 5-3. The 
seeming gas centrifuge preference shifted the HEU gun and implosion weapon true 
probabilities to a little above 10%. In contrast, the 1970 plutonium implosion weapon 
true probability plummeted to just under 2%. 
A BANE affinity interaction takes place to address the 1974 interaction between 
a West German agent providing SNA on uranium enrichment to the South African agent. 
Steinkohlen Elektrizitaia AG (STEAG) was a West German firm whose Becker jet 
nozzle technology was provided to South Africa.
108
 The STEAG knowledge transfer is 
emulated in BANE by giving the South African agent mastery of aerodynamic 
technology children nodes. In response the aerodynamic uranium enrichment true 
probability reaches 77%, while Figure 5-3 indicates the remaining enrichment options 
become negligible. The Figure 5-4 weapon preferences are mostly unchanged, and the 
inclination towards HEU weapons remains. 
The 1975 start of operation at the South African Pelindaba enrichment facility is 
covered in BANE by activating the UF6 node.
109
 As a result the aerodynamic enrichment 
true probability reaches 94.3%. The HEU gun type and implosion weapon likelihoods 
each move up to approximately 15%. The South African nuclear weapons program 
sourced tungsten from several African countries, such as allied Rhodesia, in 1977. 
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Experience with propellants, internal ballistics, and advanced explosive igniters led to a 
1977 gun type test absent an HEU core.
110
 In BANE the gun type weapon test node is 
switched to true based on the South African agent affinity material transfer and 
indigenous high explosive research. The South African agent HEU gun type pathway 
success moved up to 99.4%. By 1977 the South African inclination towards a gun type 
device was apparent; and, the BANE derived proliferation network factually highlights 
the preference by dropping the South African agent HEU implosion weapon pursuit to 
zero.
111
 
BANE module verification studies on South Africa indicate the role knowledge, 
technology, and equipment assistance play in nuclear proliferation pathway selection. 
Obtaining German origin aerodynamic knowledge and expertise incentivized the South 
Africans to pursue an aerodynamic uranium enrichment option. The BANE network 
responded appropriately with the aerodynamic pathway dominating the other uranium 
enrichment pathways. With increasing information, the normalized arrangement of 
BANE networks designates the impact of evolving proliferation decisions on available 
pathways. The importance of a few key affinity support efforts were demonstrated for 
South Africa‟s nuclear weapons program.112 
V.A.3. Iraq Nuclear Weapons Program 
The Soviet Union provided nuclear assistance to Iraq through a 2 (Megawatt) 
MW research reactor, which achieved criticality in 1967. A Soviet agent affinity transfer 
to the Iraqi agent is initiated in BANE for possessing a reactor. With only a reactor the 
BANE pathways for both weapon and enrichment remain low. Obtaining an indigenous 
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uranium mine near the Syria-Iraq border in 1974 aided the Iraqi nuclear program.
113
 
Figure 5-5 shows that in 1974 gaseous centrifuges are the most likely uranium 
enrichment route, with a BANE “true” probability of 22%. 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Netica GUI analysis of Iraq nuclear weapon acquisition pathway 
 
An Iraqi radiochemistry pilot laboratory was constructed in 1976 with Italian 
assistance.
114
 The radiochemistry lab could reprocess plutonium using three radiation 
shielded hot cells. The Italian agent technology transfer facilitates the BANE 
reprocessing capability node activation, causing the Iraqi agent enrichment paths to 
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decrease to miniscule values. The plutonium implosion nuclear weapon pathway was the 
only credible option with a 6.31% true probability shown in Figure 5-6. 
 
 
Figure 5-6. Netica GUI analysis of Iraq nuclear weapon program uranium enrichment 
pathway 
 
A France-Iraq contract for the 70 MW Osirak nuclear reactor was crafted in 
1976. However, shortly before the planned Osirak startup, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
aircraft bombed the facility to prevent its operatio.
115
 The BANE reactor node for the 
Iraqi proliferator is set to “false” to match with the IDF defensive agent strike. The Iraqi 
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agent plutonium implosion pathway becomes negligible based on the physical 
destruction of the Osirak complex. 
Iraqi R&D on a UCl4 facility started in 1984, with the corresponding BANE 
UCl4 node activation. The Iraqi proliferation network adjustment depicted EMIS in 
Figure 5-6 having a 30.9% true probability. The 1980s was a period of Iraqi interest in 
multiple uranium enrichment pathways, including gas diffusion.
116
 By 1985 R&D 
focuses became the diffuser and compressor systems, industrial scale heat exchangers, 
and particularly gas barriers. In BANE the Iraqi agent was credited with the needed 
compressor and energy requirements for gas diffusion. The 1985 proliferation 
information updates shifted the EMIS pathway likelihood to less than 8%, while the gas 
diffusion true probability rose almost 10% to 16%. 
While trouble arose with Iraqi gas diffusion barrier designs, plans were 
developed for 70 R120 and 20 RR60 separators to reach 20% and 93% HEU levels. Iraqi 
agent R&D in BANE reached the level were separators were made available. In Figure 
5-5 the EMIS pathway increased significantly to 52.2%. This represented the Iraqi‟s 
taking EMIS into the early production stages. 
The Iraqi nuclear weapon program scientist Khidhir Hamza completed $120 
million worth of contracts for technology supporting nuclear weapons development.
117
 
Individuals such as Khidhir Hamza are modeled in BANE as supporting proliferating 
agents to the primary Iraqi proliferating agent. The supporting proliferating agents can 
more easily engage with German neutral suppliers without triggering the same Iraqi 
proliferating agent scrutiny. The contracts with Germany were part of Hamza‟s August 
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1987 trip; and, included a flash camera using x-rays with the design specification 
allowing imaging through high explosive gas products.
118
 Assistance from a proliferating 
individual in BANE led to the x-ray flash camera being credited to the Iraqi proliferating 
agent. The HEU implosion pathway likelihood jumped to over 40% in Figure 5-6, but 
had not impact on the Figure 5-5 pathways for uranium enrichment. 
In 1988, indigenous Iraqi R&D successfully manufactured a UF6 resistant tube 
with applications for gas centrifuges. In BANE this corresponded to achieving high 
strength tube access, and the gas centrifuge true probability rose to almost 80% with a 
substantial drop in EMIS likelihood. Difficulties with gas diffusion barrier production 
led Iraq to shift R&D from it in 1989.
119
 The Iraqi agent in BANE shut down the gas 
diffusion paths by turning them to completely false. The BANE Iraqi proliferation 
network responds with the gas centrifuge true probability reaching 83.6%. Within BANE 
indigenous technical limitations can hinder a proliferating agent attaining mastery of a 
nuclear technology. As expected in the real world, proliferating agents in BANE can 
move backwards along a pathway while leveraging existing resource, knowledge, and 
technical investments. When practical a BANE proliferating agent selects a new 
pathway where it considers its indigenous capabilities sufficient to achieve its desired 
proliferation objective. 
In the late 1980s Iraq received 25 maraging steel sets suitable for gas centrifuge 
production. Previously the Iraqis had been restricted to less capable aluminum centrifuge 
tubes. Out of the 25 sets, 19 maraging steel kits were employed in gas centrifuge related 
testing and analysis. The Iraqi centrifuge program sourced 20 carbon fiber rotors in 
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1990. Through BANE affinity technology transfers, the Iraqi agent first was attributed 
the right to use maraging steel and then carbon fiber rotor nodes. At this point, Figure 5-
5 shows the gas centrifuge pathway is at 98.3%. Months later UF6 was introduced in the 
centrifuges; and the UF6 node activation via BANE credits Iraqi domestic research 
advancements. The Iraqi proliferating agent yields a 99.8% likelihood of obtaining 
gaseous centrifuge capability. 
It should be noted that the Iraqi proliferation teams worked under, and made 
progress despite, extreme personal risk. The Iraqi nuclear weapon technical leader 
Hussein al-Majid meted out death sentences if he deemed the technical progress 
insufficient.
120
 Thus, the nuclear weapon team was willing to risk higher detection levels 
in order to obtain outside SNA. Iraqi organizational and bureaucratic leadership thereby 
decisively influenced the proliferation program, generally in a negative manner. 
By 1990, Iraq was seeking an HEU implosion weapon concurrently with its 
uranium enrichment program. Through external connections Iraq obtained neutron 
initiator design specifics associated with nuclear devices using centrally located 
beryllium-polonium. The Iraqi nuclear weapon schematics employed a combination 
natural uranium reflect and tamper. Accordingly in BANE, affinity technology transfers 
are considered the sources of the Iraqi agent HEU implosion design data. Triggering the 
appropriate initiator, reflector, and tamper nodes in BANE leads to a 66.9% HEU 
implosion pathway likelihood.  
1990 was a busy Iraqi proliferation year because 8 EMIS separators started 
functioning. The maximum enrichment the Iraqi‟s achieved was 7.2%, out of the few 
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hundred grams of enriched uranium produced. Consequently, crediting the Iraqi 
proliferating agent with acquiring the remaining electromagnetic nodes increased the 
BANE network probability to 32.6% in Figure 5-5. BANE showed the network 
oscillations for the Iraqi agent between two competing enrichment technologies. 
Iraq defined the high explosive lens dimensions in January 1991. In BANE the 
explosive lens node was turned on, which led to a 68% likelihood for the HEU 
implosion weapon. The First Gulf War began in mid-January 1991, leading to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) eventual dismantlement of major nuclear 
program aspects. 
V.A.4. Sweden Nuclear Weapons Program 
Sweden is an interesting nuclear proliferation case, since it actively pursued a 
nuclear weapon but abandoned the program for political and not technical reason. The 
first stages of the Cold War witnessed Swedish exploration of a nuclear weapons 
program.
121
 The Soviet Union threat provoked Sweden by the late 1940s to assess the 
necessary nuclear and non-nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. At the beginning of the 
1950s, several Swedish military officials publicly stated a desire to possess nuclear 
weapons. 
In 1957 Sweden took steps towards a nascent nuclear program by acquiring a 
small, United Kingdom origin plutonium quantity.
122
 In that context BANE modeled the 
Swedish proliferating agent as receiving an affinity based transfer from a cooperative 
United Kingdom proliferating agent. The Swedish agent triggers the plutonium node 
without setting the reactor node to true despite it being the expected plutonium 
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acquisition route. The BANE plutonium weapon probability grew to 7.78% as indicated 
in Figure 5-7; and, the HEU weapon pathways expectedly were unchanged from zero. 
Swedish weapon designers by the late 1950s had mastered advanced high explosive 
implosion methods needed for nuclear weapons.
123
 BANE granting as “true” the 
implosion knowledge node jumps the Swedish proliferating agent plutonium weapon 
pathway to 29.8%. 
 
 
Figure 5-7. Netica GUI analysis of Sweden nuclear weapon acquisition pathway 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1956 1957 1959 1964 1970 1972
Te
ch
n
ic
al
 S
u
cc
e
ss
 (
A
b
so
lu
te
 %
)
Date (Years)
HEU Gun
HEU Implosion
Pu Implosion
None
  174   
 
Sweden developed plans for building a research reactor and explored establishing 
a reprocessing plant. However, in 1964 nuclear officials abandoned the reprocessing 
plant idea due to the cost.
124
 In BANE, an agent representing Swedish leadership can 
actually take a defensive agent posture in opposition to the Swedish proliferating agent. 
The Swedish leadership defensive agent thereby compels the shutdown of the Swedish 
proliferating agent reprocessing capability node. 
In 1970 the Swedish political leadership cancelled the planned reactor for 
economic and technical intricacy reasons.
125
 Again, the Swedish leadership defensive 
agent intervenes leading to the reactor node being switched to false for the Swedish 
proliferating agent. The Swedish proliferating agent weapon pathway remains since the 
plutonium node is still present. Figure 5-8 shows the negligible enrichment pathways 
throughout the BANE simulation. At effectively zero, the uranium enrichment values 
demonstrate how the BANE network handles situations where a nuclear weapon was 
sought, but the decision to cease proliferation efforts occurred. In 1971, when Sweden 
signed the NPT, policy and not technical choices precluded nuclear weapon 
production.
126
 The Swedish plutonium weapon true probability never breaches the 30% 
threshold. Nevertheless, the plutonium implosion pathway being credibly significant 
truthfully reflects the most promising route available to Sweden for obtaining a nuclear 
weapon.
127
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Figure 5-8. Netica GUI analysis of Sweden nuclear weapon program uranium 
enrichment 
 
V.A.5. Netica GUI and API Historical Weapons Analysis Results 
Due to an insufficient number of historical cases, the BANE Bayesian Netica 
GUI network presented in this work cannot ever truly be validated. There simply is not 
enough historical data to obtain sufficient statistics. However, the above four cases 
demonstrate that the Bayesian network aspect of BANE has been verified to a sufficient 
degree. The behavior of BANE is in accordance with what is expected in such situations, 
and ultimately gives the same outcome as the historical cases. The Bayesian proliferation 
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network component of BANE, while never being able to be completely validated, can 
provide useful insights for understanding proliferation. Extension of the hypothetical 
cases with the broader BANE tool, however, definitely improves the Netica proliferation 
network as a learning tool. Inclusion of the Netica proliferation network enhances the 
overall BANE utility in the future as a predictive proliferation analysis tool. 
V.B. Empowering Module Verification Testing 
BANE modules are designed to empower intelligent agent decision making. A 
series of BANE verification tests were performed on single and small groups of 
modules. The first area of analysis focused on agent handling of different resource and 
detection concerns. A second BANE aspect of interest is the handling of just a single 
affinity technology transfer without other factors. Third, several BANE modules aid in 
understanding the impact of defensive agent uncertainty on proliferating agent choices. 
V.B.1. Demonstrate Agent Objective Trade-Offs 
An entity contemplating reduced nuclear latency or nuclear weapon acquisition 
must envisage jeopardizing the status quo. Perceiving countervailing benefits from 
proliferation may swing the calculus depending on the objective. If a substantial 
decrease in nuclear latency is achievable without major economic dislocations or 
international backlash, leaders might embark on a proliferation program. Recognition of 
heavy global sanctions and military threats could retard or prevent some nuclear 
programs from starting. 
A verification test for BANE addresses a proliferating agent facing different 
resource and detection constraints. Weak constraints on a proliferating agent might 
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represent a robust economic and technical base. A sufficiently advanced state could 
conceivably undertake covert proliferation with minimized signatures. A developing 
state could seek a similar nuclear outcome, but with significantly higher dislocations. 
The challenges for a developing state include lower resource expenditure rates and a 
weaker technical base. Developing state limitations impede proliferation technical 
progress and raise concerns regarding counter proliferation intervention. BANE 
inferences from weak and strong constraints on proliferation support are depicted in 
Figure 5-9. 
 
 
Figure 5-9. Proliferating agent resource and detection constraint variations 
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The proliferating agent with only weak constraints in Figure 5-9 achieves a latent 
nuclear deterrent posture much faster than one with strong constraints. From a BANE 
verification standpoint this agent conduct is expected. A weakly constrained agent can 
sustain a much higher proliferation resource application rate. An assumption is the 
weakly constrained proliferators knows its large high technology sector can justify its 
nuclear R&D. These major benefits combined to allow the weakly restricted 
proliferating agent to achieve, in just under 40 time steps, its nuclear latency goal. 
The strongly constrained agent can only dedicate a small resource flow towards 
proliferation. A constrained agent might be proportionally allocating more proliferation 
effort than the weakly limited agent. The arrangement might occur for the constrained 
agent due to a less developed resource and technical base. Absent a growing industrial or 
even commercial sector, the constrained agent is assumed to be suspect for strongly 
advocating a domestic nuclear fuel cycle front end. Outside scrutiny, therefore, might 
necessitate greater demonstration of transparency efforts through IAEA agreements and 
inspections beyond requirements. 
V.B.2. Agent Relationship Alterations 
During the early stages of proliferation, an agent seeking latent deterrence might 
not have a strong uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing preference. Thus, the 
proliferating agent assesses its capabilities for producing SNM. If the agent has slightly 
greater plutonium reprocessing technical R&D and infrastructure that is its preferred 
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proliferation pathway. Operating in isolation restricts the proliferating agent to only its 
indigenous R&D. 
Realistically, no agent is entirely isolated. The proliferating agent can seek 
outside assistance for achieving its proliferation objective. A successful affinity transfer 
can trigger major proliferation pathway shifts. Comparing a proliferating agent absent 
and receiving outside affinity technology transfers is shown in Figure 5-10. 
 
 
Figure 5-10. Proliferating agent without and with affinity transfer  
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In the first Figure 5-10 scenario, the proliferating agent operates without any 
possibility of affinity transfers aiding its latent deterrence. The proliferating agent begins 
making initial investments in its plutonium reprocessing program. Early in the 
proliferation program the agent is hedging on specifics such as cladding removal. As the 
proliferating agent selects particular pathways its R&D effectiveness picks up. The 
increased R&D value comes from more direct application to achieving a proliferation 
objective vis-à-vis hedging. However, committing to a proliferation pathway entails 
risks if defensive entity detection, technical hurdles, or economic costs at key steps are 
prohibitive. 
The closer the proliferating agent gets to its objective the more difficult it 
becomes to achieve true mastery of the myriad component required. The physics and 
engineering integration challenge emulated in BANE is faced by real world actors 
undertaking complex technical projects. Eventually the indigenous R&D succeeds at 
time step 86 in providing the proliferator the desired latent deterrent reprocessing 
certainty. 
Providing the proliferating agent with external assistance can cause significant 
pathway alteration. In Figure 5-10 an affinity connection is made early in the 
proliferating agent latent deterrent effort. To test proliferating agent flexibility, the 
affinity technology transfer was in gas centrifuge uranium equipment rotors and tubes. 
Several industries, such as the aerospace and high end sporting goods, use cutting edge 
carbon fiber composites. The affinity connection could be end user certification 
falsification, or a complicit provision with full knowledge of intended use. 
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Prior to the affinity transfer the proliferating agent was proceeding with 
plutonium reprocessing. The rapid addition of carbon fiber rotors and tubes led the 
proliferator to conclude uranium enrichment is the best latent deterrence option. 
However, the proliferating agent still needs to procure and / or perform internal R&D on 
other technologies to develop effective gas centrifuges. The proliferating agent rate of 
progress begins to plateau fast because as it approaches the technical integration phase. 
With the affinity transfer the proliferating agent reaches a latent deterrence posture with 
uranium enrichment in 46 time steps. 
Relationships can dramatically speed up the success timeline for agents. Figure 
5-10 indicates that two technology transfers can almost cut in half the latent deterrence 
time. The affinity case study demonstrated the importance of defensive agent with 
implications for several areas. Monitoring and proliferation rollback alone are 
insufficient actions for all defensive agents. Tracking and awareness of key neutral 
suppliers is important for preventing proliferators from making rapid increases in 
capability. Shortening windows for effective counter proliferation can force decision 
makers into poor negotiating and military positions. 
V.B.3. Omniscience and Uncertainty Challenges 
Lacking omniscience, defensive agents actively monitor for proliferation 
activities. Defensive agents vary in terms of discovering different proliferation aspects.  
As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, one defensive agent might excel at gathering human 
information on proliferation and another imagery processing. A third defensive agent 
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might have the international credibility to obtain on-site access, but lack awareness about 
broader proliferation patterns.  
Discerning proliferation activities also has a strong probabilistic element. There 
is no guarantee that a defensive agent will locate proliferation. Initiating searches may 
uncover proliferation, or they might cause a false positive that garners undue 
international attention. An illustration of the nuclear latency implications due to a 
defensive agent is shown in Figure 5-11. 
 
 
Figure 5-11. Impact of defensive agent intervention on proliferating agent  
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In Figure 5-11, the proliferating agent selects a plutonium reprocessing pathway. 
Pursuing nuclear latency through aqueous plutonium reprocessing dictates an agitation 
and separation system as a technical requirement. For the first situation, the defensive 
agent does not recognize some proliferating activities are circumventing normal export 
controls. Once the defensive agent is aware of the violations the proliferating agent has 
already attained plutonium reprocessing mastery. With BANE, failure is a distinct 
defensive agent outcome. 
In the second situation, the defensive agent monitors for proliferation and notes 
export control discrepancies. Upon closer analysis the defensive agent realizes 
proliferation is occurring and prevents centrifugal contactor R&D progress. The 
defensive agent resource recovery, however, is insufficient to engage in further counter 
proliferation. The scenario is modeled as though the defensive agent can also not elicit 
other defensive agents to aid in the nuclear latency rollback. This situation might occur 
for a few reasons. Missing conclusive proliferation “proof” may fail to quickly generate 
wide spread global sanctions or strenuous IAEA inspections. Therefore, the proliferating 
agent can reconstitute its proliferation program around mixer settler systems as an 
alternative. 
Stacking defensive agents assisting each other is a powerful counter proliferation 
strategy. When proliferation is found, different defensive agents within a government 
can cause compounding problems for the nuclear weapons program. Applying political 
pressure, scrutinizing and restricting exports, initiating focused hindrance, physically 
removing key components, and others options can be integrated simultaneously. For the 
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Figure 5-11 scenario only a single defensive agent was considered. Balancing the 
multiple defensive agent skills building on each other can be done in a general sense. 
Linked defensive agent proliferation program effects require carefully tailored and 
calibrated parameters to implement. 
V.C. BANE Module Verification and Validation Limits 
BANE verification testing of individual and small linked modules groups was 
performed for the historical cases of French, South African, Iraqi, and Swedish nuclear 
proliferation. The historical case study verification allowed for checking BANE 
performance focused on the Netica GUI and API modules. When developing the 
historical case testing, the BANE output results matched expectations. Specific BANE 
modules aspect verification was demonstrated for agent information handling, 
optimization with limitations, affinities, and defensive agent monitoring. 
Analyzing the BANE historical case study results provided limited validation 
testing. Increasing the proliferation event range to states that pursued, but did not 
acquire, nuclear weapons improved the data pool. However, the small number of 
proliferation events renders statistically significant BANE testing for validation very 
difficult. 
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 CHAPTER VI 
INNOVATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS WITH BANE 
 
The limited number of historical nuclear proliferation incidents makes validation 
testing of BANE more difficult. Limited validation testing of multiple BANE modules is 
possible to see how the tool operates when assessing different proliferation scenarios. In 
this chapter, more in-depth studies of integrated proliferation case studies are examined. 
VI.A. BANE Multi-Module Verification Testing 
The BANE multi-module verification testing allows for more exploration of 
intricate scenario and historical factor impacts on past nuclear proliferation activities. A 
conceptual case study of export control violation impacts on proliferation is undertaken. 
The conceptual case study is somewhat loosely based on the Dr. A.Q. Khan gas 
centrifuge proliferation network experience. From a more historic perspective, the early 
Soviet Union and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs were analyzed. 
VI.A.1. Case 1: Export Control Violation Impacts on Nuclear Proliferation 
The first multi-mode verification scenario considers nuclear proliferation export 
control violations with multiple agent types and classes. The scenario focus is a 
“primary” proliferating agent seeking latent nuclear deterrence. A domestic enrichment 
program is preferred by the primary agent. Within the proliferation ecosystem are a 
number of neutral agents that might support the primary agent. However, several 
defensive agents are monitoring for proliferation activities; and, they can cooperate 
where mutual interest align. 
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A case study emphasizing several major aspects of proliferation together 
demonstrates the range of BANE capabilities. Multifaceted policy, economic, technical, 
and social science factors vie in BANE for dictating proliferation progress. In Figure 6-1 
supportive and adversarial proliferation aspects are displayed for a particular interaction 
outcome. 
 
 
 Figure 6-1. Impact of export control violations and responses on proliferation  
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proliferation ring. The neutral supplier provides first generation aluminum tube 
centrifuge technology. Through the initial neutral supplier connection the primary agent 
quickly makes another supplier contact. The second neutral supplier uses the first for 
routing additional gas centrifuge related rotor technology. After the second neutral 
supplier, the primary agent has advanced rapidly and pursuing advanced composite gas 
centrifuge becomes feasible. Leveraging its indigenous composites industry is studied by 
the primary agent. 
The quick succession of international contacts and hurried primary agent 
proliferation progress does raise flags. This is loosely analogous to the counter-
proliferation detection experienced by the A.Q. Khan network and its clients.
128
 A 
monitoring defensive agent notes the seemingly sudden nuclear acquisitions. Additional 
defensive agent scrutiny leads to an evolving awareness of the primary agent covert 
nuclear program. Reaching out to an allied defensive agent, an effort is initiated to roll 
back the primary agent proliferation. The primary agent domestic filament winding 
machine capability is setback by the defensive agent partnership.  
The defensive agents relax their vigilance on the proliferating agent until they 
again note potentially significant proliferation. A coordinated defensive agent response 
marks magnetic bearing R&D for interruption. Losing the magnetic bearing access after 
the filament winding machine gas centrifuge stoppage temporarily cripples the primary 
agent nuclear program. The primary agent does benefit from gas centrifuges lessons 
learned. Returning to less advanced technology, the primary agent pursues maraging 
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steel gas centrifuges. Eventually, through persistent effort the primary agent succeeds in 
obtaining its latent nuclear deterrence after 91 time steps. 
A comparison base scenario is provided in Figure 6-1. The base scenario 
constrains the proliferator to purely internal R&D progress. For a less effective 
proliferator such as Libya, the base scenario is a better approximation of the weak 
internal technical and governmental organization structure underpinning nuclear 
proliferation. A justification for this posture might be an extreme paranoia of covert 
nuclear program detection. In reality, the last decades have ushered in a growing 
information and digital age. Therefore, a proliferating agent would never be completely 
cut off from potentially beneficial proliferation knowledge and technology. When 
coupled with applying newer technology to older methods of proliferation, a large 
increase in proliferation capability is possible.
129
 
Absent international connections, the proliferating agent progression begins with 
the familiar hedging strategy. After committing to gas centrifuges, the proliferating agent 
undertakes to master the pathway R&D sections. Just prior to 60 time steps, the 
proliferating agent heavily invests in advanced centrifuge technology. The prompt over 
expenditure of large R&D resources matters for undertaking a succession of high 
technology proliferation pathway projects. Even with the additional R&D resource 
commitment, the proliferating entity still requires 112 time steps to succeed. 
Contrasting the base scenario with the first situation underscores the value of 
affinity connections for nuclear proliferation technology transfers. In the first scenario 
the proliferating agent was successful at achieving latent deterrence over 20 time step 
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sooner. This was despite the two defensive agent interventions. Without the burdens 
extracted by the defensive agent coalition, the proliferating agent success could easily 
present the global community with a latent deterrence fait accompli. 
For a truly authentic proliferation assessment greater detail could be included for 
the proliferating, defensive, or neutral supplier agents. A proliferator wanting a nuclear 
weapon for immediate security concerns and with a stronger technical and government 
system would likely proliferate far more effectively using gas centrifuges.
130
 Whether 
the defensive agents are more effective in stopping proliferation or international political 
pressure reduces proliferating agent demand for proliferation could be elaborated upon. 
Using BANE to explore those and other interlocking proliferation details could shed new 
light on more effective counter proliferation strategies. 
VI.A.2. Case 2: Soviet Union Foreign Assistance and Espionage 
In case 2, the nuclear weapon proliferation of Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) is considered. The USSR nuclear weapons program contains many 
proliferation aspects seen in later nuclear proliferation efforts. The major Soviet move 
came in October 1940 to initiate its nuclear weapons program. The governing Soviet 
Presidium funded the annual acquisition of 1500 kg of uranium bearing materials and the 
300 kg of uranium salt from Soviet industries.
131
 Soviet government proliferating agent 
actions were matched through activation of the uranium mining BANE node. Following 
Soviet domestic uranium mining the BANE network responded by increasing the HEU 
gun and implosion weapon pathways into the teens shown in Figure 6-2. The plutonium 
implosion route was unchanged with virtually no chance of occurrence. At this stage in 
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1940, the BANE network depicted in Figure 6-3 favors gas centrifuge uranium 
enrichment. Figure 6-3 then displays BANE favoring gas diffusion, with the remaining 
uranium enrichment routes being negligible. 
 
 
Figure 6-2. BANE Soviet Union nuclear weapon acquisition pathways 
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Figure 6-3. BANE Soviet Union uranium enrichment method pathways 
 
Although Soviet UF6 expertise escalates the gas centrifuge and diffusion pathway 
primacy, the relative weapon route preferences remain unchanged. The interest in UCl4 
suggests Soviet investigation of the EMIS HEU pathway in 1943. The EMIS UCl4 
constituent shifts the BANE Soviet proliferating agent EMIS route up at the expense of 
the gas centrifuge and diffusion pathways. However, by the end of 1943 Soviet attention 
fixates on gas diffusion uranium enrichment instead of other HEU producing 
technologies. The Soviets possess the necessary gas diffusion energy requirements. Once 
the Soviet proliferating agent meets the energy requirements the gas diffusion pathway 
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increases significantly. The gas centrifuge pathways probability falls; and, the other 
enrichment routes practically decline to zero. 
The United Kingdom contributed Klaus Fuchs to the Los Alamos Laboratory in 
1944.
132
 Fuchs was part of the “Tube Alloy” team assisting with the Manhattan Project. 
Additionally, Fuch was a Soviet spy who was able to transfer nuclear assistance, 
particularly on implosion methods for plutonium weapon initiation. The BANE network 
ancillaries for Fuch‟s plutonium implosion technology provided to the Soviets are the 
high explosive lends, plutonium initiator, and tamper designs.133 With the neutral agent 
assistance from Fuch‟s, the Soviet HEU implosion pathway probability surges 
dramatically. The Soviets also are widely considered to have receive nuclear secrets from 
other Manhattan project penetrations. Nuclear benefits accrue from Soviet espionage 
diversity using other sources such as Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, David Greenglass, and 
Morton Sobell.134 
In the centralized Soviet bureaucracy, its leader, Josef Stalin had significant 
influence on the nuclear weapons program. Choosing the plutonium implosion pathway 
for nuclear weapons was swayed from the upper Soviet echelons. By 1947 construction 
on nuclear reactor and a corresponding plutonium reprocessing plant began. The 
fundamental scientific R&D behind plutonium reprocessing was successfully completed. 
The BANE network responded by making the plutonium implosion pathway more 
likely. Construction finished on the reprocessing plant in 1948. Reflecting enhanced 
Soviet reprocessing expertise, the BANE network grew the plutonium implosion path 
vis-à-vis the HEU nuclear implosion route. When the Soviet Chelyabinsk-40 reactor 
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complex became operational for plutonium production the Soviet proliferating agent 
decisively favored a plutonium implosion weapon. Once the Soviet agent mastered 
plutonium production, the BANE network demonstrates the HEU implosion device 
probability becomes miniscule. The plutonium implosion weapon became the dominant 
weapon pathway. 
On August 29
th
, 1949 the USSR initiated its first complete nuclear weapon 
system test. The USSR RDS-1, Soviet code name “First Lightning,” nuclear device 
provided a 20 kt nuclear yield.
135
 The U.S. developed “Fat Man” plutonium implosion 
nuclear weapon was very similar to the later RDS-1. The Soviet test in 1949 confirmed 
the Soviet proliferation agent BANE Bayesian network indication of a plutonium 
weapon.  
It is worth bringing attention to the pathway tradeoff nature of the BANE 
Bayesian network. Technical steps raising the plutonium weapon route probability were 
partially or entirely offset by lessening the enrichment pathway probabilities. Intuitively 
this is expected behavior. Acquiring expertise and production of HEU is not obligatory 
for a plutonium weapon. This matches the belief that plutonium pathway pursuit comes 
at the expense of uranium enrichment efforts. The Soviet gaseous diffusion pathway 
drops upon obtaining stable plutonium production. Still, BANE does respond with an 
increase in gas diffusion likelihood once the diffusion facility became available for 
enriching uranium.  
Hans Bethe‟s 1945 prediction estimated the USSR obtains a successful nuclear 
weapons program by 1950.
136
 That it took the Soviet‟s 4 years, suggests that the USSR 
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espionage benefit was 1 year. Outside assistance undoubtedly provided the Soviet 
Union‟s nuclear weapons program with economic and technical benefits. 
Later nuclear weapon R&D by the Soviets and captured Germans and Austrians 
led by Dr. Max Steenbeck and Dr. Gernot Zippe in areas such as gas centrifuges.
137,138
  
An exploratory scenario of the Soviet gas centrifuge progress considering expected 
outside assistance extent is important. The captured World War II former adversaries 
supported Soviet gas centrifuge development.
139
 With gas centrifuges based on foreign 
assistance the Soviets developed a less energy intensive and more efficient means to 
produce HEU.
140
  
The United States only learned about the Soviet progress on gas centrifuges 
following the Soviet release of Dr. Zippe during summer 1956.
141
 By 1957, Dr. Zippe 
was in the United States being debriefed about the Soviet gas centrifuge program. With 
Dr. Houston Wood, Dr. Zippe at the University of Virginia helped the United States 
recreate his gas centrifuge research provided to the Soviet Union.
142
 BANE results 
shown in Figure 6-4 suggest how captured German and Austrians benefited the Soviet 
gas centrifuge program. 
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Figure 6-4. BANE scenario of Soviet gas centrifuge uranium enrichment progress 
 
The Soviet Union first developed a viable uranium enrichment method using the 
gaseous diffusion process. Figure 6-4 shows a BANE scenario for the possible outside 
aid provided by non-Soviets to the Soviet Union gas centrifuge program. The starting 
point for Figure 6-4 is January 1946, following Dr. Steenbeck and Dr. Zippe forming 
their team from seized scientists.
143
 Some initial gas centrifuge design interest was 
spawned from a German, Fritz Lange, who left Germany for the Soviet Union prior to 
World War II.
144
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Starting in 1949 four large Soviet gas diffusion sites were built at the 
Electrochemical Plant (EKhZ) in Zelenogorsk, the Anagrsk Electrolysis and Chemical 
Plant (AEKhK) in Angarsk, Irkutsk region, the Urals Electrochemical Combine 
(UEKhK) in Novouralsk, and the Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) in Seversk.
145
 
The spy Klaus Fuchs worked on gas diffusion separation barriers and his assistance 
helped encourage Soviet uranium enrichment planning and direction.
146
 Significant 
Soviet resources, technical expertise, and industrial output went into developing the gas 
diffusion plants. From 1955 to 1957 the Soviets were bringing the last gas diffusion 
plant at UEKhK online. Thus, the gas diffusion and gas centrifuge uranium enrichment 
routes competed for limited Soviet technical and industrial output.
147
 The resource 
limitation is readily apparent in the low progress rate for Soviet gas centrifuges Figure 6-
4 depicts. 
Progress on Soviet gas centrifuges included technical advancements, such as in 
metallurgy development, which would later prove useful. In Figure 6-4 innovations in 
those outside areas are shown with BANE to provide key gas centrifuge capability 
jumps. The focus of the BANE study was the time to creation of the first successful 
Soviet gas centrifuge prototypes. The Soviet gas centrifuge study showcases the ability 
of BANE to assess major nuclear program component technical success. It should be 
noted that the Figure 6-4 timeline extends beyond the much shorter timeframe for the 
really dedicated Soviet gas centrifuge program work. 
The Soviet and German gas centrifuge teams exchanged information, but the 
flow was not always equal both ways. In early 1952, the Soviet researcher Dr. Evgeni 
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Kamenev had major contributions for a successful sub-critical gas centrifuges.
148
 By 
keeping the rotor length beneath the height in which it would pass through critical 
flexing while spinning a stable centrifuge was created. Dr. Kamenev was part of Dr. 
Isaac Kikoin‟s Soviet gas centrifuge research team. 
The Dr. Steenbeck and Dr. Zippe team successfully employed the bottom needle 
bearings and top magnetic bearings to gas centrifuges.
149
 The needle bearings were 
important to allow the gas centrifuges to reach balanced, high rotational speeds without 
friction damage. The magnetic bearings at the rotor top allowed the stabilization of the 
remainder of the fragile rotor while preventing wear. The top and bottom bearing system 
created the means for a properly aligned rotor and substantially decreasing individual 
gas centrifuge stage power consumption. Another advantage of the magnetic bearings 
was it opened the way for electromagnetically induced centrifuge rotation.
150
 Prior 
mechanical rotation systems introduced friction and degradation that impeded efficient 
centrifuge operation.  
The Soviets under Dr. Kamenev also created the molecular pump system using 
an outer protective tube casing. The magnetic bearing system helped created a pressure 
gradient in the rotor which increased the UF6 gas separation efficiency. A pressure 
evacuation system using a molecular pumping configuration could then remove the 
slightly built up protective tube pressure. The decreased power draw meant less pump 
work was needed per gas centrifuge stage. 
Dr. Kikoin aided the gas centrifuge design effort by implementing a bottom 
stationary scoop within the rotor. The bottom scoop enhanced the countercurrent UF6 
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gas flow and pressure differential. The improved UF6 flow increased the concentration 
of heavier U
238
F6 near the scoop bottom exterior. With a baffles arrangement just 
beneath the top rotor scoop the countercurrent flow was maintained. The lighter U
235
F6 
concentrated near the upper central portion of the rotor above the baffles for removal to 
the next stage. 
The international approach to gas centrifuge development worked for the Soviet 
Union. In Figure 6-4 BANE indicates how major breakthroughs between the different 
gas centrifuge design teams boosted the overall program technical success. The 
advancements were made while the Soviet Union continued to bring online the proven 
gas diffusion plants. BANE properly showed relative R&D difficulties by one team 
could be countered either internally or with the assistance of the other researchers. By 
1953 the Soviet Union had developed an effective sub-critical gas centrifuge.
151,152 
However, it would not be until 1956 that the apprehended German and Austrian 
scientists would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union. 
The gas centrifuge program gave the Soviet Union a large boost in uranium 
enrichment capability once the pilot plant design was proven.
153,154
 Banks of 
interconnected sub-critical centrifuges could replace gas diffusion stages in the existing 
uranium enrichment facilities. The physical size of the uranium enrichment plants 
remained unchanged.
155
 What benefited the Soviet Union was the replacement centrifuge 
banks produced much higher Separative Work Units with lower power consumption.
156
 
The centrifuge bank upgrade was therefore a severe external detection challenge. From 
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an electro-optical satellite image standpoint the Soviet enrichment facility footprint 
remained the same.
157
 
VI.A.3. Case 3: Pakistan External and Internal Nuclear Aid 
Pakistan is the third nuclear weapon analytic case. In 1961 the Rawalpandi 
Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) was opened; and, in 1963 the 
5 MW research light water reactor (LWR) was constructed.
158
 Later, they built an 
associated reprocessing facility. BANE responded to these facilities becoming 
operational by growing the plutonium weapon path probability in Figure 6-5. Although 
small, the most plausible nuclear weapon likelihood was through gas centrifuges. 
Canada and Pakistan signed a 1965 contract to build the 137 MW(e) Canadian 
Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR).
159
 By 1972 the 
CANDU was completed as the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP). The BANE 
Pakistani proliferating agent activities were influenced in 1972 by Pakistani President 
Bhutto‟s three year nuclear weapon objective.160,161 
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Figure 6-5. BANE Pakistan nuclear weapon acquisition pathways 
 
Although in 1972 the plutonium pathway spiked, by 1974 it begins to recede for 
a few reasons. Following the establishment of KANUPP the Pakistani‟s reached an 
agreement for France to provide an industrial scale reprocessing plant.
162
  Despite having 
an inked contract, the French later pulled out of the deal. The impetus for the 
cancellation was the 1974 Indian “Smiling Bhudda” nuclear device test. The 1974 Indian 
nuclear test led to enhanced international restrictions on export controls for nuclear and 
related technologies. The increased export controls in BANE greatly decreased non-
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Pakistani affinity engagements, while heightening the Pakistani proliferating security 
concerns. 
 
 
Figure 6-6. BANE Pakistan uranium enrichment method pathways 
 
Inertia for the URENCO gas centrifuge expert A.Q. Khan‟s return to Pakistan 
came from the1974 Indian nuclear device explosion. Khan recommended that Pakistan 
pursue uranium enrichment using gas centrifuges. The Pakistani‟s began the gas 
centrifuged based Project 706, which was instituted and obtained priority as the primary 
SNM acquisition pathway.
163
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increased the HEU weapon routes. Correspondingly, the plutonium implosion weapon 
route declined to a negligible level. 
With A.Q. Khan‟s assistance in 1974 Pakistan‟s uranium enrichment options 
grew. Through the auspices of the Dr. A.Q. Khan proliferating agent gas centrifuge 
knowledge and supplier network, the Pakistani proliferating agent started receiving gas 
centrifuge constituents. The BANE network indicates the greatest proliferation pathway 
stems from gas centrifuge uranium enrichment as expected from the Project 706 
program. Using his connections Dr. Khan, acquired 6000 Netherlands origin maraging 
steel tubes. The BANE network adjusts to the Dr. Khan agent supplied connections 
triggering the high strength tubes and maraging steel Pakistani proliferating agent 
capabilities. Furthermore, Dr. Khan secured material and equipment rerouting and other 
assistance through entities located in Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Malaysia.
164,165
 At this point the over 99.9% uranium enrichment likelihood 
uses the gas centrifuge pathway. The HEU gun and implosion weapon routes continued 
to grow at the expense of the plutonium implosion routing being zeroed out. 
The overall benefit of the A.Q. Khan network is debated versus the indigenous 
Pakistani gas centrifuge program.
166
 The URENCO Cultivated Nuclear Orbital Rotor 
(CNOR) was the first Dutch attempt at building a supercritical centrifuge. The plans and 
designs stolen by A. Q. Khan did not have the later Dutch fixes that eventually enabled 
their operation.
167
 The Pakistani infrastructure base allocated to centrifuge designs might 
have been effective for supercritical machines, but required outside technical expertise to 
initially build the supercritical centrifuges. The effort to obtain critical gas centrifuges 
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components internationally alerted global counter-proliferation attention to Pakistan. A. 
Q. Khan‟s lack of direct gas centrifuge building and operating expertise was also 
considered by some to hinder Pakistan‟s program.168 
The early 1980s did witness a Pakistani renewal in plutonium reprocessing 
desires. Reportedly,Pakistan received some plutonium reprocessing technical support 
from a Swiss company.
169
 The Pakistani‟s created pilot and small scale plutonium 
reprocessing facilities.
170
 The plutonium facilities are included in BANE for the 
Pakistani proliferating agent. The evolving Pakistani proliferation capabilities altered the 
BANE network whereby the plutonium implosion weapon again grew to being non-
negligible. 
The Dr. Khan proliferating agent aided the Pakistani proliferating agent by 
standing up in the early 1980s an industrial scale UF6 production facility. The UF6 
facility was constructed piecemeal from a West German origin supplier.
171
 The 
indigenous UF6 access benefits Pakistan‟s gas centrifuge SNM route. However, the 
centrifuge path was so high to begin with, the UF6 provides only a minor HEU weapon 
benefit relative to the plutonium implosion pathway. Starting in 1982 Pakistan possessed 
sufficient gas centrifuges to annually build six HEU nuclear weapons. The BANE 
Pakistani proliferating agent HEU node was triggered. Again, the plutonium implosion 
weapon pathway declines to functionally zero, while the two HEU weapon pathways 
probabilities enlarged. 
The HEU implosion path was bolstered by Pakistan‟s 1986 high explosive 
package cold test for an implosion system.
172
 The associated BANE network change 
  204   
 
involved the Pakistani proliferating agent developing high explosive package 
proficiency. The presence of a HEU high explosives implosion system caused the HEU 
gun type likelihood to plummet relative to the HEU implosion nuclear weapon pathway. 
Later testing of a more comprehensive non-nuclear implosion system occurs. In 
response, the BANE weapons package is assessed to the Pakistani proliferating agent. 
The BANE network responds by further increasing the HEU implosion pathway. At this 
point the HEU gun type weapon likelihood becomes insignificant. 
For nuclear weapon diagnostics, buying oscilloscopes in 1987 is beneficial to 
Pakistan.
173
 With BANE, the oscilloscope acquisition causes the HEU implosion 
pathway to become incredibly probable for the Pakistani proliferating agent. Following 
US intelligence revelations about Pakistan uranium metal machining, HEU pit capability 
is assigned to Pakistan.
174
 Figure 6-7 indicates the benefit of foreign assistance to 
Pakistan‟s secondary route for obtaining SNM for nuclear weapons. 
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Figure 6-7. BANE Pakistan plutonium secondary SNM weapon route  
 
In the 1990‟s China provided valuable assistance to Pakistan‟s nuclear 
program.
175,176
 The BANE Bayesian network nuclear reactor was beneficial to the 
Pakistani proliferating agent based, and represented the work started indigenously at 
Khushab.
177
 The addition of the domestic nuclear reactor effort represented several 
major technical pushes being undertaken by the Pakistan proliferating agent. In Figure 6-
7 the jump in expected plutonium weapon success is demonstrated by BANE. Although 
not all achieved at once, the Pakistani proliferating agent was eventually better 
positioned to conduct R&D with additional resources. 
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Completion of the HEU nuclear implosion weapons provided some cross over 
expertise to the Pu implosion route. In Figure 6-7 the two smaller jumps arise from the 
nuclear weapon assistance between Pakistani proliferating agents. Towards the end of 
the BANE simulation several events converged. First, the availability of plutonium as an 
SNM option even if not allocated from safeguarded civilian usage to non-civilian 
purposes. Second, the expectation of additional nuclear weapon test data from the 
Pakistani nuclear tests. Eventually the Pakistani plutonium implosion device reached 
rough equilibrium with the HEU implosion weapon pathway. The HEU gun type or no 
nuclear weapon option likelihoods were trivial. 
BANE demonstrates the centrality, for better or worse, of Dr. A.Q. Khan‟s 
technical knowledge and supplier network to Pakistan navigating the gaseous centrifuge 
pathway. Furthermore, Dr. Khan‟s presence was dictated heavily by the 1974 Indian 
nuclear test. As Pakistan‟s nuclear program evolves based on emerging proliferator 
abilities and connections, the BANE path selection probabilities adjust accordingly. This 
leads to BANE indicating alterations in different technologies and nuclear weapon 
stockpile opportunities. 
VI.B. BANE Multi-Module Scenario Insights 
Taking advantage of the full suite of BANE modules provides an advanced 
nuclear nonproliferation assessment framework. Each horizontal and vertical nuclear 
proliferation effort has domestic R&D and global knowledge or resource acquisition 
aspects. Proliferators constantly weigh the demand-side drivers of latent or actual 
nuclear weapon programs against the risk of international exposure. With BANE, the 
  207   
 
repercussion severity might be insufficient to deter an insecure state, or even non-state, 
entity. From a supply-side perspective, proliferators are considering the benefits of 
indigenous R&D versus external support in areas such as technology transfers. 
Variations in decision calculus are captured in BANE to study the impact of different 
resource, detection, and risk aversion postures on proliferation outcomes. 
The export control violation case demonstrates the intertwined benefits and costs 
associated with foreign technology sources. Using the BANE network with entropy 
reduction, the proliferating agent recognized and updated its beliefs in the best nuclear 
weapon progress paths. The short term gains from external proliferation assistance are 
eventually challenged by the induced scrutiny from counter proliferation efforts. Chapter 
6, case 1 defensive agents have the capabilities to levy strong penalties on the 
proliferating agent. However, for case 1 the defensive agents reach the limitation of their 
capabilities while the proliferation is ongoing. Without additional resource outlays, 
international partners, or other support, the defensive agents are forced to impotently 
watch as the proliferating agent reconstitutes its nuclear program. The defensive agent 
realism built into BANE simulations matches the trials of actual counter proliferation 
entities. 
Moving into the historical realm, BANE displays its ability to account for a 
multitude of activities happening in rapid succession. The Soviet Union‟s nuclear 
proliferation program was dual track. The Soviets invested in internal nuclear weapons 
program R&D. Concurrently, the Soviets also exploited external espionage on the 
Manhattan Project with corresponding nuclear weapon gains conferred. BANE allowed 
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for the multiple internal and external proliferation choices to dynamically influence the 
Soviet nuclear weapons program direction. 
The Pakistani proliferation case presented a strong demand-side to a BANE 
proliferating agent. The eventual Pakistani President Bhutto declared, “Pakistan will eat 
grass or leaves, even go hungry in order to develop a [nuclear] program of its own.”178 
Pakistan‟s conventional insecurity prompted a sizable fraction of its scientific 
community, including A.Q. Khan, to assist in developing the nuclear weapons program. 
Pakistan‟s willingness to expend almost any means to overcome technical challenge is 
characterized in BANE by the level of internal support. The domestic support translated 
into Pakistan‟s extensive tapping of international supply-side aid. Nuclear and non-
nuclear knowledge, equipment, and material were all attained by Pakistan; and, these 
events are accounted for through the range of BANE modules. 
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 CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The BANE proliferation assessment tool balances intricate policy and technical 
factors simultaneously. The modular BANE arrangement facilitates including new 
proliferating, neutral, or defensive agent attributes in decision making. Verification and 
limited validation for BANE was performed using scenarios and historical case studies. 
As a newly developed tool, BANE has room for future contributions from computer 
science, engineering, and social scientists.  
VII.A. Bayesian and ABM Justification for Nuclear Nonproliferation 
The Bayesian and ABM methods are beneficial for BANE providing 
nonproliferation assessments. Bayesian inference has been employed in fields where 
information limits are ever present, such as intelligence. Correlating incomplete 
evidence for pattern recognition in BANE using Bayesian inference draws upon 
technical supply side proliferation linkages grounded in physics. Demand driven 
motivations for nuclear proliferation vary. Potential or current proliferator security, 
economic trajectory, or other factors modify the willingness to undertake proliferation 
steps. With Bayesian inference, the coupled demand and supply proliferation drivers are 
connected to create feedback interactions. 
Nuclear proliferation does not occur in a vacuum. BANE‟s ABM capabilities 
address the interplay between entities pushing or pulling them towards undertaking 
nuclear weapons programs. The impact of a few key outside actors can cause major 
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alterations in the robustness and effectiveness of proliferation. Understanding the 
multiplication factor of external support during critical proliferation phases is a BANE 
ABM derived advantage. The BANE ABM and MAS oriented ecosystem creates the 
framework for learning lessons about relative proliferation enabler, interference, and 
deterrent posture benefits. 
A major drawback to contemporary nuclear proliferation tailored methodologies 
is their static nature. Barrier nuclear proliferation codes emphasize proliferation 
thresholds, often on the nuclear material side. For purely SNM characterization of a 
small subset of the proliferation supply problem, the Barrier methods are beneficial. 
Static Pathway methods are highly constrained for handling intelligent proliferators or 
restricted counter proliferation efforts. The Pathway code routes are generally setup 
before the simulation; and, to test system perturbations additional parameters must be 
adjusted prior to the next run. 
From a technical perspective, dynamic nuclear engineering programs are more 
prevalent. The Cyclus code family forms a very dynamic nuclear fuel cycle simulator 
with well designed and implemented physics and engineering underpinnings. BANE is a 
dynamic Bayesian and ABM based code geared towards flexible nuclear proliferation 
assessments. The social science demand drivers and supply side enablers of nuclear 
proliferation are integral to BANE. 
VII.B. BANE Modularity Benefits 
The modular BANE nature offers multiple benefits for a nuclear nonproliferation 
enterprise. Nuclear proliferation is multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional. Engineers 
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from nuclear, chemical, electrical, and others along with physicist, business executives, 
senior military officers, political leaders and many other field are involved. Building 
BANE modules and sub-modules addresses the unique skillsets of the various fields 
associated with proliferation. 
The Netica GUI and API Parser module categories are the broadest, and 
encompasses policy and technical sectors. A Netica GUI and API Parser delineation is 
overall the demand side areas of nuclear weapon arsenal type, size, and delivery are 
policy and military factors. Supply side Netica GUI and API Parser modules are 
technically oriented around determining the best nuclear weapon acquisition pathways. 
Boundary blurring is toughest for the Netica GUI and API Parser modules, as they are 
dominant in any BANE simulation. 
The SQL data management system makes agent information accessible to other 
BANE modules. SQL database tables are agent searchable and manipulated to allow 
dynamic adjustment to proliferation preferences. Optimization within BANE includes 
additional fields associated with resources and proliferation detection. The 
preponderance of proliferation resource management decisions stem from politicians and 
military officers, with wide variations in business executive and senior technical 
researcher input. Detection capabilities are driven by a range of physics, engineering, 
and social science inputs that define counter proliferation prowess. 
Maintaining BANE authenticity drove the uncertainty modules. No proliferation 
or counter proliferation entity can 100% predict proliferation progress. A major BANE 
motivation is handling the true nature of random proliferation advancements and 
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setbacks. The BANE uncertainty modules can be included multiple ways to evaluate 
proliferation enterprises. 
The affinity and influence modules are the bedrock of social science relationship 
development in BANE. Friendships, business connections, military liaisons, political 
confidence building all interact in proliferation decision making. Connections and 
affiliations in turn define technology transfers, dual use and export control cooperation, 
etc. BANE captures the social sciences contribution integral for a reliable proliferation 
assessment methodology. 
Omniscience and monitoring modules incorporate challenges that appear 
unevenly along proliferation pathways. In BANE, the role of defensive entity power and 
competency can change proliferation political and technical calculus. Decision makers 
can be informed regarding the challenges of preventing and rolling back proliferation 
based on their actions. With a modular BANE framework, the omniscience and 
monitoring aspects can also be continually updated to match counter proliferation 
perspectives. Depending upon the user, the development of supplementary omniscience 
and monitoring modules added when pertinent for BANE upgrades is available. 
VII.C. BANE Verification and Limited Validation Testing 
Performing BANE verification testing on single and multiple module groupings 
built confidence in the code sections. The confidence in BANE module verifications 
forges trust when running the integrated code. Chapter 4 covers several single module, 
and some multi-module, BANE agent empowerment and subsequent verification testing. 
Shrewd agent technical success selection using entropy showcases BANE advanced 
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information theory and ML employment. Generalized, multi-module empowerment 
exercises were demonstrated in Chapter 5. Agents were dynamically, and unexpectedly, 
confronted with proliferation challenges and opportunities requiring logical responses 
via multiple modules. 
Historical proliferation case studies examined with BANE in Chapter 5 provide 
verification and limited validation. The French, South African, Iraqi, and Swedish cases 
explored successful and pursued nuclear weapons programs with different BANE 
modules involved. Running BANE calling modules as needed verified the agents were 
operating as expected. The limited validation stems from BANE matching historical 
proliferation trends when a large data quantity is available to inform agent choices. 
Realistically, the detailed information level with apparent connections is normally absent 
for ongoing proliferation activities.  
There are only a handful of successful proliferation cases. Maybe another dozen 
to two dozen exist depending upon the definition of significant proliferation attempts. As 
noted in Chapters 5 and 6, genuine BANE validation would require tens of case studies 
across different proliferation sectors. In some areas, such as export control and dual use 
violations, getting enough cases for validation is feasible. However, for most 
proliferation sectors deference to comments by Alexander Montgomery and Scott Sagan 
regarding proliferation prediction fidelity limitations ring true.
179
 
VII.D. BANE Case Study Proliferation Indicators 
There are an array of policy, economic, technical and other limitations and 
constraints that prevent proliferators from achieving their nuclear program goals. The 
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Chapter 6 BANE case studies provide proliferation indicators that can suggest key points 
for decision making. With BANE, the proliferating agents can use Bayesian analysis to 
adaptively make intelligent choices to overcome pathway barriers. Learning behavior 
and the ability to backtrack on proliferation pathways are signs of successful agent 
emulation of actual human behavior.  
The proliferation indicators from overconfident proliferating agents are part of 
BANE. Consciously introducing the potential for proliferating agent imperfections in 
BANE strengthens the nonproliferation enterprise realism. Social science specifies that 
individual and collective human choices are affected by “perceptions” of their 
surroundings. If the perceptions are erroneous then the choices made can be less than 
optimal. Therefore, BANE assessments are better by accounting for flawed agent 
decisions. 
BANE highlights the effects of different types of proliferation activities on 
successful nuclear weapon acquisition. From an information denial standpoint, defensive 
agents operate without omniscience. Imperfect data prevents tailored nonproliferation 
responses in areas such as export controls or counter intelligence. Policy makers 
directing counter proliferation programs can witness how their funding selection or 
operational postures differentially hinder a variety of proliferation routes.  
VII.E. Future Work 
The structure of BANE was built with nuclear proliferation analysis at the center. 
As a new tool there is a wide array of opportunities for BANE expansion. Breaking the 
agent parameters down into more sections to increase agent diversity is one avenue for 
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future work. Computationally, including parallel HPC to BANE would open up new 
areas for proliferation network relationships from policy, technical, and agent interaction 
standpoints. The data management system using SQL could undergo shifting to another 
data storage paradigm. Taking BANE beyond just nuclear proliferation could reveal 
proliferation pathway selection considering multiple weapons of mass effect and 
conventional weapon routes. 
VII.E.1. Optimization and Agent Attribute Improvements  
BANE facilitates agents optimizing technical choices for proliferation while 
factoring in resource and detection probabilities over time. There are several areas that 
could be examined and expanded to improve intelligent agent decision making. The 
resource category could be broken up into economic, industrial, technological, human 
capital, and possibly other sectors. The detection probability could be decomposed into 
specific aspects of environmental, electronic / cyber, and imagery proliferation 
information collection for instance. 
Increasing the granularity on agent parameters will aid BANE simulation 
scenario accuracy. Tailoring agent factors better approximate real world nuclear 
proliferation situations of interest. Previous nonproliferation work considered databases 
and correlations that suggested proliferation.
180
 With BANE existing information 
sources on entity characteristics both inside and outside traditional nonproliferation 
literature would be ideal. Table 7-I indicates a fraction of the sources potentially useful 
for upgrading BANE agent resource attributes. 
 
  216   
 
Table 7-I. Subset of potential data sources for updating BANE agent parameters 
 
 
Some of the databases in Table 7-I are widely distributed and accessible. If 
possible the other data sets could be obtained, otherwise substitute information resources 
could be employed. Enhancing BANE agent fidelity in the detection areas could come 
from a variety of input venues. For instance, outlines for IAEA open source analysis 
strategies and objectives are available.
181
  
Several of the databases in Table 7-I hold potential for improving BANE agent 
affinity modules. Incorporating broader trade records might enable improved analysis of 
neutral supplier interactions with potential proliferators. Furthermore, technology and 
corporate acquisitions can serve as proliferation front and shell companies. 
Understanding the nature of dispersed, targeted intellectual property and equipment 
supporting proliferation is easier with BANE. The Bayesian inference and entropy 
relationship assessment in BANE is useful pattern recognition foundation. 
 
Economic Industrial Trade Technology Social / Treaties
United States 
Patent and Trade 
Office
United Nations (UN) 
Industrial Development 
Scoreboard
Foreign Direct 
Investment
World Economic Forum 
Technology Index
Nuclear Weapon 
Treaties
European Patent 
Office
Electricity Production
Nuclear 
Cooperation 
Agreements
UN Development 
Programme Techology 
Achievement Index
Military Security 
Agreements
Gross Domestic 
Product
Steel Production
RAND Science and 
Technology Capacity 
Index
Uranium Mine 
Production
Industrial Growth 
Potential
Power Reactor Capacity
Research Reactor 
Capacity
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VII.E.2. BANE Parallel and High Performance Computing 
Growing the number of BANE agents in simulations has considerable 
proliferation assessment value. In BANE, each agent performs a number of complexly 
integrated calculations to determine future choices. Decomposing the resource and 
detection probability categories in BANE will intensify optimization calculations. 
Upgrading BANE parallel and HPC architecture will decrease the computational cost of 
agents requiring extra decision making. 
Forecasting proliferation will need to recognize the increasing global 
interdependence and technology diffusion. There are significant number of government, 
corporate, and individuals involved in international and domestic commerce. Entities 
with proliferation technical expertise comprise a tiny subset of those conducting 
appropriate business and relationships. Taking advantage of multi-core processing will 
enable BANE to handle scaling agent sizes. The neutral supplier agents involved in 
BANE simulations could be expanded with greater computer resources to manage them. 
A BANE version with parallel HPC architecture could readily undertake fully 
stochastic uncertainty simulations. Propagating uncertainty aggregation with large 
numbers of agents making thousands of decisions over hundreds of time steps is 
computationally challenging. Repeating the same BANE simulation stochastically 
hundreds or thousands of times could uncover policy and technical configurations 
favoring proliferation. 
BANE is designed for computers with Windows operating systems. Taking 
BANE even partially into the open source arena may require a rethinking of Windows 
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only compatibility. Locating open source programming library replacements, such as 
Boost C++, is worth exploring for BANE. A hybrid open system might be possible with 
BANE. The Netica API-C library works for UNIX. For BANE demonstration purposes 
in open source environments, providing a key for running Netica might be an option. 
VII.E.3. Consider HDF5 for Supplementing SQL Data Management 
SQL is the cornerstone of BANE data management. Each BANE agent possesses 
unique parameters that must be cataloged. Currently, SQL database operation in BANE 
is an appropriate mechanism for cataloging agent and proliferation figures. There are no 
information processing barriers with SQL databases running BANE on multiple 
Windows machines.  
In the future, Hierarchical Data Format (HDF) might be a data storage method to 
consider. HDF version 5 (HDF5) is becoming more widely used in the scientific 
computing community for large scale data management. The HDF5 structure basis is 
hierarchical data objects versus the relational nature of SQL database tables.
182
 As the 
complexity of SQL databases table information grows HDF5 will potentially offer faster 
accessibility and data manipulation. 
Another advantage of HDF5 is the ease of exchanging data object datasets. 
Developers working on BANE with HDF5 would not need an intermediary program for 
moving SQL tables. The HDF5 datasets can easily handle user defined variable types. 
Combining data types has advantage for information placed in data storage. 
From a cautionary standpoint, HDF5 is designed for open source software usage. 
There are ways to use pre-compiled HDF5 files with Visual Studio. The pre-compiled 
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HDF5 might not offer the same level of benefit for transitioning BANE from SQL. 
Redesigning the manner that BANE uses data storage from SQL databases to HDF5 
datasets might shift the future implementation of HDF5. 
VII.E.4. BANE Evolution into Weapons of Mass Effect Simulator 
States balance pursuing Weapons of Mass Effect (WME) against conventional 
weapon acquisitions to further their national interests. WME includes the traditional 
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons along with newer, advanced cyber weapons. 
Conventional weapons are generally easier to obtain than WME. Incremental 
adjustments in conventional air, land, or sea based weapons might not redress 
conventional weapon asymmetries. However, for a state the deterrence value of 
deployable WME relative to conventional weapons can justify the WME resource 
commitment.  
Economic, technical, and outside non-detection constraints force states to prefer 
different WME pathways. Pursuing WME requires significant resource allocations away 
from other economic and security sectors. Knowledge and infrastructure thresholds in 
key areas must be reached depending upon the specific WME for successful 
proliferation. Counter WME defensive organizations dynamically attempt to thwart 
WME outside assistance and indigenous development.  
Realistically, no two WME proliferators or defensive entities are exactly 
identical; and, ABM is a computational methodology addressing the uniqueness of those 
facilitating or preventing WME spread. Coupling ABM with Bayesian analysis is 
powerful from an omniscience limitation perspective. Bayesian analysis supports linking 
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crucial knowledge and technology requirements into relationship networks for each 
WME sector. With a Bayesian network gaining information on proliferator actions in 
one WME field informs counter WME agents where to expend limited WME impeding 
capabilities.  
Exploring BANE‟s modularity for expansion to analyze WME proliferation 
beyond just nuclear threats, and relative to conventional weapon selection, is a future 
work avenue. Expanding BANE to consider WME and conventional weapon options 
will increase policy maker understandings about the trade-offs states make in securing 
their national interests. Figure 7-1 describes a possible arrangement for a WME 
proliferation framework. 
 
 
 Figure 7-1. BANE arrangement for weapons of mass effect 
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An important facet of Figure 7-1 is the Enhanced Conventional sector.  The 
Enhanced Conventional arena encompasses major evolutionary upgrades along with 
incremental increases in conventional weapons approaches. Evolutionary upgrades are 
new classes of weapons such as the historical introduction of wide spread precision 
guided munitions (PGMs). A small aerial force equipped with PGMs can devastate an 
entire armored division or industrial complex. Prior to PGMs the destruction assurance 
would require an entire air wing of hundreds of planes. 
Incremental conventional weapons would allow analysis of qualitative and 
quantitative trade-offs for military forces. Assessing the cost, and risk of failure, for new 
weapon system types versus adding more slightly updated current generation weapons. 
Non-state agents could incrementally increase the capabilities and deployment rates of 
their improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A limited financial resource and technical 
base typically will push non-state actors toward conventional weapon preferences.  
Following the BANE paradigm, failure to obtain a pursued weapon category 
precludes its utilization. However, acquiring the desired weapon does not indicate it will 
immediately be deployed. The presence of a WME may bring a valuable deterrent or 
prestige benefit. Improved conventional weapons can be stockpiled until a political or 
security situation justifies their usage. 
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